Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy

Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-304

  Leiter, Brian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

Contemporary Jurisprudence; Critical Legal Studies; Legal Positivism; Legal Realism; Methodology Debate; Morality; Objectivity of Law; Philosophical Naturalists; Reinterpretation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922780975     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199206490.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (527)

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80. Cf. John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
81. Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
82. Jacques Bouveresse, Wittgenstein Reads Freud: The Myth of the Unconscious, trans. C. Cosman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
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86. Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's "Beingand Time," Division I (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991).
87. Leiter, "Nietzsche and the Morality Critics," Ethics 107 (1997): 250-85.
88. Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
89. Wil Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1994).
90. Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, "Legal Positivism," in D.M. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
91. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (n. 6 above), p. vi.
92. W.E. Rumble, American Legal Realism: Skepticism, Reform, and the Judicial Process (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968).
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99. Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
100. W.W. Fisher et al. (eds.), American Legal Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), a volume which views Realism through a C.L.S. lens.
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103. Leiter, "Legal Indeterminacy," Legal Theory 1 (1995): 481-92.
104. Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, "Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 142 (1993): 568-72.
105. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 104-19.)
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126. E.g., P. Pettit, "Realism and Response-Dependence," Mind 100 (1991) 587-626.
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135. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
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137. Brink, "Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation and Judicial Review," Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (1988) 105-48.
138. Brink, "Legal Interpretation, Objectivity, and Morality," in Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law and Morals (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001)).
139. Stavropoulos, Objectivity in Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) pp. 17-34, 53-76.
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141. K. Greenawalt, Law and Objectivity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) for a wide-ranging survey, though one that is a bit thin in its treatment of the philosophical issues.
142. B. Leiter, "Legal Indeterminancy," Legal Theory 1 (1995) 481-92.
143. M. Moore, "A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation," Southern California Law Review 58 (1985) 277-398.
144. D. Brink (1988, 2001) (n. 16 above).
145. J.L. Coleman, "Truth and Objectivity in Law," Legal Theory 1 (1995) 33-68.
146. J.L. Coleman and B. Leiter, "Determinancy, Objectivity and Authority," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 142 (1993) 549-637.
147. A. Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
148. M. Moore (1985) (n. 24 above).
149. M. Moore, "Law as a Functional Kind," in R. George (ed.), Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
150. N. Stavropoulos (n. 16 above).
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153. A version of this point was first made by S. Munzer, "Realistic Limits on Realist Interpretation," Southern California Law Review 58 (1985) 459-75, in criticizing M. Moore (n. 24 above).
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156. J. McDowell, "Projection and Truth in Ethics," in S. Darwall et al (eds.) Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
157. T. Nagel, The LastWord (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
158. H. Putnam, "Replies to Brian Leiter and Jules Coleman," Legal Theory 1 (1995) 69-80.
159. Ronald Dworkin notes that, "Students are taught that the second rival to positivism [after Natural Law Theory] is the school of legal realism." Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 36.
160. Theodore Benditt, Law as Rule and Principle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), p. 61.
161. Harold J. Berman, "Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History," California Law Review 76 (1988): 779-801, 781 (Realism is "at the opposite pole of positivist jurisprudence").
162. Edgar Bodenheimer, "Analytical Positivism, Legal Realism, and the Future of Legal Method," Virginia Law Review 44 (1958): 365-78, 365.
163. Alan Mabe, "An Appraisal of Dworkin's Systematic Legal Theory," Florida StateLawReview 15 (1987): 587-606, 588.
164. Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jules L. Coleman, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence, rev. ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1990), p. 33.
165. Anthony Sebok, "Misunderstanding Positivism," Michigan Law Review 93 (1995): 2054-132, 2094 ("Legal realism and legal positivism were, in fact, deeply antag onistic theories.")
166. Michael S. Moore, "The Need for aTheory of Legal Theories," Cornell Law Review 69 (1984): 988-1013, 1013.
167. Leslie Green, "The Concept of Law Revisited," Michigan Law Review 94 (1996): 1687-717.
168. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
169. Andrew Altman, "Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin," Philosophy & Public Affairs 15 (1986): 205-35.
