Nietzsche and the morality critics

Ethics

Volumn 107, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 250-285

  Leiter, Brian ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0040428383     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233720     Document Type: Article

References (145)

1. A very different Nietzsche has engaged thinkers elsewhere, notably on the European continent and in literature departments in the United States. There the key themes have been perspectivism, the primacy of interpretation (and, at the same time, its indeterminacy), and the impossibility of truth. This Nietzsche is well represented by Paul de Man, in Allegories of Reading (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 5 and 6, and by many of the essays in D. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta, 1977); it has received its most sophisticated articulation, however, in Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) , a book which, accordingly, gives only cursory attention to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. The problems with this reading of Nietzsche - which are, I think, many - are discussed in my "Nietzsche and Aestheticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 275-90, and my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. R. Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Compare Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chaps. 1-4. Interestingly, the last explosion of Anglo-American philosophical interest in Nietzsche - roughly, from 1900 until the end of World War I - was also driven by an interest in his ethics (and esp. its connection to evolutionary theory and positivism). See, e.g., Maurice Adams, "The Ethics of Tolstoy and Nietzsche," Ethics 11 (1900): 82-105; Alfred W. Benn, "The Morals of an Immoralist - Friedrich Nietzsche," Ethics 19 (1908-9): 1-23, 192-211; A. K. Rogers, "Nietzsche and Democracy," Philosophical Review 21 (1912): 32-50; William M. Salter, "Nietzsche's Moral Aim," Ethics 25 (1915): 226-51, 372-403; Bertram Laing, "The Metaphysics of Nietzsche's Immoralism," Philosophical Review 24 (1915): 386-418. One may hope that no philosopher today would write, as one dissenter from the Nietzsche revival did then, that "nothing . . . quite so worthless as 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' or 'Beyond Good and Evil' has ever attracted so much attention from serious students of the philosophy of morals" (Herbert Stewart, "Some Criticisms on the Nietzsche Revival," Ethics 19 [1909]: 427-28).
2. A very different Nietzsche has engaged thinkers elsewhere, notably on the European continent and in literature departments in the United States. There the key themes have been perspectivism, the primacy of interpretation (and, at the same time, its indeterminacy), and the impossibility of truth. This Nietzsche is well represented by Paul de Man, in Allegories of Reading (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 5 and 6, and by many of the essays in D. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta, 1977); it has received its most sophisticated articulation, however, in Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) , a book which, accordingly, gives only cursory attention to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. The problems with this reading of Nietzsche - which are, I think, many - are discussed in my "Nietzsche and Aestheticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 275-90, and my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. R. Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Compare Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chaps. 1-4. Interestingly, the last explosion of Anglo-American philosophical interest in Nietzsche - roughly, from 1900 until the end of World War I - was also driven by an interest in his ethics (and esp. its connection to evolutionary theory and positivism). See, e.g., Maurice Adams, "The Ethics of Tolstoy and Nietzsche," Ethics 11 (1900): 82-105; Alfred W. Benn, "The Morals of an Immoralist - Friedrich Nietzsche," Ethics 19 (1908-9): 1-23, 192-211; A. K. Rogers, "Nietzsche and Democracy," Philosophical Review 21 (1912): 32-50; William M. Salter, "Nietzsche's Moral Aim," Ethics 25 (1915): 226-51, 372-403; Bertram Laing, "The Metaphysics of Nietzsche's Immoralism," Philosophical Review 24 (1915): 386-418. One may hope that no philosopher today would write, as one dissenter from the Nietzsche revival did then, that "nothing . . . quite so worthless as 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' or 'Beyond Good and Evil' has ever attracted so much attention from serious students of the philosophy of morals" (Herbert Stewart, "Some Criticisms on the Nietzsche Revival," Ethics 19 [1909]: 427-28).
3. A very different Nietzsche has engaged thinkers elsewhere, notably on the European continent and in literature departments in the United States. There the key themes have been perspectivism, the primacy of interpretation (and, at the same time, its indeterminacy), and the impossibility of truth. This Nietzsche is well represented by Paul de Man, in Allegories of Reading (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 5 and 6, and by many of the essays in D. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta, 1977); it has received its most sophisticated articulation, however, in Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) , a book which, accordingly, gives only cursory attention to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. The problems with this reading of Nietzsche - which are, I think, many - are discussed in my "Nietzsche and Aestheticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 275-90, and my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. R. Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Compare Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chaps. 1-4. Interestingly, the last explosion of Anglo-American philosophical interest in Nietzsche - roughly, from 1900 until the end of World War I - was also driven by an interest in his ethics (and esp. its connection to evolutionary theory and positivism). See, e.g., Maurice Adams, "The Ethics of Tolstoy and Nietzsche," Ethics 11 (1900): 82-105; Alfred W. Benn, "The Morals of an Immoralist - Friedrich Nietzsche," Ethics 19 (1908-9): 1-23, 192-211; A. K. Rogers, "Nietzsche and Democracy," Philosophical Review 21 (1912): 32-50; William M. Salter, "Nietzsche's Moral Aim," Ethics 25 (1915): 226-51, 372-403; Bertram Laing, "The Metaphysics of Nietzsche's Immoralism," Philosophical Review 24 (1915): 386-418. One may hope that no philosopher today would write, as one dissenter from the Nietzsche revival did then, that "nothing . . . quite so worthless as 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' or 'Beyond Good and Evil' has ever attracted so much attention from serious students of the philosophy of morals" (Herbert Stewart, "Some Criticisms on the Nietzsche Revival," Ethics 19 [1909]: 427-28).
4. A very different Nietzsche has engaged thinkers elsewhere, notably on the European continent and in literature departments in the United States. There the key themes have been perspectivism, the primacy of interpretation (and, at the same time, its indeterminacy), and the impossibility of truth. This Nietzsche is well represented by Paul de Man, in Allegories of Reading (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 5 and 6, and by many of the essays in D. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta, 1977); it has received its most sophisticated articulation, however, in Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) , a book which, accordingly, gives only cursory attention to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. The problems with this reading of Nietzsche - which are, I think, many - are discussed in my "Nietzsche and Aestheticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 275-90, and my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. R. Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Compare Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chaps. 1-4. Interestingly, the last explosion of Anglo-American philosophical interest in Nietzsche - roughly, from 1900 until the end of World War I - was also driven by an interest in his ethics (and esp. its connection to evolutionary theory and positivism). See, e.g., Maurice Adams, "The Ethics of Tolstoy and Nietzsche," Ethics 11 (1900): 82-105; Alfred W. Benn, "The Morals of an Immoralist - Friedrich Nietzsche," Ethics 19 (1908-9): 1-23, 192-211; A. K. Rogers, "Nietzsche and Democracy," Philosophical Review 21 (1912): 32-50; William M. Salter, "Nietzsche's Moral Aim," Ethics 25 (1915): 226-51, 372-403; Bertram Laing, "The Metaphysics of Nietzsche's Immoralism," Philosophical Review 24 (1915): 386-418. One may hope that no philosopher today would write, as one dissenter from the Nietzsche revival did then, that "nothing . . . quite so worthless as 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' or 'Beyond Good and Evil' has ever attracted so much attention from serious students of the philosophy of morals" (Herbert Stewart, "Some Criticisms on the Nietzsche Revival," Ethics 19 [1909]: 427-28).
5. A very different Nietzsche has engaged thinkers elsewhere, notably on the European continent and in literature departments in the United States. There the key themes have been perspectivism, the primacy of interpretation (and, at the same time, its indeterminacy), and the impossibility of truth. This Nietzsche is well represented by Paul de Man, in Allegories of Reading (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 5 and 6, and by many of the essays in D. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta, 1977); it has received its most sophisticated articulation, however, in Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) , a book which, accordingly, gives only cursory attention to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. The problems with this reading of Nietzsche - which are, I think, many - are discussed in my "Nietzsche and Aestheticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 275-90, and my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. R. Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Compare Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chaps. 1-4. Interestingly, the last explosion of Anglo-American philosophical interest in Nietzsche - roughly, from 1900 until the end of World War I - was also driven by an interest in his ethics (and esp. its connection to evolutionary theory and positivism). See, e.g., Maurice Adams, "The Ethics of Tolstoy and Nietzsche," Ethics 11 (1900): 82-105; Alfred W. Benn, "The Morals of an Immoralist - Friedrich Nietzsche," Ethics 19 (1908-9): 1-23, 192-211; A. K. Rogers, "Nietzsche and Democracy," Philosophical Review 21 (1912): 32-50; William M. Salter, "Nietzsche's Moral Aim," Ethics 25 (1915): 226-51, 372-403; Bertram Laing, "The Metaphysics of Nietzsche's Immoralism," Philosophical Review 24 (1915): 386-418. One may hope that no philosopher today would write, as one dissenter from the Nietzsche revival did then, that "nothing . . . quite so worthless as 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' or 'Beyond Good and Evil' has ever attracted so much attention from serious students of the philosophy of morals" (Herbert Stewart, "Some Criticisms on the Nietzsche Revival," Ethics 19 [1909]: 427-28).
6. A very different Nietzsche has engaged thinkers elsewhere, notably on the European continent and in literature departments in the United States. There the key themes have been perspectivism, the primacy of interpretation (and, at the same time, its indeterminacy), and the impossibility of truth. This Nietzsche is well represented by Paul de Man, in Allegories of Reading (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 5 and 6, and by many of the essays in D. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta, 1977); it has received its most sophisticated articulation, however, in Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) , a book which, accordingly, gives only cursory attention to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. The problems with this reading of Nietzsche - which are, I think, many - are discussed in my "Nietzsche and Aestheticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 275-90, and my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. R. Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Compare Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chaps. 1-4. Interestingly, the last explosion of Anglo-American philosophical interest in Nietzsche - roughly, from 1900 until the end of World War I - was also driven by an interest in his ethics (and esp. its connection to evolutionary theory and positivism). See, e.g., Maurice Adams, "The Ethics of Tolstoy and Nietzsche," Ethics 11 (1900): 82-105; Alfred W. Benn, "The Morals of an Immoralist - Friedrich Nietzsche," Ethics 19 (1908-9): 1-23, 192-211; A. K. Rogers, "Nietzsche and Democracy," Philosophical Review 21 (1912): 32-50; William M. Salter, "Nietzsche's Moral Aim," Ethics 25 (1915): 226-51, 372-403; Bertram Laing, "The Metaphysics of Nietzsche's Immoralism," Philosophical Review 24 (1915): 386-418. One may hope that no philosopher today would write, as one dissenter from the Nietzsche revival did then, that "nothing . . . quite so worthless as 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' or 'Beyond Good and Evil' has ever attracted so much attention from serious students of the philosophy of morals" (Herbert Stewart, "Some Criticisms on the Nietzsche Revival," Ethics 19 [1909]: 427-28).
7. A very different Nietzsche has engaged thinkers elsewhere, notably on the European continent and in literature departments in the United States. There the key themes have been perspectivism, the primacy of interpretation (and, at the same time, its indeterminacy), and the impossibility of truth. This Nietzsche is well represented by Paul de Man, in Allegories of Reading (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 5 and 6, and by many of the essays in D. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta, 1977); it has received its most sophisticated articulation, however, in Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) , a book which, accordingly, gives only cursory attention to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. The problems with this reading of Nietzsche - which are, I think, many - are discussed in my "Nietzsche and Aestheticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 275-90, and my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. R. Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Compare Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chaps. 1-4. Interestingly, the last explosion of Anglo-American philosophical interest in Nietzsche - roughly, from 1900 until the end of World War I - was also driven by an interest in his ethics (and esp. its connection to evolutionary theory and positivism). See, e.g., Maurice Adams, "The Ethics of Tolstoy and Nietzsche," Ethics 11 (1900): 82-105; Alfred W. Benn, "The Morals of an Immoralist - Friedrich Nietzsche," Ethics 19 (1908-9): 1-23, 192-211; A. K. Rogers, "Nietzsche and Democracy," Philosophical Review 21 (1912): 32-50; William M. Salter, "Nietzsche's Moral Aim," Ethics 25 (1915): 226-51, 372-403; Bertram Laing, "The Metaphysics of Nietzsche's Immoralism," Philosophical Review 24 (1915): 386-418. One may hope that no philosopher today would write, as one dissenter from the Nietzsche revival did then, that "nothing . . . quite so worthless as 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' or 'Beyond Good and Evil' has ever attracted so much attention from serious students of the philosophy of morals" (Herbert Stewart, "Some Criticisms on the Nietzsche Revival," Ethics 19 [1909]: 427-28).
