Vagueness and Degrees of Truth

Vagueness and Degrees of Truth

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-352

  Smith, Nicholas J J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Degree theoretic treatment; Degrees; False sentences; Fuzzy plurivaluationism; Truth; Truth values

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921945424     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199233007.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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