Waldron on Law and Disagreement

Law and Philosophy

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 513-543

  Christiano, Thomas ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034554460     PISSN: 01675249     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3505081     Document Type: Article

References (31)

1. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 126.
2. Hart, p. 129.
3. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), Chap. 4. Raz does not focus much on the institutional dimension of authority until his paper "On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions", in Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations ed. Larry Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
4. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), Chap. 4. Raz does not focus much on the institutional dimension of authority until his paper "On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions", in Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations ed. Larry Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
5. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 376.
6. For the locus classicus of contemporary philosophical anarchism see Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970) and more recently see A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) as well as "Justification and Legitimacy", in Ethics July 1999.
7. For the locus classicus of contemporary philosophical anarchism see Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and Row, 1970) and more recently see A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) as well as "Justification and Legitimacy", in Ethics July 1999.
8. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. See also Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy", in Deliberative Democracy ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998).
9. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. See also Joshua Cohen, "Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy", in Deliberative Democracy ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998).
10. See Waldron's Law and Disagreement Chap. 7 for this critique. See also Jean Hampton, "The Moral Commitments of Liberalism", in The Idea of Democracy ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton and John Roemer (Cambridge University Press, 1993). have also criticized these views in my "The Significance of Public Deliberation", in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998).
11. See Waldron's Law and Disagreement Chap. 7 for this critique. See also Jean Hampton, "The Moral Commitments of Liberalism", in The Idea of Democracy ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton and John Roemer (Cambridge University Press, 1993). have also criticized these views in my "The Significance of Public Deliberation", in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998).
12. See Waldron's Law and Disagreement Chap. 7 for this critique. See also Jean Hampton, "The Moral Commitments of Liberalism", in The Idea of Democracy ed. David Copp, Jean Hampton and John Roemer (Cambridge University Press, 1993). have also criticized these views in my "The Significance of Public Deliberation", in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics ed. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998).
13. Peter Singer in Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974) attempts another defense of democracy along similar lines.
14. See J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, Chap. 8. See also where Waldron considers this possibility as an option (p. 115). Or rather he seems to allow that plural voting may be legitimate but then seems to retract it on the grounds that standards of wisdom are not likely to be agreed upon.
15. Of course, judicial review was introduced in a ruling in 1803 by the Supreme Court. But even in this case, there was no major groundswell to have judicial review made unconstitutional and there have been significant changes to the structure of the US constitution.
16. I have made this criticism of this kind of theory in my paper "Freedom, Consensus and Equality", Ethics October 1990; another version of the criticism can be found in my book The Rule of the Many (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1996) Chap. 2.
17. I have made this criticism of this kind of theory in my paper "Freedom, Consensus and Equality", Ethics October 1990; another version of the criticism can be found in my book The Rule of the Many (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1996) Chap. 2.
18. See J.-J. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality among Men (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1990).
19. I discuss issues of authority and defend my own account of the authority of democracy in "Justice and Disagreement in Political Authority", Ethics October 1999; am working on a book length treatment of it in my Democratic Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
20. I discuss issues of authority and defend my own account of the authority of democracy in "Justice and Disagreement in Political Authority", Ethics October 1999; am working on a book length treatment of it in my Democratic Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
21. See my paper "The Parallelism between Liberal and Democratic Rights" (unpublished ms.) for my own treatment of this parallelism.
22. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964) and Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1950) for two seminal treatments of this question. The literature discussing these problems is gargantuan now.
23. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964) and Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1950) for two seminal treatments of this question. The literature discussing these problems is gargantuan now.
24. I deal with some of these questions in detail in Parts II and III of my The Rule of the Many.
25. Indeed, it appears that some effective forms of democratic control over interpretation of the US Constitution existed before 1803 in the US. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1998) pp. 23, 98-104.
26. One possibility that I cannot explore here in detail is the Rawlsian idea of a kind of reciprocal equal respect for judgment. Each respects the judgment of the other on the condition that the other does likewise. This has a number of difficulties. It requires a partial consensus among citizens. And it still suffers from the problem of reflexivity to the extent that interpretations of equal respect may vary quite a bit in the ways I noted on p. 8 (ms). I have criticized the Rawlsian approach in some detail in my "The Significance of Public Deliberation."
27. I have defended such a principle in my book The Rule of the Many Chap. 2, and at greater length in "Knowledge and Power in the Justification of Democracy", Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).
28. I have defended such a principle in my book The Rule of the Many Chap. 2, and at greater length in "Knowledge and Power in the Justification of Democracy", Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming).
29. I argue for these ideas in much greater detail in my book Democratic Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
30. I argue for a stronger thesis in my book Democratic Equality. I argue that clear cut attempts on the part of democratic assemblies to violate core democratic or liberal rights do not have even pro tanto force.
31. Here I agree with the general thrust of Ronald Dworkin's argument in Freedom's Law [(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996) pp. 23-26] to the effect that there is a democratic rationale for limitations on majority rule.