8. A very different Nietzsche has engaged thinkers elsewhere, notably on the European continent and in literature departments in the United States. There the key themes have been perspectivism, the primacy of interpretation (and, at the same time, its indeterminacy), and the impossibility of truth. This Nietzsche is well represented by Paul de Man, in Allegories of Reading (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 5 and 6, and by many of the essays in D. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta, 1977); it has received its most sophisticated articulation, however, in Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) , a book which, accordingly, gives only cursory attention to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. The problems with this reading of Nietzsche - which are, I think, many - are discussed in my "Nietzsche and Aestheticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 275-90, and my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. R. Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Compare Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chaps. 1-4. Interestingly, the last explosion of Anglo-American philosophical interest in Nietzsche - roughly, from 1900 until the end of World War I - was also driven by an interest in his ethics (and esp. its connection to evolutionary theory and positivism). See, e.g., Maurice Adams, "The Ethics of Tolstoy and Nietzsche," Ethics 11 (1900): 82-105; Alfred W. Benn, "The Morals of an Immoralist - Friedrich Nietzsche," Ethics 19 (1908-9): 1-23, 192-211; A. K. Rogers, "Nietzsche and Democracy," Philosophical Review 21 (1912): 32-50; William M. Salter, "Nietzsche's Moral Aim," Ethics 25 (1915): 226-51, 372-403; Bertram Laing, "The Metaphysics of Nietzsche's Immoralism," Philosophical Review 24 (1915): 386-418. One may hope that no philosopher today would write, as one dissenter from the Nietzsche revival did then, that "nothing . . . quite so worthless as 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' or 'Beyond Good and Evil' has ever attracted so much attention from serious students of the philosophy of morals" (Herbert Stewart, "Some Criticisms on the Nietzsche Revival," Ethics 19 [1909]: 427-28).
9. A very different Nietzsche has engaged thinkers elsewhere, notably on the European continent and in literature departments in the United States. There the key themes have been perspectivism, the primacy of interpretation (and, at the same time, its indeterminacy), and the impossibility of truth. This Nietzsche is well represented by Paul de Man, in Allegories of Reading (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 5 and 6, and by many of the essays in D. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta, 1977); it has received its most sophisticated articulation, however, in Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) , a book which, accordingly, gives only cursory attention to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. The problems with this reading of Nietzsche - which are, I think, many - are discussed in my "Nietzsche and Aestheticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 275-90, and my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. R. Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Compare Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chaps. 1-4. Interestingly, the last explosion of Anglo-American philosophical interest in Nietzsche - roughly, from 1900 until the end of World War I - was also driven by an interest in his ethics (and esp. its connection to evolutionary theory and positivism). See, e.g., Maurice Adams, "The Ethics of Tolstoy and Nietzsche," Ethics 11 (1900): 82-105; Alfred W. Benn, "The Morals of an Immoralist - Friedrich Nietzsche," Ethics 19 (1908-9): 1-23, 192-211; A. K. Rogers, "Nietzsche and Democracy," Philosophical Review 21 (1912): 32-50; William M. Salter, "Nietzsche's Moral Aim," Ethics 25 (1915): 226-51, 372-403; Bertram Laing, "The Metaphysics of Nietzsche's Immoralism," Philosophical Review 24 (1915): 386-418. One may hope that no philosopher today would write, as one dissenter from the Nietzsche revival did then, that "nothing . . . quite so worthless as 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' or 'Beyond Good and Evil' has ever attracted so much attention from serious students of the philosophy of morals" (Herbert Stewart, "Some Criticisms on the Nietzsche Revival," Ethics 19 [1909]: 427-28).
10. A very different Nietzsche has engaged thinkers elsewhere, notably on the European continent and in literature departments in the United States. There the key themes have been perspectivism, the primacy of interpretation (and, at the same time, its indeterminacy), and the impossibility of truth. This Nietzsche is well represented by Paul de Man, in Allegories of Reading (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 5 and 6, and by many of the essays in D. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta, 1977); it has received its most sophisticated articulation, however, in Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) , a book which, accordingly, gives only cursory attention to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. The problems with this reading of Nietzsche - which are, I think, many - are discussed in my "Nietzsche and Aestheticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 275-90, and my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. R. Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Compare Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chaps. 1-4. Interestingly, the last explosion of Anglo-American philosophical interest in Nietzsche - roughly, from 1900 until the end of World War I - was also driven by an interest in his ethics (and esp. its connection to evolutionary theory and positivism). See, e.g., Maurice Adams, "The Ethics of Tolstoy and Nietzsche," Ethics 11 (1900): 82-105; Alfred W. Benn, "The Morals of an Immoralist - Friedrich Nietzsche," Ethics 19 (1908-9): 1-23, 192-211; A. K. Rogers, "Nietzsche and Democracy," Philosophical Review 21 (1912): 32-50; William M. Salter, "Nietzsche's Moral Aim," Ethics 25 (1915): 226-51, 372-403; Bertram Laing, "The Metaphysics of Nietzsche's Immoralism," Philosophical Review 24 (1915): 386-418. One may hope that no philosopher today would write, as one dissenter from the Nietzsche revival did then, that "nothing . . . quite so worthless as 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' or 'Beyond Good and Evil' has ever attracted so much attention from serious students of the philosophy of morals" (Herbert Stewart, "Some Criticisms on the Nietzsche Revival," Ethics 19 [1909]: 427-28).
11. A very different Nietzsche has engaged thinkers elsewhere, notably on the European continent and in literature departments in the United States. There the key themes have been perspectivism, the primacy of interpretation (and, at the same time, its indeterminacy), and the impossibility of truth. This Nietzsche is well represented by Paul de Man, in Allegories of Reading (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 5 and 6, and by many of the essays in D. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta, 1977); it has received its most sophisticated articulation, however, in Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) , a book which, accordingly, gives only cursory attention to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. The problems with this reading of Nietzsche - which are, I think, many - are discussed in my "Nietzsche and Aestheticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 275-90, and my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. R. Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Compare Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chaps. 1-4. Interestingly, the last explosion of Anglo-American philosophical interest in Nietzsche - roughly, from 1900 until the end of World War I - was also driven by an interest in his ethics (and esp. its connection to evolutionary theory and positivism). See, e.g., Maurice Adams, "The Ethics of Tolstoy and Nietzsche," Ethics 11 (1900): 82-105; Alfred W. Benn, "The Morals of an Immoralist - Friedrich Nietzsche," Ethics 19 (1908-9): 1-23, 192-211; A. K. Rogers, "Nietzsche and Democracy," Philosophical Review 21 (1912): 32-50; William M. Salter, "Nietzsche's Moral Aim," Ethics 25 (1915): 226-51, 372-403; Bertram Laing, "The Metaphysics of Nietzsche's Immoralism," Philosophical Review 24 (1915): 386-418. One may hope that no philosopher today would write, as one dissenter from the Nietzsche revival did then, that "nothing . . . quite so worthless as 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' or 'Beyond Good and Evil' has ever attracted so much attention from serious students of the philosophy of morals" (Herbert Stewart, "Some Criticisms on the Nietzsche Revival," Ethics 19 [1909]: 427-28).
12. A very different Nietzsche has engaged thinkers elsewhere, notably on the European continent and in literature departments in the United States. There the key themes have been perspectivism, the primacy of interpretation (and, at the same time, its indeterminacy), and the impossibility of truth. This Nietzsche is well represented by Paul de Man, in Allegories of Reading (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 5 and 6, and by many of the essays in D. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Delta, 1977); it has received its most sophisticated articulation, however, in Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) , a book which, accordingly, gives only cursory attention to Nietzsche's moral philosophy. The problems with this reading of Nietzsche - which are, I think, many - are discussed in my "Nietzsche and Aestheticism," Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 275-90, and my "Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals," in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. R. Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994). Compare Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chaps. 1-4. Interestingly, the last explosion of Anglo-American philosophical interest in Nietzsche - roughly, from 1900 until the end of World War I - was also driven by an interest in his ethics (and esp. its connection to evolutionary theory and positivism). See, e.g., Maurice Adams, "The Ethics of Tolstoy and Nietzsche," Ethics 11 (1900): 82-105; Alfred W. Benn, "The Morals of an Immoralist - Friedrich Nietzsche," Ethics 19 (1908-9): 1-23, 192-211; A. K. Rogers, "Nietzsche and Democracy," Philosophical Review 21 (1912): 32-50; William M. Salter, "Nietzsche's Moral Aim," Ethics 25 (1915): 226-51, 372-403; Bertram Laing, "The Metaphysics of Nietzsche's Immoralism," Philosophical Review 24 (1915): 386-418. One may hope that no philosopher today would write, as one dissenter from the Nietzsche revival did then, that "nothing . . . quite so worthless as 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' or 'Beyond Good and Evil' has ever attracted so much attention from serious students of the philosophy of morals" (Herbert Stewart, "Some Criticisms on the Nietzsche Revival," Ethics 19 [1909]: 427-28).
13. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), esp. pp. 107-11.
14. Annette Baier, "Theory and Reflective Practices," in Postures of the Mind (London: Methuen, 1985), pp. 207-27, p. 224.
15. Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 419-39, p. 433.
16. See, e.g., Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), p. 79; Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 196; Philippa Foot, "Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values," in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. R. Solomon (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), esp. p. 163; see also her "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?" reprinted in her Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
17. See, e.g., Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), p. 79; Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 196; Philippa Foot, "Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values," in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. R. Solomon (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), esp. p. 163; see also her "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?" reprinted in her Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
18. See, e.g., Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), p. 79; Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 196; Philippa Foot, "Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values," in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. R. Solomon (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), esp. p. 163; see also her "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?" reprinted in her Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
19. See, e.g., Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), p. 79; Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 196; Philippa Foot, "Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values," in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. R. Solomon (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), esp. p. 163; see also her "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives?" reprinted in her Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
20. Robert Louden, "Can We Be Too Moral?" Ethics 98 (1988): 361-80, p. 361. Louden begins his essay by quoting Nietzsche's call for "a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question" (GM, pref.). A note on citations: I cite Nietzsche's texts using the standard English-language acronyms: The Birth of Tragedy (BT), Untimely Meditations (U), Dawn (D), The Gay Science (GS), Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Z), Beyond Good and Evil (BGE), On the Genealogy of Morality (GM), Twilight of the Idols (TI), The Antichrist (A), Ecce Homo (EH), Nietzsche Contra Wagner (NCW), and The Will to Power (WP). Roman numerals refer to major divisions or chapters; arabic numerals refer to sections, not pages. Translations, with occasional minor emendations, are by Walter Kaufmann and/or R. J. Hollingdale; for purposes of making emendations, I rely upon the Sämtliche Werke in 15 Bänden, ed. G. Colli and M. Mottinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980).
21. Robert Louden, "Can We Be Too Moral?" Ethics 98 (1988): 361-80, p. 361. Louden begins his essay by quoting Nietzsche's call for "a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question" (GM, pref.). A note on citations: I cite Nietzsche's texts using the standard English-language acronyms: The Birth of Tragedy (BT), Untimely Meditations (U), Dawn (D), The Gay Science (GS), Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Z), Beyond Good and Evil (BGE), On the Genealogy of Morality (GM), Twilight of the Idols (TI), The Antichrist (A), Ecce Homo (EH), Nietzsche Contra Wagner (NCW), and The Will to Power (WP). Roman numerals refer to major divisions or chapters; arabic numerals refer to sections, not pages. Translations, with occasional minor emendations, are by Walter Kaufmann and/or R. J. Hollingdale; for purposes of making emendations, I rely upon the Sämtliche Werke in 15 Bänden, ed. G. Colli and M. Mottinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980).
22. Robert Louden, "Can We Be Too Moral?" Ethics 98 (1988): 361-80, p. 361. Louden begins his essay by quoting Nietzsche's call for "a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question" (GM, pref.). A note on citations: I cite Nietzsche's texts using the standard English-language acronyms: The Birth of Tragedy (BT), Untimely Meditations (U), Dawn (D), The Gay Science (GS), Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Z), Beyond Good and Evil (BGE), On the Genealogy of Morality (GM), Twilight of the Idols (TI), The Antichrist (A), Ecce Homo (EH), Nietzsche Contra Wagner (NCW), and The Will to Power (WP). Roman numerals refer to major divisions or chapters; arabic numerals refer to sections, not pages. Translations, with occasional minor emendations, are by Walter Kaufmann and/or R. J. Hollingdale; for purposes of making emendations, I rely upon the Sämtliche Werke in 15 Bänden, ed. G. Colli and M. Mottinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980).
23. Robert Louden, "Can We Be Too Moral?" Ethics 98 (1988): 361-80, p. 361. Louden begins his essay by quoting Nietzsche's call for "a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must first be called in question" (GM, pref.). A note on citations: I cite Nietzsche's texts using the standard English-language acronyms: The Birth of Tragedy (BT), Untimely Meditations (U), Dawn (D), The Gay Science (GS), Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Z), Beyond Good and Evil (BGE), On the Genealogy of Morality (GM), Twilight of the Idols (TI), The Antichrist (A), Ecce Homo (EH), Nietzsche Contra Wagner (NCW), and The Will to Power (WP). Roman numerals refer to major divisions or chapters; arabic numerals refer to sections, not pages. Translations, with occasional minor emendations, are by Walter Kaufmann and/or R. J. Hollingdale; for purposes of making emendations, I rely upon the Sämtliche Werke in 15 Bänden, ed. G. Colli and M. Mottinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980).
24. See the useful overview in Robert Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 4-7, 30.
25. See Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, "Toward Fin de siecle Ethics: Some Trends," Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 115-89, p. 181. This forms the subject matter of normative theory, which these authors, following Baier, identify as the primary target of those I am calling the Theory Critics.