170. Gary Peller, "The Metaphysics of American Law," California Law Review 73 (1985): 1151-290.
171. J. William Singer, "Legal Realism Now," California Law Review 76 (1988): 465-544.
172. Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law: 1870-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
173. Edwin W. Patterson, Jurisprudence: Men and Ideas of the Law (Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1953), p. 541.
174. L.A. Powe, Jr., "Justice Douglas After Fifty Years: The First Amendment, McCarthyism and Rights," Constitutional Commentary 6 (1989): 267-87, 271.
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176. W.V.O. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 82.
177. Jaegwon Kim, "What is 'Naturalized Epistemology'?" Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 381-405, 388.
178. Underhill Moore & Charles Callahan, "Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control," Yale Law Journal 53 (1943): 1-136, 1.
179. Brian Leiter, "Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence," in Analyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory, ed. B. Bix (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
180. Richard Foley, "Quine and Naturalized Epistemology," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994): 243-60.
181. Kim, "What is 'Naturalized' Epistemology" (n. 21 above).
182. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 19-21.
183. Leiter, "Legal Indeterminacy," Legal Theory 1 (1995): 481-92.
184. Brian Leiter, "Realism, Hard Positivism, and Conceptual Analysis," Legal Theory 4 (1998): 533-47.
185. Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, "Legal Positivism," inA Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, p. 241.
186. Jules L. Coleman, "Negative and Positive Positivism," reprinted in Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence, ed. M. Cohen (London: Duckworth, 1983), p. 29
187. Raz, "Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law" (n. 30 above), p. 37.
188. P. Bulloch and J. Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
189. W.J. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
190. Cf. Stephen R. Perry, "The Varieties of Legal Positivism," Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 9 (1996): 361-81.
191. Joseph Raz, "Authority, Law and Morality," The Monist 68 (1985): 295-324.
192. Felix Cohen, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach," Columbia Law Review 35 (1935): 809-49.
193. "Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin" (n. 4 above), p. 212 n. 18.
194. O.W. Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law," Harvard Law Review 10 (1897): 457-78, 457.
195. Michael S. Moore, Educating Oneself in Public: Critical Essays in Jurisprudence (New York:Oxford University Press, 2000).
196. Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York: Oceana, 1930), p. 3.
197. "The Path of the Law," (n. 44 above) p. 467.
198. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (n. 45 above), pp. 72-5.
199. Max Radin, "Statutory Interpretation," Harvard Law Review 43 (1930): 863-85.
200. Karl Llewellyn, "Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules and Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed," Vanderbilt Law Review 3 (1950): 395-406.
201. The Bramble Bush (n. 45 above), p. 13.
202. David O. Brink, "Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review," Philosophy & Public Affairs 17 (1988): 105-48.
203. Brink, "Legal Interpretation, Objectivity, and Morality," in Leiter (ed.), Objectivity in Law andMorals (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
204. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (n. 43 above), pp, 108-10.
205. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (n. 45 above), p. 80.
206. The Common Law Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), pp. 122-4.
207. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., "The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial Decision," Cornell Law Quarterly 14 (1929): 274-88, 285.
208. Karl Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound," Harvard Law Review 44 (1931): 1222-64, 1239.
209. Max Radin, "In Defense of an Unsystematic Science of Law," Yale Law Journal 51 (1942): 1269-79, 1271.
210. Karl Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step," Columbia Law Review 30 (1930): 431-65, 444.
211. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (New York: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1993).
212. Frank B. Cross, "Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance," Northwestern University Law Review 92 (1997): 251-326.
213. H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals," Harvard Law Review 71 (1958): 593-629, 606.
214. Joseph Raz, "Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law," in The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 37-52.
215. Joseph Raz, "Authority, Law and Morality," The Monist 68 (1985): 295-324.
216. Jules Coleman, "Negative and Positive Positivism," reprinted in Marshall Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence, (London:Duckworth, 1983), 28-48.
217. Jules Coleman, "Incorporationism, Conventionality and the Practical Difference Thesis," Legal Theory 4 (1998): 381-425.
218. David Lyons, "Principles, Positivism and Legal Theory," Yale Law Journal 87 (1977): 415-35.
219. E. Philip Soper, "Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute," Michigan Law Review 75 (1977): 473-519.
