Crowdsourcing with endogenous entry

WWW'12 - Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference on World Wide Web

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 999-1008

  Ghosh, Arpita ^a   Mcafee, Preston ^a  

^a YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

Contest design; Crowdsourcing; Game theory; Mechanism design; Social computing; User generated content (UGC)

Indexed keywords

CROWDSOURCING; ENDOGENOUS ENTRY; EQUILIBRIUM DISTRIBUTIONS; EXPECTED VALUES; FREE ENTRY; HIGH QUALITY; MECHANISM DESIGN; OPTIMAL MECHANISM; QUALITY CHOICE; QUALITY CONTENT; SOCIAL COMPUTING; STRATEGIC CHOICE; USER-GENERATED CONTENT; WINNER TAKE ALLS;

GAME THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN;

WORLD WIDE WEB;

EID: 84860868169     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2187836.2187970     Document Type: Conference Paper

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