26. See Jonathan Dancy, "Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties," Mind 92 (1983): 530-47.
27. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 16-17, cited hereafter in the text as ELP; Thomas Nagel, "The Fragmentation of Value," reprinted in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 131-32; Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 138; Charles Taylor, "The Diversity of Goods," reprinted in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Elsewhere in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Williams worries about a different kind of reductionism, i.e., the attempt to reduce all practical reasoning and all obligation to moral reasoning and moral obligation. See esp. chap. 10.
28. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 16-17, cited hereafter in the text as ELP; Thomas Nagel, "The Fragmentation of Value," reprinted in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 131-32; Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 138; Charles Taylor, "The Diversity of Goods," reprinted in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Elsewhere in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Williams worries about a different kind of reductionism, i.e., the attempt to reduce all practical reasoning and all obligation to moral reasoning and moral obligation. See esp. chap. 10.
29. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 16-17, cited hereafter in the text as ELP; Thomas Nagel, "The Fragmentation of Value," reprinted in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 131-32; Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 138; Charles Taylor, "The Diversity of Goods," reprinted in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Elsewhere in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Williams worries about a different kind of reductionism, i.e., the attempt to reduce all practical reasoning and all obligation to moral reasoning and moral obligation. See esp. chap. 10.
30. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 16-17, cited hereafter in the text as ELP; Thomas Nagel, "The Fragmentation of Value," reprinted in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 131-32; Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 138; Charles Taylor, "The Diversity of Goods," reprinted in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Elsewhere in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Williams worries about a different kind of reductionism, i.e., the attempt to reduce all practical reasoning and all obligation to moral reasoning and moral obligation. See esp. chap. 10.
31. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 16-17, cited hereafter in the text as ELP; Thomas Nagel, "The Fragmentation of Value," reprinted in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 131-32; Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 138; Charles Taylor, "The Diversity of Goods," reprinted in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Elsewhere in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Williams worries about a different kind of reductionism, i.e., the attempt to reduce all practical reasoning and all obligation to moral reasoning and moral obligation. See esp. chap. 10.
32. Bernard Williams, "Preface," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. x; Larmore, p. ix, chap. 1; Taylor. Something similar seems to be Annette Baier's target in "Theory and Reflective Practices," and "Doing without Moral Theory?" (reprinted in Postures of the Mind, pp. 228-45), esp. in her talk of the theorist's hierarchical ordering of more principles "in which the less general are derived from the more general" ("Doing without Moral Theory?" p. 232) on the model of a legal system ("Theory and Reflective Practices," p. 214) (where the latter is thought of, in a pre-Legal Realist sense, as involving the deduction of particular decisions from general rules).
33. Bernard Williams, "Preface," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. x; Larmore, p. ix, chap. 1; Taylor. Something similar seems to be Annette Baier's target in "Theory and Reflective Practices," and "Doing without Moral Theory?" (reprinted in Postures of the Mind, pp. 228-45), esp. in her talk of the theorist's hierarchical ordering of more principles "in which the less general are derived from the more general" ("Doing without Moral Theory?" p. 232) on the model of a legal system ("Theory and Reflective Practices," p. 214) (where the latter is thought of, in a pre-Legal Realist sense, as involving the deduction of particular decisions from general rules).
34. Bernard Williams, "Preface," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. x; Larmore, p. ix, chap. 1; Taylor. Something similar seems to be Annette Baier's target in "Theory and Reflective Practices," and "Doing without Moral Theory?" (reprinted in Postures of the Mind, pp. 228-45), esp. in her talk of the theorist's hierarchical ordering of more principles "in which the less general are derived from the more general" ("Doing without Moral Theory?" p. 232) on the model of a legal system ("Theory and Reflective Practices," p. 214) (where the latter is thought of, in a pre-Legal Realist sense, as involving the deduction of particular decisions from general rules).
35. Bernard Williams, "Preface," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. x; Larmore, p. ix, chap. 1; Taylor. Something similar seems to be Annette Baier's target in "Theory and Reflective Practices," and "Doing without Moral Theory?" (reprinted in Postures of the Mind, pp. 228-45), esp. in her talk of the theorist's hierarchical ordering of more principles "in which the less general are derived from the more general" ("Doing without Moral Theory?" p. 232) on the model of a legal system ("Theory and Reflective Practices," p. 214) (where the latter is thought of, in a pre-Legal Realist sense, as involving the deduction of particular decisions from general rules).
36. Bernard Williams, "Preface," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. x; Larmore, p. ix, chap. 1; Taylor. Something similar seems to be Annette Baier's target in "Theory and Reflective Practices," and "Doing without Moral Theory?" (reprinted in Postures of the Mind, pp. 228-45), esp. in her talk of the theorist's hierarchical ordering of more principles "in which the less general are derived from the more general" ("Doing without Moral Theory?" p. 232) on the model of a legal system ("Theory and Reflective Practices," p. 214) (where the latter is thought of, in a pre-Legal Realist sense, as involving the deduction of particular decisions from general rules).
37. Taylor aptly calls this the ambition for a "single-consideration procedure," a label which suggests the unity of Reduction and Mechanical Decision, and objects that such a procedure cannot do justice to "the real diversity of goods that we recognize" (pp. 245, 247).
38. See Baier, "Theory and Reflective Practices" and "Doing without Moral Theory?"; and Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, esp. pp. 115-17, 127, 202.
39. See Baier, "Theory and Reflective Practices" and "Doing without Moral Theory?"; and Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, esp. pp. 115-17, 127, 202.
40. For example, Baier argues for ethical reflection without "normative theory in the Kantian sense" while noting that "reflectiveness about our practices requires at the very least noting whether they are counterproductive to their expressed aims" ("Theory and Reflective Practices," p. 226). Williams wonders throughout Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy "why reflection should be taken to require theory" (p. 112) and claims that "philosophy in the modern world cannot make any special claim to reflectiveness" (p. 3). Taylor goes further and concedes that even if there are a plurality of goods, "people . . . are faced with the job of somehow making them compatible in their lives" (p. 236) and that, as a result, "the demand for a unified theory" is a "demand we cannot totally repudiate" (p. 245).
41. For example, Baier argues for ethical reflection without "normative theory in the Kantian sense" while noting that "reflectiveness about our practices requires at the very least noting whether they are counterproductive to their expressed aims" ("Theory and Reflective Practices," p. 226). Williams wonders throughout Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy "why reflection should be taken to require theory" (p. 112) and claims that "philosophy in the modern world cannot make any special claim to reflectiveness" (p. 3). Taylor goes further and concedes that even if there are a plurality of goods, "people . . . are faced with the job of somehow making them compatible in their lives" (p. 236) and that, as a result, "the demand for a unified theory" is a "demand we cannot totally repudiate" (p. 245).
42. For example, Baier argues for ethical reflection without "normative theory in the Kantian sense" while noting that "reflectiveness about our practices requires at the very least noting whether they are counterproductive to their expressed aims" ("Theory and Reflective Practices," p. 226). Williams wonders throughout Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy "why reflection should be taken to require theory" (p. 112) and claims that "philosophy in the modern world cannot make any special claim to reflectiveness" (p. 3). Taylor goes further and concedes that even if there are a plurality of goods, "people . . . are faced with the job of somehow making them compatible in their lives" (p. 236) and that, as a result, "the demand for a unified theory" is a "demand we cannot totally repudiate" (p. 245).
43. For example, Baier argues for ethical reflection without "normative theory in the Kantian sense" while noting that "reflectiveness about our practices requires at the very least noting whether they are counterproductive to their expressed aims" ("Theory and Reflective Practices," p. 226). Williams wonders throughout Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy "why reflection should be taken to require theory" (p. 112) and claims that "philosophy in the modern world cannot make any special claim to reflectiveness" (p. 3). Taylor goes further and concedes that even if there are a plurality of goods, "people . . . are faced with the job of somehow making them compatible in their lives" (p. 236) and that, as a result, "the demand for a unified theory" is a "demand we cannot totally repudiate" (p. 245).
44. For example, Baier argues for ethical reflection without "normative theory in the Kantian sense" while noting that "reflectiveness about our practices requires at the very least noting whether they are counterproductive to their expressed aims" ("Theory and Reflective Practices," p. 226). Williams wonders throughout Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy "why reflection should be taken to require theory" (p. 112) and claims that "philosophy in the modern world cannot make any special claim to reflectiveness" (p. 3). Taylor goes further and concedes that even if there are a plurality of goods, "people . . . are faced with the job of somehow making them compatible in their lives" (p. 236) and that, as a result, "the demand for a unified theory" is a "demand we cannot totally repudiate" (p. 245).
45. This is clearest in the case of writers like Nagel and Larmore, who explicitly affirm both the tenability of moral theory and the indispensable role of something like Aristotle's practical wisdom or judgment in our moral life. See Nagel, "The Fragmentation of Value," pp. 135-37; and Larmore, chap. 1, p. 151 ("My intention . . . has not been to deny the possibilities or importance of moral theory. I do not believe that the complexity of morality is so great, so boundless, that it baffles any attempt at systematization.").
46. This is clearest in the case of writers like Nagel and Larmore, who explicitly affirm both the tenability of moral theory and the indispensable role of something like Aristotle's practical wisdom or judgment in our moral life. See Nagel, "The Fragmentation of Value," pp. 135-37; and Larmore, chap. 1, p. 151 ("My intention . . . has not been to deny the possibilities or importance of moral theory. I do not believe that the complexity of morality is so great, so boundless, that it baffles any attempt at systematization.").
47. I take the preceding sentence to be a more obviously apt characterization of some of Williams's earlier work in ethics.
48. See the further discussion in Sec. V.
49. Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 453-66, cited in this section by page number.
50. See esp. the concluding pages of Stocker's piece. Susan Wolf presents a slightly different case than other Morality Critics in this regard; see "Moral Saints," pp. 435-37; and my discussion in n. 26.
51. For example, of the former type, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), esp. pp. 26-27; of the latter type, Samuel Scheffler, "Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues," Mind 94 (1985): 409-19, esp. p. 409.
52. For example, of the former type, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), esp. pp. 26-27; of the latter type, Samuel Scheffler, "Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues," Mind 94 (1985): 409-19, esp. p. 409.
53. A third difficulty is that some writers construe demands of, e.g., partiality and integrity to be essentially moral demands, apart from their role in deontological and consequentialist theories. See David Brink, "Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point of View," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 417-38, pp. 418-19; Larmore, pp. 132-33. This construal is not, I think, suggested by the writings of most Morality Critics themselves and, in any event, can be dealt with in the way suggested in the text.
54. A third difficulty is that some writers construe demands of, e.g., partiality and integrity to be essentially moral demands, apart from their role in deontological and consequentialist theories. See David Brink, "Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point of View," Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 417-38, pp. 418-19; Larmore, pp. 132-33. This construal is not, I think, suggested by the writings of most Morality Critics themselves and, in any event, can be dealt with in the way suggested in the text.
55. Nagel speaks of morality posing "a serious threat to the kind of personal life that many of us take to be desirable" (View from Nowhere, p. 190). Wolf claims that the "moral saint" cannot realize "a great variety of forms of personal excellence" (p. 426). Bernard Williams argues that both Kantian and utilitarian theories will sometimes require us to abandon our "ground projects," those projects "which propel [a person] in the future, and give him (in a sense) a reason for living" ("Persons, Character, and Morality," in The Identities of Persons, ed. A. Rorty [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976], pp. 209-10). See Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 77-150, esp. pp. 115-17, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, esp. pp. 181-82 (worrying that a Kantian notion of obligation can "come to dominate life altogether"). Slote argues that a commitment to morality would require us to "deplore and disavow" (p. 85) certain otherwise admirable traits like "single-minded devotion to aesthetic goals or ideals" (p. 80) - because of their essential tendency also to produce immoral behavior. Michael Stocker is probably an exception to the characterization offered in the text. While most Morality Critics view the nonmoral goods and considerations as largely prudential in character, Stocker is concerned with phenomena like "love" and "friendship" whose value is probably not prudential. See "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories."
56. Nagel speaks of morality posing "a serious threat to the kind of personal life that many of us take to be desirable" (View from Nowhere, p. 190). Wolf claims that the "moral saint" cannot realize "a great variety of forms of personal excellence" (p. 426). Bernard Williams argues that both Kantian and utilitarian theories will sometimes require us to abandon our "ground projects," those projects "which propel [a person] in the future, and give him (in a sense) a reason for living" ("Persons, Character, and Morality," in The Identities of Persons, ed. A. Rorty [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976], pp. 209-10). See Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 77-150, esp. pp. 115-17, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, esp. pp. 181-82 (worrying that a Kantian notion of obligation can "come to dominate life altogether"). Slote argues that a commitment to morality would require us to "deplore and disavow" (p. 85) certain otherwise admirable traits like "single-minded devotion to aesthetic goals or ideals" (p. 80) - because of their essential tendency also to produce immoral behavior. Michael Stocker is probably an exception to the characterization offered in the text. While most Morality Critics view the nonmoral goods and considerations as largely prudential in character, Stocker is concerned with phenomena like "love" and "friendship" whose value is probably not prudential. See "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories."
