A game-theoretic analysis of rank-order mechanisms for user-generated content

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 154, Issue , 2014, Pages 349-374

  Ghosh, Arpita ^a   Hummel, Patrick ^b  

^a Cornell University ^*  (United States)

^b GOOGLE INC   (United States)

Author keywords

Attention economics; Game theory; Rank order mechanisms; User generated content

Indexed keywords

EID: 84923043111     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.009     Document Type: Article

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