220. W.J. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
221. H.L.A. Hart, "Postscript," in The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
222. Leslie Green, "The Concept of Law Revisited," Michigan Law Review 94 (1996): 1705-07.
223. Brian Leiter, "Legal Indeterminacy," Legal Theory 1 (1995), 481-92.
224. Leiter, "Legal Realism" (n. 1 above), pp. 268-69.
225. Brian Bix, "Conceptual Questions and Jurisprudence," Legal Theory 1 (1995): 470-5.
226. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 347.
227. "Realism, Hard Positivism, and Conceptual Analysis," Legal Theory 4 (1998) 542-43.
228. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (n. 4 above), 136.
229. Stephen R. Perry, "Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987): 223.
230. Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (n. 4 above), 137.
231. Stephen R. Perry, "Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory," in A. Marmor (ed.), Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 97-135.
232. Stephen R. Perry, "The Varieties of Legal Positivism," Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 9 (1996): 361-81.
233. Frank B. Cross, "Political Science and the New Legal Realism:A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance", Northwestern University Law Review 92 (1997), 251-325.
234. Jerry Fodor's defense of the reality of the attitudes in Psychosemantics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), Ch. 1.
235. Richard Boyd, "Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology," in PSA 1980, Volume2, ed. P. Asquith & R. Giere (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1982).
236. Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).
237. Nicholas Sturgeon, "Moral Explanations," reprinted in Essays on Moral Realism, ed. G. Sayre-McCord (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
238. Gilbert Harman, "Moral Explanations of Natural Facts-Can Moral Claims Be Tested Against Moral Reality?" Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (Supp. 1986): 57-68.
239. Nicholas Sturgeon, "Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts," Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (Supp. 1986): 69-78.
240. David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 187 ff.
241. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence," in Essays on Moral Realism (n. 3 above), pp. 272-4.
242. Arthur Fine, "The Natural Ontological Attitude," in Scientific Realism, ed. J. Leplin (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1984), pp. 84-91.
243. Bas van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 142-9.
244. Paul Thagard, "The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice," Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978): 76-92.
245. Leiter, "The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche," in Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator, ed. C. Janaway (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), esp. pp. 230-5.
246. Leiter, "One Health, One Earth, One Sun: Nietzsche's Respect for Natural Science," Times Literary Supplement (Oct. 2, 1998), pp. 30-1.
247. Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality (London: Routledge, 2002).
248. Adolf Grünbaum, The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
249. Arthur Fine and Mickey Forbes, "Grünbaum on Freud: Three Grounds for Dissent," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1986): 237-8.
250. Jim Hopkins, "Epistemology and Depth Psychology: Critical Notes on The Foundations of Psychoanalysis," in Mind, Psychoanalysis and Science, ed. P. Clark & C. Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988).
251. David Sachs, "In Fairness to Freud: A Critical Notice of The Foundations of Psychoanalysis by Adolf Grünbaum," Philosophical Review 98 (1989): 349-78.
252. Richard Wollheim, "Desire, Belief, and Professor Grünbaum's Freud," in The Mind and Its Depths (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
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254. John Deigh, "Remarks on Some Difficulties in Freud's Theory of Moral Development," reprinted in The Sources of Moral Agency (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 66.
255. John Deigh, "Freud, Naturalism, and Modern Moral Philosophy," reprinted in The Sources of Moral Agency, p. 127.
256. Simon Blackburn, "How To Be an Ethical Antirealist," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1988): 361-76.
257. Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings:A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).
258. Gilbert Harman, "Explaining Value," Social Philosophy & Policy 11 (1994): 229-48, esp. at pp. 238-9.
259. Nicholas L. Sturgeon "Critical Study" of Gibbard in Noûs 29 (1995): 402-24, esp. at pp. 415-18.
260. Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: Murray, 1871), p. 166.
261. Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).
262. John Maynard Smith, Nature 393 (1998): 639-40.
263. Richard C. Lewontin, The New York Review of Books 45 (October 22, 1998): 59-63.
264. W.D. Hamilton, "The Evolution of Altruistic Behavior," American Naturalist 97 (1963): 354-6.
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267. W.D. Hamilton, Narrow Roads of Gene Land (Oxford: W.H. Freeman, 1996).
268. E.g., Sayre-McCord, "Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence" David Copp, "Explanation and Justification in Ethics," Ethics 100 (1990): 237-58.
269. Peter Railton, "Naturalism and Prescriptivity," in Foundations of Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. E.F. Paul et al. (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1990).