57. Nagel speaks of morality posing "a serious threat to the kind of personal life that many of us take to be desirable" (View from Nowhere, p. 190). Wolf claims that the "moral saint" cannot realize "a great variety of forms of personal excellence" (p. 426). Bernard Williams argues that both Kantian and utilitarian theories will sometimes require us to abandon our "ground projects," those projects "which propel [a person] in the future, and give him (in a sense) a reason for living" ("Persons, Character, and Morality," in The Identities of Persons, ed. A. Rorty [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976], pp. 209-10). See Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 77-150, esp. pp. 115-17, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, esp. pp. 181-82 (worrying that a Kantian notion of obligation can "come to dominate life altogether"). Slote argues that a commitment to morality would require us to "deplore and disavow" (p. 85) certain otherwise admirable traits like "single-minded devotion to aesthetic goals or ideals" (p. 80) - because of their essential tendency also to produce immoral behavior. Michael Stocker is probably an exception to the characterization offered in the text. While most Morality Critics view the nonmoral goods and considerations as largely prudential in character, Stocker is concerned with phenomena like "love" and "friendship" whose value is probably not prudential. See "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories."
58. Nagel speaks of morality posing "a serious threat to the kind of personal life that many of us take to be desirable" (View from Nowhere, p. 190). Wolf claims that the "moral saint" cannot realize "a great variety of forms of personal excellence" (p. 426). Bernard Williams argues that both Kantian and utilitarian theories will sometimes require us to abandon our "ground projects," those projects "which propel [a person] in the future, and give him (in a sense) a reason for living" ("Persons, Character, and Morality," in The Identities of Persons, ed. A. Rorty [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976], pp. 209-10). See Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 77-150, esp. pp. 115-17, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, esp. pp. 181-82 (worrying that a Kantian notion of obligation can "come to dominate life altogether"). Slote argues that a commitment to morality would require us to "deplore and disavow" (p. 85) certain otherwise admirable traits like "single-minded devotion to aesthetic goals or ideals" (p. 80) - because of their essential tendency also to produce immoral behavior. Michael Stocker is probably an exception to the characterization offered in the text. While most Morality Critics view the nonmoral goods and considerations as largely prudential in character, Stocker is concerned with phenomena like "love" and "friendship" whose value is probably not prudential. See "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories."
59. Nagel speaks of morality posing "a serious threat to the kind of personal life that many of us take to be desirable" (View from Nowhere, p. 190). Wolf claims that the "moral saint" cannot realize "a great variety of forms of personal excellence" (p. 426). Bernard Williams argues that both Kantian and utilitarian theories will sometimes require us to abandon our "ground projects," those projects "which propel [a person] in the future, and give him (in a sense) a reason for living" ("Persons, Character, and Morality," in The Identities of Persons, ed. A. Rorty [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976], pp. 209-10). See Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 77-150, esp. pp. 115-17, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, esp. pp. 181-82 (worrying that a Kantian notion of obligation can "come to dominate life altogether"). Slote argues that a commitment to morality would require us to "deplore and disavow" (p. 85) certain otherwise admirable traits like "single-minded devotion to aesthetic goals or ideals" (p. 80) - because of their essential tendency also to produce immoral behavior. Michael Stocker is probably an exception to the
60. Nagel speaks of morality posing "a serious threat to the kind of personal life that many of us take to be desirable" (View from Nowhere, p. 190). Wolf claims that the "moral saint" cannot realize "a great variety of forms of personal excellence" (p. 426). Bernard Williams argues that both Kantian and utilitarian theories will sometimes require us to abandon our "ground projects," those projects "which propel [a person] in the future, and give him (in a sense) a reason for living" ("Persons, Character, and Morality," in The Identities of Persons, ed. A. Rorty [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976], pp. 209-10). See Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 77-150, esp. pp. 115-17, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, esp. pp. 181-82 (worrying that a Kantian notion of obligation can "come to dominate life altogether"). Slote argues that a commitment to morality would require us to "deplore and disavow" (p. 85) certain otherwise admirable traits like "single-minded devotion to aesthetic goals or ideals" (p. 80) - because of their essential tendency also to produce immoral behavior. Michael Stocker is probably an exception to the characterization offered in the text. While most Morality Critics view the nonmoral goods and considerations as largely prudential in character, Stocker is concerned with phenomena like "love" and "friendship" whose value is probably not prudential. See "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories."
61. Nagel speaks of morality posing "a serious threat to the kind of personal life that many of us take to be desirable" (View from Nowhere, p. 190). Wolf claims that the "moral saint" cannot realize "a great variety of forms of personal excellence" (p. 426). Bernard Williams argues that both Kantian and utilitarian theories will sometimes require us to abandon our "ground projects," those projects "which propel [a person] in the future, and give him (in a sense) a reason for living" ("Persons, Character, and Morality," in The Identities of Persons, ed. A. Rorty [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976], pp. 209-10). See Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 77-150, esp. pp. 115-17, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, esp. pp. 181-82 (worrying that a Kantian notion of obligation can "come to dominate life altogether"). Slote argues that a commitment to morality would require us to "deplore and disavow" (p. 85) certain otherwise admirable traits like "single-minded devotion to aesthetic goals or ideals" (p. 80) - because of their essential tendency also to produce immoral behavior. Michael Stocker is probably an exception to the characterization offered in the text. While most Morality Critics view the nonmoral goods and considerations as largely prudential in character, Stocker is concerned with phenomena like "love" and "friendship" whose value is probably not prudential. See "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories."
62. Nagel speaks of morality posing "a serious threat to the kind of personal life that many of us take to be desirable" (View from Nowhere, p. 190). Wolf claims that the "moral saint" cannot realize "a great variety of forms of personal excellence" (p. 426). Bernard Williams argues that both Kantian and utilitarian theories will sometimes require us to abandon our "ground projects," those projects "which propel [a person] in the future, and give him (in a sense) a reason for living" ("Persons, Character, and Morality," in The Identities of Persons, ed. A. Rorty [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976], pp. 209-10). See Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 77-150, esp. pp. 115-17, and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, esp. pp. 181-82 (worrying that a Kantian notion of obligation can "come to dominate life altogether"). Slote argues that a commitment to morality would require us to "deplore and disavow" (p. 85) certain otherwise admirable traits like "single-minded devotion to aesthetic goals or ideals" (p. 80) - because of their essential tendency also to produce immoral behavior. Michael Stocker is probably an exception to the characterization offered in the text. While most Morality Critics view the nonmoral goods and considerations as largely prudential in character, Stocker is concerned with phenomena like "love" and "friendship" whose value is probably not prudential. See "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories."
63. For example, Wolf: "The admiration of and striving toward achieving any of a great variety of forms of personal excellence are character traits it is valuable and desirable for people to have. . . . In thinking that it is good for a person to strive for [this] ideal . . . , we implicitly acknowledge the goodness of ideals incompatible with that of the moral saint" (p. 426). The truth of IT is defended in slightly different ways by the Critics, depending on whether they are taking consequentialism or Kantianism as the target. (For consequentialism, and specifically Utilitarianism, see Wolf, pp. 427-30; Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," pp. 93-118, "Persons, Character, and Morality," pp. 199-200, 210; for Kantianism, see Wolf, pp. 430-33; Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chap. 10.) However, as a number of writers have noted, there is a common element in both deontological and consequentialist theories that is supposed to generate IT, i.e., their commitment to an impersonal point of view and impartial value. Because of this commitment, these theories cannot (according to the Critics) do real justice to the importance of our various personal and partial attachments and projects: such projects and attachments can always be sacrificed when impersonal and impartial considerations demand it. Our most important personal project is, after all, just one among many from the moral point of view, which is precisely why (according to the Critics) morality cannot do justice to its significance and value. See Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 189-91.
64. For example, Wolf: "The admiration of and striving toward achieving any of a great variety of forms of personal excellence are character traits it is valuable and desirable for people to have. . . . In thinking that it is good for a person to strive for [this] ideal . . . , we implicitly acknowledge the goodness of ideals incompatible with that of the moral saint" (p. 426). The truth of IT is defended in slightly different ways by the Critics, depending on whether they are taking consequentialism or Kantianism as the target. (For consequentialism, and specifically Utilitarianism, see Wolf, pp. 427-30; Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," pp. 93-118, "Persons, Character, and Morality," pp. 199-200, 210; for Kantianism, see Wolf, pp. 430-33; Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chap. 10.) However, as a number of writers have noted, there is a common element in both deontological and consequentialist theories that is supposed to generate IT, i.e., their commitment to an impersonal point of view and impartial value. Because of this commitment, these theories cannot (according to the Critics) do real justice to the importance of our various personal and partial attachments and projects: such projects and attachments can always be sacrificed when impersonal and impartial considerations demand it. Our most important personal project is, after all, just one among many from the moral point of view, which is precisely why (according to the Critics) morality cannot do justice to its significance and value. See Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 189-91.
65. For example, Wolf: "The admiration of and striving toward achieving any of a great variety of forms of personal excellence are character traits it is valuable and desirable for people to have. . . . In thinking that it is good for a person to strive for [this] ideal . . . , we implicitly acknowledge the goodness of ideals incompatible with that of the moral saint" (p. 426). The truth of IT is defended in slightly different ways by the Critics, depending on whether they are taking consequentialism or Kantianism as the target. (For consequentialism, and specifically Utilitarianism, see Wolf, pp. 427-30; Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," pp. 93-118, "Persons, Character, and Morality," pp. 199-200, 210; for Kantianism, see Wolf, pp. 430-33; Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chap. 10.) However, as a number of writers have noted, there is a common element in both deontological and consequentialist theories that is supposed to generate IT, i.e., their commitment to an impersonal point of view and impartial value. Because of this commitment, these theories cannot (according to the Critics) do real justice to the importance of our various personal and partial attachments and projects: such projects and attachments can always be sacrificed when impersonal and impartial considerations demand it. Our most important personal project is, after all, just one among many from the moral point of view, which is precisely why (according to the Critics) morality cannot do justice to its significance and value. See Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 189-91.
66. For example, Wolf: "The admiration of and striving toward achieving any of a great variety of forms of personal excellence are character traits it is valuable and desirable for people to have. . . . In thinking that it is good for a person to strive for [this] ideal . . . , we implicitly acknowledge the goodness of ideals incompatible with that of the moral saint" (p. 426). The truth of IT is defended in slightly different ways by the Critics, depending on whether they are taking consequentialism or Kantianism as the target. (For consequentialism, and specifically Utilitarianism, see Wolf, pp. 427-30; Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," pp. 93-118, "Persons, Character, and Morality," pp. 199-200, 210; for Kantianism, see Wolf, pp. 430-33; Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chap. 10.) However, as a number of writers have noted, there is a common element in both deontological and consequentialist theories that is supposed to generate IT, i.e., their commitment to an impersonal point of view and impartial value. Because of this commitment, these theories cannot (according to the Critics) do real justice to the importance of our various personal and partial attachments and projects: such projects and attachments can always be sacrificed when impersonal and impartial considerations demand it. Our most important personal project is, after all, just one among many from the moral point of view, which is precisely why (according to the Critics) morality cannot do justice to its significance and value. See Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 189-91.
67. For example, Wolf: "The admiration of and striving toward achieving any of a great variety of forms of personal excellence are character traits it is valuable and desirable for people to have. . . . In thinking that it is good for a person to strive for [this] ideal . . . , we implicitly acknowledge the goodness of ideals incompatible with that of the moral saint" (p. 426). The truth of IT is defended in slightly different ways by the Critics, depending on whether they are taking consequentialism or Kantianism as the target. (For consequentialism, and specifically Utilitarianism, see Wolf, pp. 427-30; Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," pp. 93-118, "Persons, Character, and Morality," pp. 199-200, 210; for Kantianism, see Wolf, pp. 430-33; Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chap. 10.) However, as a number of writers have noted, there is a common element in both deontological and consequentialist theories that is supposed to generate IT, i.e., their commitment to an impersonal point of view and impartial value. Because of this commitment, these theories cannot (according to the Critics) do real justice to the importance of our various personal and partial attachments and projects: such projects and attachments can always be sacrificed when impersonal and impartial considerations demand it. Our most important personal project is, after all, just one among many from the moral point of view, which is precisely why (according to the Critics) morality cannot do justice to its significance and value. See Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 189-91.
68. For example, Wolf: "The admiration of and striving toward achieving any of a great variety of forms of personal excellence are character traits it is valuable and desirable for people to have. . . . In thinking that it is good for a person to strive for [this] ideal . . . , we implicitly acknowledge the goodness of ideals incompatible with that of the moral saint" (p. 426). The truth of IT is defended in slightly different ways by the Critics, depending on whether they are taking consequentialism or Kantianism as the target. (For consequentialism, and specifically Utilitarianism, see Wolf, pp. 427-30; Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," pp. 93-118, "Persons, Character, and Morality," pp. 199-200, 210; for Kantianism, see Wolf, pp. 430-33; Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chap. 10.) However, as a number of writers have noted, there is a common element in both deontological and consequentialist theories that is supposed to generate IT, i.e., their commitment to an impersonal point of view and impartial value. Because of this commitment, these theories cannot (according to the Critics) do real justice to the importance of our various personal and partial attachments and projects: such projects and attachments can always be sacrificed when impersonal and impartial considerations demand it. Our most important personal project is, after all, just one among many from the moral point of view, which is precisely why (according to the Critics) morality cannot do justice to its significance and value. See Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 189-91.
69. For example, Wolf: "The admiration of and striving toward achieving any of a great variety of forms of personal excellence are character traits it is valuable and desirable for people to have. . . . In thinking that it is good for a person to strive for [this] ideal . . . , we implicitly acknowledge the goodness of ideals incompatible with that of the moral saint" (p. 426). The truth of IT is defended in slightly different ways by the Critics, depending on whether they are taking consequentialism or Kantianism as the target. (For consequentialism, and specifically Utilitarianism, see Wolf, pp. 427-30; Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," pp. 93-118, "Persons, Character, and Morality," pp. 199-200, 210; for Kantianism, see Wolf, pp. 430-33; Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chap. 10.) However, as a number of writers have noted, there is a common element in both deontological and consequentialist theories that is supposed to generate IT, i.e., their commitment to an impersonal point of view and impartial value. Because of this commitment, these theories cannot (according to the Critics) do real justice to the importance of our various personal and partial attachments and projects: such projects and attachments can always be sacrificed when impersonal and impartial considerations demand it. Our most important personal project is, after all, just one among many from the moral point of view, which is precisely why (according to the Critics) morality cannot do justice to its significance and value. See Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 189-91.
70. Wolf challenges "the assumption that it is always better to be morally better" and concludes that "our values cannot be fully comprehended on the model of a hierarchical system with morality at the top" (p. 438). Slote claims that the possibility of admirable immorality should "[loosen]. . . our attachment to the 'overridingness' thesis" (p. 107). Williams concludes, "Life has to have substance if anything is to have sense, including adherence to the impartial [moral] system; but if it has substance, then it cannot grant supreme importance to the impartial system" ("Persons, Character, and Morality," p. 215). Owen Flanagan identifies "this assumption of the sovereignty of the moral good" as the target of critics like Wolf, Williams, and Slote (Owen Flanagan, "Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection," Journal of Philosophy 83 [1986]: 41-60, p. 41). Note that for at least Williams, morality already does its damage - in the form of "alienation" - once it asks us to view our personal projects as up for grabs in moral deliberation (whether or not morality ultimately requires us to abandon them).
71. Wolf challenges "the assumption that it is always better to be morally better" and concludes that "our values cannot be fully comprehended on the model of a hierarchical system with morality at the top" (p. 438). Slote claims that the possibility of admirable immorality should "[loosen]. . . our attachment to the 'overridingness' thesis" (p. 107). Williams concludes, "Life has to have substance if anything is to have sense, including adherence to the impartial [moral] system; but if it has substance, then it cannot grant supreme importance to the impartial system" ("Persons, Character, and Morality," p. 215). Owen Flanagan identifies "this assumption of the sovereignty of the moral good" as the target of critics like Wolf, Williams, and Slote (Owen Flanagan, "Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection," Journal of Philosophy 83 [1986]: 41-60, p. 41). Note that for at least Williams, morality already does its damage - in the form of "alienation" - once it asks us to view our personal projects as up for grabs in moral deliberation (whether or not morality ultimately requires us to abandon them).
72. Wolf challenges "the assumption that it is always better to be morally better" and concludes that "our values cannot be fully comprehended on the model of a hierarchical system with morality at the top" (p. 438). Slote claims that the possibility of admirable immorality should "[loosen]. . . our attachment to the 'overridingness' thesis" (p. 107). Williams concludes, "Life has to have substance if anything is to have sense, including adherence to the impartial [moral] system; but if it has substance, then it cannot grant supreme importance to the impartial system" ("Persons, Character, and Morality," p. 215). Owen Flanagan identifies "this assumption of the sovereignty of the moral good" as the target of critics like Wolf, Williams, and Slote (Owen Flanagan, "Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection," Journal of Philosophy 83 [1986]: 41-60, p. 41). Note that for at least Williams, morality already does its damage - in the form of "alienation" - once it asks us to view our personal projects as up for grabs in moral deliberation (whether or not morality ultimately requires us to abandon them).
73. Wolf challenges "the assumption that it is always better to be morally better" and concludes that "our values cannot be fully comprehended on the model of a hierarchical system with morality at the top" (p. 438). Slote claims that the possibility of admirable immorality should "[loosen]. . . our attachment to the 'overridingness' thesis" (p. 107). Williams concludes, "Life has to have substance if anything is to have sense, including adherence to the impartial [moral] system; but if it has substance, then it cannot grant supreme importance to the impartial system" ("Persons, Character, and Morality," p. 215). Owen Flanagan identifies "this assumption of the sovereignty of the moral good" as the target of critics like Wolf, Williams, and Slote (Owen Flanagan, "Admirable Immorality and Admirable Imperfection," Journal of Philosophy 83 [1986]: 41-60, p. 41). Note that for at least Williams, morality already does its damage - in the form of "alienation" - once it asks us to view our personal projects as up for grabs in moral deliberation (whether or not morality ultimately requires us to abandon them).
74. On the "objective purview" response: see, e.g., Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," reprinted in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. S. Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 93-133, esp. pp. 113-17; see also Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, esp. p. 303. This general point is often put by saying that Utilitarianism provides a criterion or standard of rightness, not a decision procedure. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), bk. 4, chap. 1, sec. 1, and chap. 3, sec. 3; R. E. Bales, "Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?" American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971): 257-65; Brink. On the "supererogation" response: see, e.g., Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 203-4; Stephen Darwall, "Abolishing Morality," Synthese 72 (1987): 71-89, esp. pp. 78-83. Note that for the "Kantians," the ability of morality to accommodate personal goods also derives from morality's objective or impersonal point of view. As Nagel explains it, "The appearance of supererogation in a morality is a recognition from an impersonal standpoint of the difficulties with which that standpoint has to contend in becoming motivationally effective in the real life of beings of whom it is only one aspect" (p. 204). In contrast, Barbara Herman argues that Kantianism indeed does not permit "unconditional attachment" to personal projects irrespective of their morality and that "it does not seem rational to want it otherwise." She claims further that such unconditional attachments are not even essential to one's character or integrity (Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," Monist 66 [1983]: 233-50, p. 243). See also Conly's related response to Williams on behalf of Utilitarianism at pp. 305-11, p. 308 ("as much emotional attachment [to personal projects] as Williams wants, admittedly more than utilitarianism allows, gives not so much integrity as something like solipsism"); and Marcia Baron's response to Slote in "On Admirable Immorality," Ethics 96 (1986): 557-66, esp. pp. 563-64 (single-minded devotion [to a project] that knows no bounds is not admirable and is rightly prohibited by morality). I return to these issues in n. 51, below.
75. On the "objective purview" response: see, e.g., Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," reprinted in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. S. Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 93-133, esp. pp. 113-17; see also Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, esp. p. 303. This general point is often put by saying that Utilitarianism provides a criterion or standard of rightness, not a decision procedure. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), bk. 4, chap. 1, sec. 1, and chap. 3, sec. 3; R. E. Bales, "Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?" American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971): 257-65; Brink. On the "supererogation" response: see, e.g., Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 203-4; Stephen Darwall, "Abolishing Morality," Synthese 72 (1987): 71-89, esp. pp. 78-83. Note that for the "Kantians," the ability of morality to accommodate personal goods also derives from morality's objective or impersonal point of view. As Nagel explains it, "The appearance of supererogation in a morality is a recognition from an impersonal standpoint of the difficulties with which that standpoint has to contend in becoming motivationally effective in the real life of beings of whom it is only one aspect" (p. 204). In contrast, Barbara Herman argues that Kantianism indeed does not permit "unconditional attachment" to personal projects irrespective of their morality and that "it does not seem rational to want it otherwise." She claims further that such unconditional attachments are not even essential to one's character or integrity (Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," Monist 66 [1983]: 233-50, p. 243). See also Conly's related response to Williams on behalf of Utilitarianism at pp. 305-11, p. 308 ("as much emotional attachment [to personal projects] as Williams wants, admittedly more than utilitarianism allows, gives not so much integrity as something like solipsism"); and Marcia Baron's response to Slote in "On Admirable Immorality," Ethics 96 (1986): 557-66, esp. pp. 563-64 (single-minded devotion [to a project] that knows no bounds is not admirable and is rightly prohibited by morality). I return to these issues in n. 51, below.
76. On the "objective purview" response: see, e.g., Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," reprinted in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. S. Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 93-133, esp. pp. 113-17; see also Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, esp. p. 303. This general point is often put by saying that Utilitarianism provides a criterion or standard of rightness, not a decision procedure. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), bk. 4, chap. 1, sec. 1, and chap. 3, sec. 3; R. E. Bales, "Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?" American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971): 257-65; Brink. On the "supererogation" response: see, e.g., Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 203-4; Stephen Darwall, "Abolishing Morality," Synthese 72 (1987): 71-89, esp. pp. 78-83. Note that for the "Kantians," the ability of morality to accommodate personal goods also derives from morality's objective or impersonal point of view. As Nagel explains it, "The appearance of supererogation in a morality is a recognition from an impersonal standpoint of the difficulties with which that standpoint has to contend in becoming motivationally effective in the real life of beings of whom it is only one aspect" (p. 204). In contrast, Barbara Herman argues that Kantianism indeed does not permit "unconditional attachment" to personal projects irrespective of their morality and that "it does not seem rational to want it otherwise." She claims further that such unconditional attachments are not even essential to one's character or integrity (Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," Monist 66 [1983]: 233-50, p. 243). See also Conly's related response to Williams on behalf of Utilitarianism at pp. 305-11, p. 308 ("as much emotional attachment [to personal projects] as Williams wants, admittedly more than utilitarianism allows, gives not so much integrity as something like solipsism"); and Marcia Baron's response to Slote in "On Admirable Immorality," Ethics 96 (1986): 557-66, esp. pp. 563-64 (single-minded devotion [to a project] that knows no bounds is not admirable and is rightly prohibited by morality). I return to these issues in n. 51, below.
77. On the "objective purview" response: see, e.g., Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," reprinted in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. S. Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 93-133, esp. pp. 113-17; see also Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, esp. p. 303. This general point is often put by saying that Utilitarianism provides a criterion or standard of rightness, not a decision procedure. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), bk. 4, chap. 1, sec. 1, and chap. 3, sec. 3; R. E. Bales, "Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?" American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971): 257-65; Brink. On the "supererogation" response: see, e.g., Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 203-4; Stephen Darwall, "Abolishing Morality," Synthese 72 (1987): 71-89, esp. pp. 78-83. Note that for the "Kantians," the ability of morality to accommodate personal goods also derives from morality's objective or impersonal point of view. As Nagel explains it, "The appearance of supererogation in a morality is a recognition from an impersonal standpoint of the difficulties with which that standpoint has to contend in becoming motivationally effective in the real life of beings of whom it is only one aspect" (p. 204). In contrast, Barbara Herman argues that Kantianism indeed does not permit "unconditional attachment" to personal projects irrespective of their morality and that "it does not seem rational to want it otherwise." She claims further that such unconditional attachments are not even essential to one's character or integrity (Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," Monist 66 [1983]: 233-50, p. 243). See also Conly's related response to Williams on behalf of Utilitarianism at pp. 305-11, p. 308 ("as much emotional attachment [to personal projects] as Williams wants, admittedly more than utilitarianism allows, gives not so much integrity as something like solipsism"); and Marcia Baron's response to Slote in "On Admirable Immorality," Ethics 96 (1986): 557-66, esp. pp. 563-64 (single-minded devotion [to a project] that knows no bounds is not admirable and is rightly prohibited by morality). I return to these issues in n. 51, below.
78. On the "objective purview" response: see, e.g., Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," reprinted in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. S. Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 93-133, esp. pp. 113-17; see also Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, esp. p. 303. This general point is often put by saying that Utilitarianism provides a criterion or standard of rightness, not a decision procedure. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), bk. 4, chap. 1, sec. 1, and chap. 3, sec. 3; R. E. Bales, "Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?" American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971): 257-65; Brink. On the "supererogation" response: see, e.g., Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 203-4; Stephen Darwall, "Abolishing Morality," Synthese 72 (1987): 71-89, esp. pp. 78-83. Note that for the "Kantians," the ability of morality to accommodate personal goods also derives from morality's objective or impersonal point of view. As Nagel explains it, "The appearance of supererogation in a morality is a recognition from an impersonal standpoint of the difficulties with which that standpoint has to contend in becoming motivationally effective in the real life of beings of whom it is only one aspect" (p. 204). In contrast, Barbara Herman argues that Kantianism indeed does not permit "unconditional attachment" to personal projects irrespective of their morality and that "it does not seem rational to want it otherwise." She claims further that such unconditional attachments are not even essential to one's character or integrity (Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," Monist 66 [1983]: 233-50, p. 243). See also Conly's related response to Williams on behalf of Utilitarianism at pp. 305-11, p. 308 ("as much emotional attachment [to personal projects] as Williams wants, admittedly more than utilitarianism allows, gives not so much integrity as something like solipsism"); and Marcia Baron's response to Slote in "On Admirable Immorality," Ethics 96 (1986): 557-66, esp. pp. 563-64 (single-minded devotion [to a project] that knows no bounds is not admirable and is rightly prohibited by morality). I return to these issues in n. 51, below.