270. "Moral Realism" (n. 9 above), p. 205.
271. The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 144.
272. Sigrún Svavarsdóttir, "Objective Values: Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?" in Objectivity in Law and Morals, ed. B. Leiter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
273. Ronald Dworkin, "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It," Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996): 87-139.
274. Paul Boghossian & J. David Velleman, "Colour as a Secondary Quality," Mind 98 (1989): p. 97.
275. "Physicalist Theories of Color," Philosophical Review 100 (1991): 67-106.
276. John Mackie, "The Third Theory of Law," reprinted in Marshall Cohen (ed.), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (London: Duckworth, 1983), p. 165.
277. Dworkin, "Can Rights Be Controversial?" in Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).
278. "Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?"
279. MP1 "On Interpretation and Objectivity,"
280. MP2 A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).
281. Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), 78-86.
282. "Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality," in M. Brint & W. Weaver (eds.), Pragmatism in Law and Society (Boulder: Westview, 1991).
283. "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It," Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996): 87-139 [cited hereafter as OT].
284. Michael S. Moore, "Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Legal Theory," Southern California Law Review 60 (1987): 453-506.
285. Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
286. Hilary Putnam, "Are Moral and Legal Values Made or Discovered?" and "Replies to Brian Leiter and Jules Coleman," Legal Theory 1 (1995): 5-19, 69-80.
287. "Legal Indeterminacy," Legal Theory 1 (1995): 481-92.
288. "Legal Realism," in D. M. Patterson (ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
289. Roger Gibson, "Willard van Orman Quine," in J. Kim & E. Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 427.
290. Peter Hylton, "Quine's Naturalism," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994): 261-82.
291. W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), pp. 24-5.
292. W. V. O. Quine, "Comments on Lauener," in R. Barrett & R. Gibson (eds.), Perspectives on Quine (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 229.
293. "Science is self-conscious common sense." Word and Object (n. 15 above), p. 3.
294. W. V. O. Quine, "The Scope and Language of Science," in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 233.
295. Word and Object (n. 15 above), p. 22.
296. W. V. O. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 21.
297. Nicholas L. Sturgeon, "What Difference Does It Make Whether Moral Realism Is True?," in N. Gillespie (ed.), Moral Realism: Proceedings of the 1985 Spindel Conference, Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 Supp. (1986): 115-71.
298. Jeremy Waldron, "The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity," in R. George (ed.), Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
299. Brian Leiter, "Tort Theory and the Objectivity of Corrective Justice," Arizona Law Review 37 (1995): 45-51, p. 48.
300. Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 10 ff.
301. Peter Railton, "What the Noncognitivist Helps Us to See, the Naturalist Must Help Us to Explain," in J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation and Projection (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
302. John McDowell, "Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding," in H. Parret & J. Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and Understanding (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981).
303. "Non- Cognivitism and Rule-Following," in S. Holtzman & C. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (London: Routledge, 1981).
304. "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule," Synthese 58 (1984): 325-63.
305. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Mind 95 (1986): 377-86.
306. "In Defence of Modesty," in B. Taylor (ed.), Michael Dummett:Contributions to Philosophy (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff, 1987).
307. "Projection and Truth in Ethics," Lindley Lecture, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas (1988)
308. McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
309. "Objectivity and the Problems of Jurisprudence," Texas Law Review 72 (1993): 187-209, esp. pp. 190-6.
310. Crispin Wright, Introduction, in Realism, Meaning and Truth (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 245.
311. W. Kaufmann (ed.), The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking, 1954).
312. Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1982).
313. Philip Pettit, "Realism and Response- Dependence," Mind 100 (1991): 587-626.
314. Pettit, "Embracing Objectivity in Ethics" (n. 23 above).
315. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
316. Mark Johnston, "Dispositional Theories of Value," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 62 (1989): 139-74.
317. Crispin Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).
318. Mind and World, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994) pp. 77-86.
319. John McDowell, "Two Sorts of Naturalism," in R. Hursthouse et al. (eds.), Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
320. Crispin Wright's review, "Human Nature?" European Journal of Philosophy 5 (1996): 235-54.
321. C. C. W. Taylor, "Politics," in J. Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 255.
322. "Morality in the Pejorative Sense: On the Logic of Nietzsche's Critique of Morality," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 3 (1995): 113-45.