79. On the "objective purview" response: see, e.g., Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," reprinted in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. S. Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 93-133, esp. pp. 113-17; see also Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, esp. p. 303. This general point is often put by saying that Utilitarianism provides a criterion or standard of rightness, not a decision procedure. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), bk. 4, chap. 1, sec. 1, and chap. 3, sec. 3; R. E. Bales, "Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?" American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971): 257-65; Brink. On the "supererogation" response: see, e.g., Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 203-4; Stephen Darwall, "Abolishing Morality," Synthese 72 (1987): 71-89, esp. pp. 78-83. Note that for the "Kantians," the ability of morality to accommodate personal goods also derives from morality's objective or impersonal point of view. As Nagel explains it, "The appearance of supererogation in a morality is a recognition from an impersonal standpoint of the difficulties with which that standpoint has to contend in becoming motivationally effective in the real life of beings of whom it is only one aspect" (p. 204). In contrast, Barbara Herman argues that Kantianism indeed does not permit "unconditional attachment" to personal projects irrespective of their morality and that "it does not seem rational to want it otherwise." She claims further that such unconditional attachments are not even essential to one's character or integrity (Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," Monist 66 [1983]: 233-50, p. 243). See also Conly's related response to Williams on behalf of Utilitarianism at pp. 305-11, p. 308 ("as much emotional attachment [to personal projects] as Williams wants, admittedly more than utilitarianism allows, gives not so much integrity as something like solipsism"); and Marcia Baron's response to Slote in "On Admirable Immorality," Ethics 96 (1986): 557-66, esp. pp. 563-64 (single-minded devotion [to a project] that knows no bounds is not admirable and is rightly prohibited by morality). I return to these issues in n. 51, below.
80. On the "objective purview" response: see, e.g., Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," reprinted in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. S. Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 93-133, esp. pp. 113-17; see also Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, esp. p. 303. This general point is often put by saying that Utilitarianism provides a criterion or standard of rightness, not a decision procedure. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), bk. 4, chap. 1, sec. 1, and chap. 3, sec. 3; R. E. Bales, "Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?" American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971): 257-65; Brink. On the "supererogation" response: see, e.g., Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 203-4; Stephen Darwall, "Abolishing Morality," Synthese 72 (1987): 71-89, esp. pp. 78-83. Note that for the "Kantians," the ability of morality to accommodate personal goods also derives from morality's objective or impersonal point of view. As Nagel explains it, "The appearance of supererogation in a morality is a recognition from an impersonal standpoint of the difficulties with which that standpoint has to contend in becoming motivationally effective in the real life of beings of whom it is only one aspect" (p. 204). In contrast, Barbara Herman argues that Kantianism indeed does not permit "unconditional attachment" to personal projects irrespective of their morality and that "it does not seem rational to want it otherwise." She claims further that such unconditional attachments are not even essential to one's character or integrity (Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," Monist 66 [1983]: 233-50, p. 243). See also Conly's related response to Williams on behalf of Utilitarianism at pp. 305-11, p. 308 ("as much emotional attachment [to personal projects] as Williams wants, admittedly more than utilitarianism allows, gives not so much integrity as something like solipsism"); and Marcia Baron's response to Slote in "On Admirable Immorality," Ethics 96 (1986): 557-66, esp. pp. 563-64 (single-minded devotion [to a project] that knows no bounds is not admirable and is rightly prohibited by morality). I return to these issues in n. 51, below.
81. On the "objective purview" response: see, e.g., Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," reprinted in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. S. Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 93-133, esp. pp. 113-17; see also Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, esp. p. 303. This general point is often put by saying that Utilitarianism provides a criterion or standard of rightness, not a decision procedure. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), bk. 4, chap. 1, sec. 1, and chap. 3, sec. 3; R. E. Bales, "Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?" American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971): 257-65; Brink. On the "supererogation" response: see, e.g., Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 203-4; Stephen Darwall, "Abolishing Morality," Synthese 72 (1987): 71-89, esp. pp. 78-83. Note that for the "Kantians," the ability of morality to accommodate personal goods also derives from morality's objective or impersonal point of view. As Nagel explains it, "The appearance of supererogation in a morality is a recognition from an impersonal standpoint of the difficulties with which that standpoint has to contend in becoming motivationally effective in the real life of beings of whom it is only one aspect" (p. 204). In contrast, Barbara Herman argues that Kantianism indeed does not permit "unconditional attachment" to personal projects irrespective of their morality and that "it does not seem rational to want it otherwise." She claims further that such unconditional attachments are not even essential to one's character or integrity (Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," Monist 66 [1983]: 233-50, p. 243). See also Conly's related response to Williams on behalf of Utilitarianism at pp. 305-11, p. 308 ("as much emotional attachment [to personal projects] as Williams wants, admittedly more than utilitarianism allows, gives not so much integrity as something like solipsism"); and Marcia Baron's response to Slote in "On Admirable Immorality," Ethics 96 (1986): 557-66, esp. pp. 563-64 (single-minded devotion [to a project] that knows no bounds is not admirable and is rightly prohibited by morality). I return to these issues in n. 51, below.
82. On the "objective purview" response: see, e.g., Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality," reprinted in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. S. Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 93-133, esp. pp. 113-17; see also Sarah Conly, "Utilitarianism and Integrity," Monist 66 (1983): 298-311, esp. p. 303. This general point is often put by saying that Utilitarianism provides a criterion or standard of rightness, not a decision procedure. See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), bk. 4, chap. 1, sec. 1, and chap. 3, sec. 3; R. E. Bales, "Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?" American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1971): 257-65; Brink. On the "supererogation" response: see, e.g., Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 203-4; Stephen Darwall, "Abolishing Morality," Synthese 72 (1987): 71-89, esp. pp. 78-83. Note that for the "Kantians," the ability of morality to accommodate personal goods also derives from morality's objective or impersonal point of view. As Nagel explains it, "The appearance of supererogation in a morality is a recognition from an impersonal standpoint of the difficulties with which that standpoint has to contend in becoming motivationally effective in the real life of beings of whom it is only one aspect" (p. 204). In contrast, Barbara Herman argues that Kantianism indeed does not permit "unconditional attachment" to personal projects irrespective of their morality and that "it does not seem rational to want it otherwise." She claims further that such unconditional attachments are not even essential to one's character or integrity (Barbara Herman, "Integrity and Impartiality," Monist 66 [1983]: 233-50, p. 243). See also Conly's related response to Williams on behalf of Utilitarianism at pp. 305-11, p. 308 ("as much emotional attachment [to personal projects] as Williams wants, admittedly more than utilitarianism allows, gives not so much integrity as something like solipsism"); and Marcia Baron's response to Slote in "On Admirable Immorality," Ethics 96 (1986): 557-66, esp. pp. 563-64 (single-minded devotion [to a project] that knows no bounds is not admirable and is rightly prohibited by morality). I return to these issues in n. 51, below.
83. Some cautionary notes about the distinction developed in this section between Theory and Morality Critics are in order. There is, of course, a real distinction here, but it may not be as easy to mark as I have so far suggested. Take, e.g., Susan Wolf's remark that "the basic problem with any of the models of moral sainthood . . . is that they are dominated by a single, all-important value under which all other possible values must be subsumed" (p. 431).
84. As a freestanding complaint, this could be made by a Theory Critic as well as a Morality Critic: for the former, it would come in the context of an attack on the reductionist aims of Theory based on the real "diversity of goods"; for the latter, it would serve to show that the reason the ("perfect master's") Moral Life is incompatible with the Good Life is that it privileges some type of moral value at the expense of other, nonmoral values. Quite generally, it is easy to see how, e.g., objections to the reductionist aims of Theory based on the plurality of values can quickly start to sound like objections to Morality for wrongly overriding other distinct sources of value. The difference here may only be a matter of emphasis, though it is a difference that is real enough: the Theory Critic invokes the plurality of values to emphasize the inadequacy of a theoretical framework which excludes so much, while the Morality Critic invokes the plurality of values in order to emphasize the costs of morality's OT and to argue against it. The ease with which we might move from one sort of criticism to the other should not obscure the fact, however, that many writers lodge themselves firmly in one camp rather than the other - in fact, only Williams and Foot seem to take both sorts of critical positions. Wolf, e.g., is explicit in distancing herself from any critique of theory per se: "The flaws of a perfect master of a moral theory need not reflect flaws in the intramoral content of the theory itself" (p. 435). Rather, for
85. Wolf, such flaws show only the need for more theory, a theory of "reasons that are independent of moral reasons for wanting ourselves and others to develop our characters and live our lives in certain ways" (p. 437).
86. A different question is whether he offers an ethical theory more akin to ancient ones - say, a type of virtue ethics, as some recent writers have suggested. See, e.g., John Casey, Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), esp. pp. 79-83; Lester Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue (London: Routledge, 1991). The difficulties with Hunt's account will serve to highlight the problems confronting this interpretation of Nietzsche. According to Hunt, Nietzsche's theory of virtue is "procedural": "it specifies which traits are virtues by indicating a certain process and declaring that any trait that arises from this process is virtuous" (p. 145). The relevant process is given by Nietzsche's "experimentalism," which requires us to experiment with different goals until we find those which bring about "a complete integration of the psyche" (p. 141), such that "one part of the self imposes order on other, potentially chaotic parts by successfully orienting the subordinate parts towards its own purposes" (p. 128). The traits that are conducive to the integrating goals are, says Hunt, virtues for Nietzsche. There is certainly something broadly right about this picture, though its vagueness is only one of its several problems. First, the theory seems not so much procedural as substantive, since it employs a substantive criterion (integration of the self) for identifying which goal-oriented activities involve virtues. Second, it seems to stretch Nietzsche's ambitions considerably to attribute to him something called a "procedural theory of virtue." Third, Hunt gives almost none of the detail about particular virtues that interest most contemporary writers (including, e.g., Casey), even relegating Nietzsche's own specific virtue lists to an endnote (p. 187, n. 4). While Hunt has a multitude of interesting things to say about Nietzsche, it is not clear that his account makes Nietzsche a virtue theorist of much practical or philosophical help.
87. A different question is whether he offers an ethical theory more akin to ancient ones - say, a type of virtue ethics, as some recent writers have suggested. See, e.g., John Casey, Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), esp. pp. 79-83; Lester Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue (London: Routledge, 1991). The difficulties with Hunt's account will serve to highlight the problems confronting this interpretation of Nietzsche. According to Hunt, Nietzsche's theory of virtue is "procedural": "it specifies which traits are virtues by indicating a certain process and declaring that any trait that arises from this process is virtuous" (p. 145). The relevant process is given by Nietzsche's "experimentalism," which requires us to experiment with different goals until we find those which bring about "a complete integration of the psyche" (p. 141), such that "one part of the self imposes order on other, potentially chaotic parts by successfully orienting the subordinate parts towards its own purposes" (p. 128). The traits that are conducive to the integrating goals are, says Hunt, virtues for Nietzsche. There is certainly something broadly right about this picture, though its vagueness is only one of its several problems. First, the theory seems not so much procedural as substantive, since it employs a substantive criterion (integration of the self) for identifying which goal-oriented activities involve virtues. Second, it seems to stretch Nietzsche's ambitions considerably to attribute to him something called a "procedural theory of virtue." Third, Hunt gives almost none of the detail about particular virtues that interest most contemporary writers (including, e.g., Casey), even relegating Nietzsche's own specific virtue lists to an endnote (p. 187, n. 4). While Hunt has a multitude of interesting things to say about Nietzsche, it is not clear that his account makes Nietzsche a virtue theorist of much practical or philosophical help.
88. A different question is whether he offers an ethical theory more akin to ancient ones - say, a type of virtue ethics, as some recent writers have suggested. See, e.g., John Casey, Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), esp. pp. 79-83; Lester Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue (London: Routledge, 1991). The difficulties with Hunt's account will serve to highlight the problems confronting this interpretation of Nietzsche. According to Hunt, Nietzsche's theory of virtue is "procedural": "it specifies which traits are virtues by indicating a certain process and declaring that any trait that arises from this process is virtuous" (p. 145). The relevant process is given by Nietzsche's "experimentalism," which requires us to experiment with different goals until we find those which bring about "a complete integration of the psyche" (p. 141), such that "one part of the self imposes order on other, potentially chaotic parts by successfully orienting the subordinate parts towards its own purposes" (p. 128). The traits that are conducive to the integrating goals are, says Hunt, virtues for Nietzsche. There is certainly something broadly right about this picture, though its vagueness is only one of its several problems. First, the theory seems not so much procedural as substantive, since it employs a substantive criterion (integration of the self) for identifying which goal-oriented activities involve virtues. Second, it seems to stretch Nietzsche's ambitions considerably to attribute to him something called a "procedural theory of virtue." Third, Hunt gives almost none of the detail about particular virtues that interest most contemporary writers (including, e.g., Casey), even relegating Nietzsche's own specific virtue lists to an endnote (p. 187, n. 4). While Hunt has a multitude of interesting things to say about Nietzsche, it is not clear that his account makes Nietzsche a virtue theorist of much practical or philosophical help.
89. A different question is whether he offers an ethical theory more akin to ancient ones - say, a type of virtue ethics, as some recent writers have suggested. See, e.g., John Casey, Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), esp. pp. 79-83; Lester Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue (London: Routledge, 1991). The difficulties with Hunt's account will serve to highlight the problems confronting this interpretation of Nietzsche. According to Hunt, Nietzsche's theory of virtue is "procedural": "it specifies which traits are virtues by indicating a certain process and declaring that any trait that arises from this process is virtuous" (p. 145). The relevant process is given by Nietzsche's "experimentalism," which requires us to experiment with different goals until we find those which bring about "a complete integration of the psyche" (p. 141), such that "one part of the self imposes order on other, potentially chaotic parts by successfully orienting the subordinate parts towards its own purposes" (p. 128). The traits that are conducive to the integrating goals are, says Hunt, virtues for Nietzsche. There is certainly something broadly right about this picture, though its vagueness is only one of its several problems. First, the theory seems not so much procedural as substantive, since it employs a substantive criterion (integration of the self) for identifying which goal-oriented activities involve virtues. Second, it seems to stretch Nietzsche's ambitions considerably to attribute to him something called a "procedural theory of virtue." Third, Hunt gives almost none of the detail about particular virtues that interest most contemporary writers (including, e.g., Casey), even relegating Nietzsche's own specific virtue lists to an endnote (p. 187, n. 4). While Hunt has a multitude of interesting things to say about Nietzsche, it is not clear that his account makes Nietzsche a virtue theorist of much practical or philosophical help.
90. A different question is whether he offers an ethical theory more akin to ancient ones - say, a type of virtue ethics, as some recent writers have suggested. See, e.g., John Casey, Pagan Virtue: An Essay in Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), esp. pp. 79-83; Lester Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue (London: Routledge, 1991). The difficulties with Hunt's account will serve to highlight the problems confronting this interpretation of Nietzsche. According to Hunt, Nietzsche's theory of virtue is "procedural": "it specifies which traits are virtues by indicating a certain process and declaring that any trait that arises from this process is virtuous" (p. 145). The relevant process is given by Nietzsche's "experimentalism," which requires us to experiment with different goals until we find those which bring about "a complete integration of the psyche" (p. 141), such that "one part of the self imposes order on other, potentially chaotic parts by successfully orienting the subordinate parts towards its own purposes" (p. 128). The traits that are conducive to the integrating goals are, says Hunt, virtues for Nietzsche. There is certainly something broadly right about this picture, though its vagueness is only one of its several problems. First, the theory seems not so much procedural as substantive, since it employs a substantive criterion (integration of the self) for identifying which goal-oriented activities involve virtues. Second, it seems to stretch Nietzsche's ambitions considerably to attribute to him something called a "procedural theory of virtue." Third, Hunt gives almost none of the detail about particular virtues that interest most contemporary writers (including, e.g., Casey), even relegating Nietzsche's own specific virtue lists to an endnote (p. 187, n. 4). While Hunt has a multitude of interesting things to say about Nietzsche, it is not clear that his account makes Nietzsche a virtue theorist of much practical or philosophical help.
91. For a more substantial discussion of these oft-neglected themes in Nietzsche's work, see Brian Leiter, "The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche," in Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator, ed. C. Janaway (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press).
92. For further discussion, see ibid.
93. See esp. Brian Leiter, "Morality in the Pejorative Sense: On the Logic of Nietzsche's Critique of Morality," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 3 (1995): 113-45, and also Leiter, "Beyond Good and Evil," History of Philosophy Quarterly 10 (1993): 261-70. The former sets out the affinities and differences my account has with those common in the secondary literature.
94. See esp. Brian Leiter, "Morality in the Pejorative Sense: On the Logic of Nietzsche's Critique of Morality," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 3 (1995): 113-45, and also Leiter, "Beyond Good and Evil," History of Philosophy Quarterly 10 (1993): 261-70. The former sets out the affinities and differences my account has with those common in the secondary literature.
95. For some nonpejorative uses of the word 'morality', see, e.g., TI, IV, sec. 4 (where he speaks of the possibility of a "healthy morality" [gesunde Moral]), and BGE, 202 ("higher moralities" [Morale]). On the nature and content of such a morality, see my "Beyond Good and Evil."
96. Smart's Utilitarianism is a good example of an MPS that embodies a normative agenda that is objectionable on Nietzschean grounds, while involving no commitment to an untenable metaphysics of agency. See esp. J. J. C. Smart, "'Ought,' 'Can,' Free Will and Responsibility," in Ethics, Persuasion and Truth (London: Routledge, 1984). Bernard Williams has gone so far as to suggest that because blaming can be justified on utilitarian grounds alone (and regardless of whether agents have free will), Utilitarianism is, at best, a "marginal member of the morality system" - where Williams takes Kantian morality to be the paradigmatic member (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 178).
97. Smart's Utilitarianism is a good example of an MPS that embodies a normative agenda that is objectionable on Nietzschean grounds, while involving no commitment to an untenable metaphysics of agency. See esp. J. J. C. Smart, "'Ought,' 'Can,' Free Will and Responsibility," in Ethics, Persuasion and Truth (London: Routledge, 1984). Bernard Williams has gone so far as to suggest that because blaming can be justified on utilitarian grounds alone (and regardless of whether agents have free will), Utilitarianism is, at best, a "marginal member of the morality system" - where Williams takes Kantian morality to be the paradigmatic member (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 178).
98. See the overview in Leiter, "Morality in the Pejorative Sense," pp. 113-17.
99. See, e.g., Nehamas, pp. 209, 214, 223.
100. See D, 163; BGE, 62, 212; GM, III, sec. 14; A, 5, 24; EH, IV, sec. 4; WP, 274, 345, 400, 870, 879, 957. For example, in a work of 1880 he writes, "Our weak, unmanly, social concepts of good and evil and their tremendous ascendancy over body and soul have finally weakened all bodies and souls and snapped the self-reliant, independent, unprejudiced men, the pillars of a strong civilization" (D, 163). While in a posthumously published note of 1885 he remarks that "men of great creativity, the really great men according to my understanding, will be sought in vain today" because "nothing stands more malignantly in the way of their rise and evolution . . . than what in Europe today is called simply 'morality'" (WP, 957). Similarly, in a late note of 1888, he observes (in a passage plainly echoing the preface of GM),
101. I should not be construed here as endorsing the idiosyncratic view defended in the last chapter of Nehamas. According to Nehamas, Nietzsche does not describe his ideal person - his "higher man" - but rather "exemplifies" such a person in the form of the "character" that is constituted by and exemplified in his literary corpus. Nietzsche, however, describes at great length and in many places (see D, 201; GS, 55; BGE, 287; WP, 943) the types of persons he admires, and he also describes himself as such a person (see EH, I, sec. 2). For further criticism of Nehamas on this and other points, see my "Nietzsche and Aestheticism."
102. This type of simplifying move, however, does not obviously help us get a fix on who "lower men" are supposed to be. Yet not saying more about "lower men" is not necessarily problematic for my project here of characterizing Nietzsche's conception of MPS. For the heart of Nietzsche's complaint is simply that MPS has a deleterious effect on higher types (i.e., those who manifest human excellence). It is true that Nietzsche also seems to think that MPS is in the interests of other persons - "lower men" - but this by itself is not objectionable; recall that Nietzsche says, "The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd - but not reach out beyond it" (WP, 287). It is this "reaching out beyond," then, that is at issue because it is this that harms "higher men." If there were a social order in which MPS existed - and in which it served the interests of "lower" types - without having any effects on potentially "higher men," then one would imagine that Nietzsche should have no objections. In that case, one could leave the issue of who "lower men" are pleasantly vague without any cost to the analytical task of getting clear about Nietzsche's critique of morality.
103. So an agent who says, colloquially speaking, "I would gladly lead my life again, except for the time in my thirties when I was ill and depressed," would not affirm life in the requisite sense.
104. For example, EH, III, Z-1: "The idea of the eternal recurrence, this highest formulation of affirmation that is at all attainable" (cf. BGE, 56).
105. Some writers (e.g., Richard Schacht, Nietische [London: Routledge, 1983]) have argued that Nietzsche objects to MPS centrally because it is harmful to "life." The main difficulty with this approach, even as it is typically developed, is its vagueness: as Mark Platts remarks, "Morality versus life is not the best defined of battle lines" (Moral Realities [London: Routledge, 1991], p. 220). I argue elsewhere that when Nietzsche speaks of morality being harmful to "life," he really means harmful to "higher men"; see my "Morality in the Pejorative Sense," pp. 132-34. Other writers (including Schacht again) have suggested that Nietzsche criticizes morality by reference to his preferred standard of "value" as "will to power." I ignore this possibility here, because it seems to make the notion of "will to power" more central to Nietzsche's mature thought than recent scholarship would suggest is warranted. See Mazzino Montinari, "Nietzsches Nachlass von 1885 bis 1888 oder Textkritik und Wille zur Macht," in his Nietzsche Lesen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1982); Clark, pp. 212-27. Textual worries aside, I doubt whether a good argument can even be made out that "will to power" provides Nietzsche with his standard of value. I make this case in an unpublished manuscript, "Nietzsche's Metaethics."
106. Some writers (e.g., Richard Schacht, Nietische [London: Routledge, 1983]) have argued that Nietzsche objects to MPS centrally because it is harmful to "life." The main difficulty with this approach, even as it is typically developed, is its vagueness: as Mark Platts remarks, "Morality versus life is not the best defined of battle lines" (Moral Realities [London: Routledge, 1991], p. 220). I argue elsewhere that when Nietzsche speaks of morality being harmful to "life," he really means harmful to "higher men"; see my "Morality in the Pejorative Sense," pp. 132-34. Other writers (including Schacht again) have suggested that Nietzsche criticizes morality by reference to his preferred standard of "value" as "will to power." I ignore this possibility here, because it seems to make the notion of "will to power" more central to Nietzsche's mature thought than recent scholarship would suggest is warranted. See Mazzino Montinari, "Nietzsches Nachlass von 1885 bis 1888 oder Textkritik und Wille zur Macht," in his Nietzsche Lesen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1982); Clark, pp. 212-27. Textual worries aside, I doubt whether a good argument can even be made out that "will to power" provides Nietzsche with his standard of value. I make this case in an unpublished manuscript, "Nietzsche's Metaethics."
107. Some writers (e.g., Richard Schacht, Nietische [London: Routledge, 1983]) have argued that Nietzsche objects to MPS centrally because it is harmful to "life." The main difficulty with this approach, even as it is typically developed, is its vagueness: as Mark Platts remarks, "Morality versus life is not the best defined of battle lines" (Moral Realities [London: Routledge, 1991], p. 220). I argue elsewhere that when Nietzsche speaks of morality being harmful to "life," he really means harmful to "higher men"; see my "Morality in the Pejorative Sense," pp. 132-34. Other writers (including Schacht again) have suggested that Nietzsche criticizes morality by reference to his preferred standard of "value" as "will to power." I ignore this possibility here, because it seems to make the notion of "will to power" more central to Nietzsche's mature thought than recent scholarship would suggest is warranted. See Mazzino Montinari, "Nietzsches Nachlass von 1885 bis 1888 oder Textkritik und Wille zur Macht," in his Nietzsche Lesen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1982); Clark, pp. 212-27. Textual worries aside, I doubt whether a good argument can even be made out that "will to power" provides Nietzsche with his standard of value. I make this case in an unpublished manuscript, "Nietzsche's Metaethics."
108. Some writers (e.g., Richard Schacht, Nietische [London: Routledge, 1983]) have argued that Nietzsche objects to MPS centrally because it is harmful to "life." The main difficulty with this approach, even as it is typically developed, is its vagueness: as Mark Platts remarks, "Morality versus life is not the best defined of battle lines" (Moral Realities [London: Routledge, 1991], p. 220). I argue elsewhere that when Nietzsche speaks of morality being harmful to "life," he really means harmful to "higher men"; see my "Morality in the Pejorative Sense," pp. 132-34. Other writers (including Schacht again) have suggested that Nietzsche criticizes morality by reference to his preferred standard of "value" as "will to power." I ignore this possibility here, because it seems to make the notion of "will to power" more central to Nietzsche's mature thought than recent scholarship would suggest is warranted. See Mazzino Montinari, "Nietzsches Nachlass von 1885 bis 1888 oder Textkritik und Wille zur Macht," in his Nietzsche Lesen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1982); Clark, pp. 212-27. Textual worries aside, I doubt whether a good argument can even be made out that "will to power" provides Nietzsche with his standard of value. I make this case in an unpublished manuscript, "Nietzsche's Metaethics."