323. Leiter, "Nietzsche and the Morality Critics," Ethics 107 (1997): 250-85.
324. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, ed. & trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966), Section 257.
325. Samuel Scheffler, "Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues," Mind 94 (1985): 409-19.
326. P. F. Strawson, "Ethical Intuitionism," Philosophy 24 (1949): 23-33.
327. W.V.O. Quine, "Things and Their Place in Theories," in his Theories and Things (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 21.
328. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1997).
329. Robert Cummins, "Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium," in Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, ed. M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 117-18.
330. Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind (Evantson: Northwestern University Press, 1965).
331. Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind Revisited (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).
332. David W. Rhode & Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision Making (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1976).
333. Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court Policy Making: Explanation and Prediction (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1979).
334. Jeffrey A. Segal, "Predicting Supreme Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962-1981," American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 891-900.
335. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, "Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices," American Political Science Review 83 (1989): 557-65.
336. Tracey George & Lee Epstein, "On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision-Making," American Political Science Review (1992), 323-37.
337. Timothy M. Hagle & Harold J. Spaeth, "The Emergence of a New Ideology: The Business Decisions of the Burger Court," Journal of Politics 54 (1992): 120-34.
338. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1993).
339. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
340. Liam Murphy "Concepts of Law," Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 30 (2005), p. 14.
341. Jules Coleman, The Practice of Principle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 213.
342. Jules Coleman, "Methodology," in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, ed. J. Coleman & S. Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 350.
343. Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), p. 17.
344. Joseph Raz, "Authority, Law and Morality," The Monist 68 (1995), pp. 321-2.
345. Richard W. Miller, Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation andReality in the Natural and Social Sciences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 95.
346. Philip Kitcher, "The Ends of the Sciences," in The Future for Philosophy, ed. B. Leiter (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), esp. p. 215.
347. Liam Murphy, "Concepts of Law," Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 30 (2005): p. 9.
348. Murphy, "The Political Question of the Concept of Law," in Hart's Postscript, ed. J.L. Coleman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
349. Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, & Stephen Stich, "Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions," Philosophical Topics 29 (2001): 429-60.
350. Joshua Knobe, "Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation," Philosophical Psychology 16 (2003): 309-24.
351. Shaun Nichols, "The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts," Mind & Language 19 (2004): 473-502.
352. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), esp. pp. 33-5.
353. Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), pp. 68-9.
354. John Oberdiek and Dennis Patterson, "Moral Evaluation and Conceptual Analysis in Jurisprudential Methodology," in Current Legal Issues: Law and Philosophy, ed. R. Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
355. Hart, The Concept of Law (n. 40 above), p. 14.
356. "H.L.A. Hart and the Methodology of Jurisprudence" (n. 48 above), p. 1001.
357. "H.L.A. Hart and the Methodology of Jurisprudence" (n. 48 above), p. 1001 and n. 87.
358. Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), p. 17.
359. "H.L.A. Hart and the Methodology of Jurisprudence" (n. 48 above), p. 1008.
360. Donald R. Davis, Jr., for example, raises related questions in a very learned piece on "A Realist View of Hindu Law," Ratio Juris 19 (2006): 287-313.
361. Michael S. Moore, Educating Oneself in Public: Critical Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 32-3.
362. Roscoe Pound, "The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence," Harvard Law Review 44 (1931): 697-711.
363. Ben W. Palmer, "Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler," American Bar Association Journal 31 (1945): 569-73.
364. Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York: Oceana, 1930), pp. 74-6.
365. Karl Llewellyn, "Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules and Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed," Vanderbilt Law Review 3 (1950): 395-406.
366. Max Radin, "Statutory Interpretation," Harvard Law Review 43 (1930): 863-85.
367. Karl Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence-the Next Step," Columbia Law Review 30 (1930): p. 444.
368. Karl Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound," Harvard Law Review 44 (1931), p. 1237.
369. Karl Llewellyn, "The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract," Yale Law Journal 47 (1938): 1243-71.
370. "Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory" (n. 27 above), p. 45.
371. Hilary Kornblith, "Introduction: What Is Naturalistic Epistemology?" in Naturalizing Epistemology, 2nd edition, ed. H. Kornblith (Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 1994), p. 4.
372. W.V.O. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 75-6.
373. Jaegwon Kim, "What is 'Naturalized Epistemology,'" in Naturalizing Epistemology (n. 58 above), p. 388.
374. Roger Gibson, "Willard van Orman Quine," in A Companion to Metaphysics, ed. J. Kim & E. Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 427.
375. W.V.O. Quine, "Comment on Lauener," in Perspectives on Quine, ed. R. Barrett & R. Gibson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), p. 229.
376. W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), p. 3.
377. Christopher Hookway, Quine (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 209.
378. TakingRights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 3.
379. "Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of Institutional Values," California Law Review 72 (1984), 202-03.
380. Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 44.
381. Playing by the Rules (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 191.
382. Doing Justice: A Trial Judge at Work (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 64.
383. Richard Posner, Overcoming Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 2-3, 20, 393.
384. Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 186.
385. Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale 1927-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 3, 6.
386. Jerome Frank, "Are Judges Human?: Part One" University of Pennsylvania Law Review 80 (1931), 30 n. 31.
387. Leiter, "Legal Realism," in C.B. Gray (ed.), The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland, 1999).
388. Leiter, "Legal Realism," in D.M. Patterson (ed.), A Companion To Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 261-79.
389. J. William Singer, "Legal Realism Now," California Law Review 76 (1988): 465.
390. Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
391. J.M. Balkin, "Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment," Duke Law Journal (1990), 375-430.
392. William W. Fisher et al. (eds.), American Legal Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
393. Clare Dalton, "An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine," Yale Law Journal 94 (1985): 997-1114.
394. Mark Tushnet, "Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles," Harvard Law Review 96 (1983) 781-827.
395. Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).
396. Duncan Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication," Harvard Law Review 89 (1976): 1685-1778.
397. Girardeau Spann, "Deconstructing the Legislative Veto," Minnesota Law Review 68 (1984) 473-544.
398. Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, "Determinacy, Objectivity and Authority," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 142 (1993): 549-637.
399. Robert Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982).
400. S. Moore, "The Need for aTheory of Legal Theories: Assessing Pragmatic Instrumentalism," Cornell Law Review 69 (1984) 988-1013.
401. William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973).
402. G. Edward White, Patterns of American Legal Thought (Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1978).
403. Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale 1927-1960 (n. 10 above).
404. Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (n. 9 above).
405. John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
406. Herman Oliphant, "A Return to Stare Decisis," American Bar Association Journal 14 (1928): 75.
407. Joseph Hutcheson, Jr., "The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial Decision," CornellLaw Quarterly 14 (1929): 285.
408. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Brentano's, 1930), p. 104.
409. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind at 102-03.
410. Judge Sam Sparks, "Tribute to the Honorable Homer Thornberry," Texas Law Review 74 (1996): 949-50.
411. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (n. 26 above), 33.
412. Llewellyn, "Some Realism About Realism," (n. 19 above) 1243.
413. Cf. Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: DecidingAppeals (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), 122.
414. Max Radin, "The Theory of Judicial Decision: or How Judges Think," American Bar Association Journal (1925), 362.
415. "Are Judges Human? Part Two," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 80 (1931), 242.
416. O. W. Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Harvard Law Review 10 (1897): 461.
417. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (n. 26 above), 4.
418. Underhill Moore, "Rational Basis of Legal Institutions," Columbia Law Review 23 (1923): 609-17.
419. Vank, Law and the Modern Mind (n. 36above), 110-11.
420. Oliphant, "A Return to Stare Decisis" (n. 34 above) 159-60.
421. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (n. 40 above), 122-4.
422. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition (n. 40 above), 45.
423. Radin, "The Theory of Judicial Decision: or How Judges Think" (n. 44 above), 358.
424. Felix Cohen, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach," Columbia Law Review 35 (1935): 846.
425. Daniel Dennett, "Foreword," in Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), ix.
426. Peter Railton, "Naturalism and Prescriptivity," in Ellen Frankel Paul et al. (eds.), Foundations of Moral and Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 156-7.
427. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).
428. Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990).
429. Putnam, "Replies," Legal Theory 1 (1995) 70-2.
430. Philip Pettit, "Naturalism," in Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology (Oxford:Blackwell, 1992), 296-7.
431. Stephen J. Wagner & Richard Warner, "Introduction" in Stephen Wagner and Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A CriticalAppraisal (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 1-3.