109. Some writers (e.g., Richard Schacht, Nietische [London: Routledge, 1983]) have argued that Nietzsche objects to MPS centrally because it is harmful to "life." The main difficulty with this approach, even as it is typically developed, is its vagueness: as Mark Platts remarks, "Morality versus life is not the best defined of battle lines" (Moral Realities [London: Routledge, 1991], p. 220). I argue elsewhere that when Nietzsche speaks of morality being harmful to "life," he really means harmful to "higher men"; see my "Morality in the Pejorative Sense," pp. 132-34. Other writers (including Schacht again) have suggested that Nietzsche criticizes morality by reference to his preferred standard of "value" as "will to power." I ignore this possibility here, because it seems to make the notion of "will to power" more central to Nietzsche's mature thought than recent scholarship would suggest is warranted. See Mazzino Montinari, "Nietzsches Nachlass von 1885 bis 1888 oder Textkritik und Wille zur Macht," in his Nietzsche Lesen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1982); Clark, pp. 212-27. Textual worries aside, I doubt whether a good argument can even be made out that "will to power" provides Nietzsche with his standard of value. I make this case in an unpublished manuscript, "Nietzsche's Metaethics."
110. Some writers (e.g., Richard Schacht, Nietische [London: Routledge, 1983]) have argued that Nietzsche objects to MPS centrally because it is harmful to "life." The main difficulty with this approach, even as it is typically developed, is its vagueness: as Mark Platts remarks, "Morality versus life is not the best defined of battle lines" (Moral Realities [London: Routledge, 1991], p. 220). I argue elsewhere that when Nietzsche speaks of morality being harmful to "life," he really means harmful to "higher men"; see my "Morality in the Pejorative Sense," pp. 132-34. Other writers (including Schacht again) have suggested that Nietzsche criticizes morality by reference to his preferred standard of "value" as "will to power." I ignore this possibility here, because it seems to make the notion of "will to power" more central to Nietzsche's mature thought than recent scholarship would suggest is warranted. See Mazzino Montinari, "Nietzsches Nachlass von 1885 bis 1888 oder Textkritik und Wille zur Macht," in his Nietzsche Lesen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1982); Clark, pp. 212-27. Textual worries aside, I doubt whether a good argument can even be made out that "will to power" provides Nietzsche with his standard of value. I make this case in an unpublished manuscript, "Nietzsche's Metaethics."
111. For a more complete discussion, see again my "Morality in the Pejorative Sense," pp. 134-42.
112. Nietzsche only advocates "severe" self-love, i.e., highly critical concern with the self, as the only self-love conducive to the full flourishing of the strong and healthy individual. See EH, IV, sec. 7, and the further discussion below.
113. One problem with this view is that its endpoint - the abolition of suffering and the reign of happiness - is an impossibility because Nietzsche holds that "happiness and unhappiness are sisters" (GS, 338), that we must have both in order to have either. Although the unity of apparent opposites is a recurring theme in Nietzsche, it is not central to his objection to this aspect of MPS. A useful discussion of this theme can be found in Nehamas, pp. 209-11.
114. Nietzsche no doubt construes the doctrine thus uncharitably because he thinks that the "British utilitarians . . . walk clumsily and honorably in Bentham's footsteps" and that they have "not a new idea, no trace of a subtler version or twist of an old idea" (BGE, 228). Mill, of course, was at pains to develop a subtler hedonistic doctrine than Bentham's, though it is an open question whether in the process he does not pour all the content out of the notion of "pleasure." In any event, Nietzsche drew no distinction between Bentham and Mill - referring to the latter (in an especially intemperate spirit) as "the flathead John Stuart Mill" (WP, 30).
115. Compare GS, pref. 3: "Only great pain is the ultimate liberator of the spirit. . . . I doubt that such pain makes us 'better'; but I know that it makes us more profound."
116. For a general account, see Ronald Hayman, Nietzsche: A Critical Life (New York: Penguin, 1980).
117. Compare this letter of January 1880, quoted ibid., p. 219: "My existence is a fearful burden. I would have thrown it off long ago if I had not been making the most instructive tests and experiments on mental and moral questions in precisely this condition of suffering and almost complete renunciation."
118. Nietzsche, in fact, reverses the MPS valuation, commenting, "Never have I felt happier with myself than in the sickest and most painful periods of my life" (EH, III, HAH-4).
119. Richard Miller, Moral Differences (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 309.
120. Indeed, even among Morality Critics we sometimes hear echoes of the specifically Nietzschean worry, e.g., in the famous Gauguin case, where it is supposed that the Moral Life would undermine "great creativity," or in Wolf's worry that the moral saint cannot achieve "any of a great variety of forms of personal excellence" (p. 426). Moreover, we have already noted that there is clearly an element of extremism running through Nietzsche's critical position; e.g., we can be sure that Nietzsche would not agree with Wolf that a critique of morality does not show "that moral value should not be an important, even the most important, kind of value we attend to in evaluating and improving ourselves and our world" (p. 438). Yet we can live (probably happily) with these differences of degree and still think that Nietzsche joins cause with the Morality Critics, quite broadly, in accepting the truth of IT and rejecting OT.
121. Indeed, even among Morality Critics we sometimes hear echoes of the specifically Nietzschean worry, e.g., in the famous Gauguin case, where it is supposed that the Moral Life would undermine "great creativity," or in Wolf's worry that the moral saint cannot achieve "any of a great variety of forms of personal excellence" (p. 426). Moreover, we have already noted that there is clearly an element of extremism running through Nietzsche's critical position; e.g., we can be sure that Nietzsche would not agree with Wolf that a critique of morality does not show "that moral value should not be an important, even the most important, kind of value we attend to in evaluating and improving ourselves and our world" (p. 438). Yet we can live (probably happily) with these differences of degree and still think that Nietzsche joins cause with the Morality Critics, quite broadly, in accepting the truth of IT and rejecting OT.
122. See the literature cited above in n. 25. As we saw earlier, there are really two strands in the responses to the Morality Critics: what we might call "Bullet Biters" and "Accommodationists." Bullet Biters like Conly, Herman, and Baron simply "bite the bullet" on the challenge of the Morality Critics: yes, these writers concede, morality is incompatible with a certain sort of commitment to personal projects - but so much the better, the Bullet Biters claim. For the sort of ability of personal projects to override morality that the Critics envision is not appealing, admirable, or central to a person's character or integrity. By contrast, Accommodationists like Railton, Nagel, and Darwall accept the force of the Critics' challenge but claim that morality can, contrary to IT, accommodate the sorts of personal projects that the Morality Critics care about. It is the response of the Accommodationists that is analogous to the challenge posed by the Harm Puzzle. (Needless to say, the line between the two types of theory defenders is not hard and fast. See Railton's account of why "alienation is not always a bad thing," pp. 106-8, and compare with the position of the Bullet Biters.)
123. For doubts that this is, in fact, an adequate response, see Wolf, p. 428. For related discussion of the important political dimension of these issues, see Railton, pp. 122-23; and Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 206-7. For a very different perspective on this debate, however, see the scathing critique of the: Morality Critics (including Wolf) in Catherine Wilson, "On Some Alleged Limitations to Moral Endeavor," Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 275-89.
124. For doubts that this is, in fact, an adequate response, see Wolf, p. 428. For related discussion of the important political dimension of these issues, see Railton, pp. 122-23; and Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 206-7. For a very different perspective on this debate, however, see the scathing critique of the: Morality Critics (including Wolf) in Catherine Wilson, "On Some Alleged Limitations to Moral Endeavor," Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 275-89.
125. For doubts that this is, in fact, an adequate response, see Wolf, p. 428. For related discussion of the important political dimension of these issues, see Railton, pp. 122-23; and Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 206-7. For a very different perspective on this debate, however, see the scathing critique of the: Morality Critics (including Wolf) in Catherine Wilson, "On Some Alleged Limitations to Moral Endeavor," Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 275-89.
126. For doubts that this is, in fact, an adequate response, see Wolf, p. 428. For related discussion of the important political dimension of these issues, see Railton, pp. 122-23; and Nagel, View from Nowhere, pp. 206-7. For a very different perspective on this debate, however, see the scathing critique of the: Morality Critics (including Wolf) in Catherine Wilson, "On Some Alleged Limitations to Moral Endeavor," Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 275-89.
127. Of course, the theorist might object that, even if Nietzsche were right, all this would show is that our cultural practices need correction by a suitable moral theory, one that will permit nascent Nietzsches to suffer and the like. I shall postpone this worry for now and consider it, and several other objections to Nietzsche's position, in the final section of this paper.
128. Compare Lawrence Becker's observation that defenders of morality's commitment to impartiality try to show that the "purported inadequacies [of impartiality] . . . are not really attributable to a proper theoretical commitment to impartiality" ("Impartiality and Ethical Theory," Ethics 101 [1991]: 698-700, p. 700, emphasis added). See also Stocker: "[The phenomenon of] admirable immorality . . . show[s] how immorality and defect can and must be allowed for in ethical theory" (Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values [Oxford: Clarendon, 1990], p. 50).
129. Compare Lawrence Becker's observation that defenders of morality's commitment to impartiality try to show that the "purported inadequacies [of impartiality] . . . are not really attributable to a proper theoretical commitment to impartiality" ("Impartiality and Ethical Theory," Ethics 101 [1991]: 698-700, p. 700, emphasis added). See also Stocker: "[The phenomenon of] admirable immorality . . . show[s] how immorality and defect can and must be allowed for in ethical theory" (Michael Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values [Oxford: Clarendon, 1990], p. 50).
130. Indeed, one might pick out various points where the Morality Critics seem to echo Nietzsche. Compare Wolf: "A moral saint will have to be very, very nice. It is important that he not be offensive. The worry is that, as a result, he will have to be dull-witted or humorless or bland" (p. 422); cf. BGE, 260: "the good human being [according to slave morality] has to be undangerous . . . : he is good-natured, easy to deceive, a little stupid perhaps, un bonhomme. Wherever slave morality becomes preponderant, language tends to bring the words 'good' and 'stupid' closer together."
131. The reader may wonder in what sense Nietzsche's claims are empirical, since they are hardly the upshot of systematic investigation into, say, the psychology and etiology of genius. They are empirical, however, in the sense that Nietzsche seems to have reached these conclusions from certain sorts of observation: first, and most important, of himself and his own development (note that the theme only appears in his work in the very late 1870s, when he is about thirty-five and has already been ill for several years); second, of various historical figures and cultures with which he was acquainted through his studies and reading. As I note at the end, though, the case for his critique really requires a more sustained empirical examination.
132. Compare Annette Baier's complaints about the irrelevance of moral theory, of its "construction of private fantasy moral worlds" ("Doing without Moral Theory?" p. 235; cf. p. 234).
133. Gilles Deleuze aptly calls phenomenology "our modern scholasticism" in Nietische and Philosophy, trans. H. Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 195.
134. Nagel, Mortal Questions, p. xii.
135. One might worry, though, that such a complaint will backfire against Nietzsche, for isn't he a "theorist" of sorts, hoping to affect cultural practice? The answer, I think, is that Nietzsche is an esoteric moralist, hoping to reach only a few select readers, those "predisposed and predestined for" his insights (BGE, 30); thus he aims not to reform culture but to enlighten a select few to the dangers of the dominant moral culture. This is why, contrary to a large amount of recent literature, Nietzsche does not have any political theory or any real politics. I hope to address these issues, however, elsewhere.
136. See Nehamas, pp. 202-3; Philippa Foot, "Nietzsche's Immoralism," New York Review of Books 38 (June 13, 1991), p. 19, reprinted in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality.
137. See Nehamas, pp. 202-3; Philippa Foot, "Nietzsche's Immoralism," New York Review of Books 38 (June 13, 1991), p. 19, reprinted in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality.
138. See Nehamas, pp. 202-3; Philippa Foot, "Nietzsche's Immoralism," New York Review of Books 38 (June 13, 1991), p. 19, reprinted in Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality.
139. Nietzsche's polemic against Christianity in The Antichrist is framed in the starkest Calliclean terms, with Nietzsche describing "the cross as the mark of recognition for the most subterranean conspiracy that ever existed - against health, beauty, whatever has turned out well, courage, spirit, graciousness of the soul, against life itself" (A, 62); see also WP, 400: "In the history of morality a will to power finds expression, through which now the slaves and oppressed, now the ill-constituted and those who suffer from themselves, now the mediocre attempt to make those value judgments prevail that are favorable to them."
140. Nietzsche also often blames "Christianity," but we must remember that for Nietzsche Christianity was simply "the most prodigal elaboration of the moral theme to which humanity has ever been subjected" (BT, pref. 5).
141. Foot, "Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values," p. 168.
142. To say that they take the demands of MPS "seriously" is not to say that they understand them in the way a philosophical theory would; it is only to say that they are more likely to take these unsystematic and inchoate demands constitutive of morality as weighing seriously upon them.
143. See the earlier quotations from Zarathustra's description of the last man.
144. In his Calliclean moods, of course, Nietzsche believes that morality really aims to undermine the Extraordinary Life, but one might reject the Callicleanism and still think there is something to the underlying causal claim.
145. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic, 1974), p. 247.