432. Philip Kitcher, "The Naturalists Return," Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 53.
433. W.V.O. Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized," in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
434. W.V.O. Quine, "Grades of Theoriticity," in Lawrence Foster and Joe Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970).
435. Jaegwon Kim, "What is 'Naturalized Epistemology?'" Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 385-6.
436. Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 211-54.
437. Stephen P. Stich, "Naturalizing Epistemology: Quine, Simon and the Prospects for Pragmatism," in Christopher Hookway and Donald Peterson (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Royal Institute of Philosophy, Supplement no. 34 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3-5.
438. Kim, "What is 'Naturalized Epistemology?'" (n. 103 above)
439. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (n. 90 above), 2-3.
440. Richard Foley, "Quine and Naturalized Epistemology," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994): 243-60.
441. Jilda M. Aliotta, "Combining Judges' Attributes and Case Characteristics: An Alternative Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking," Judicature 71 (Feb.-Mar. 1988), 277-80.
442. Sheldon Goldman, "Voting Behavior on the United States Court of Appeals Revisited," American Political Science Review 69 (1975): 491-506.
443. Joel Grossman, "Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisionmaking," Harvard Law Review 79 (1966): 1551-64.
444. Stuart Nagel, "Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions," American Political Science Review 55 (1961): 843-50.
445. C. Neal Tate, "Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1975," American Political Science Review 75 (1981): 355-67.
446. Andrew Altman, "Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin," Philosophy & Public Affairs 15 (1986): 205-35.
447. Barry Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London: Routledge, 1974).
448. David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge, 1974).
449. Barry Barnes and David Bloor, "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge," in Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.) Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), 21-47.
450. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (1886), Sec. 5.
451. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (n. 26 above), 70-6.
452. Max Radin, "Statutory Interpretation," Harvard Law Review 43 (1930): 863.
453. Karl Llewellyn, "Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules and Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed," Vanderbilt Law Review 3 (1950): 395-406.
454. Steven D. Smith, "The Pursuit of Pragmatism," Yale Law Journal 100 (1990): 409-49.
455. Steven Walt, "Some Problems of Pragmatic Jurisprudence," Texas Law Review 70 (1991): 317-64.
456. Richard Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990)).
457. Richard Rorty, "The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice," Southern California Law Review 63 (1990): 1811-13.
458. Thomas Grey, "Holmes and Legal Pragmatism," Stanford Law Review 41 (1989): 814.
459. Richard Warner, "Why Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical Theory," University of Illinois Law Review (1993), 539-45.
460. Susan Haack, "Pragmatism," in A Companion to Epistemology, 351-56.
461. Anthony J. Sebok, "Misunderstanding Positivism," Michigan Law Review 93 (1995): 2078-90.
462. H.L.A. Hart, "Analytic Jurisprudence in Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor Bodenheimer," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 105 (1957): 955-6.
463. Vincent A. Wellman, "Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart & Sacks," Arizona Law Review 29 (1987): 413-74.
464. "Positivism, Formalism, Realism," Columbia Law Review 99 (1999), 1138-64.
465. Margaret Jane Radin, "The Pragmatist and the Feminist," Southern California Law Review 63 (1990): 1699-1726.
466. Margaret Jane Radin & Frank Michelman, "Pragmatist and Poststructuralist Critical Legal Practrice," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 139 (1991): 1019-58.
467. Pierre Schlag, "Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law," Texas Law Review 67 (1989): 1195-250.
468. Stanley Fish, "Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence," University of Chicago Law Review 57 (1990): 1447-75.
469. This, in a nutshell, is also the central point of Mark Johnston's important recent paper, "Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism Without Verificationism," in John Haldane and Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation and Projection (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
470. Rudolf Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology," in Leonard Linsky (ed.), Semantics and the Philosophy of Language (Urbana:University of Illinois Press, 1952), 208-28.
471. W.V.O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), 20-46.
472. Paul Thagard, "The Best Explanation: Criteria for Theory Choice," Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978): 79-85.
473. W.V.O. Quine, "The Scope and Language of Science," in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 233.
474. Peter Hylton, "Quine's Naturalism", Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994), 261-82.
475. Dennis Patterson, "Postmodernism/Feminism/Law," Cornell Law Review 77 (1992): 270-9.
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