Vagueness in Context

Vagueness in Context

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-240

  Shapiro, Stewart ^a,b  

^a OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Language; Model theory; Philosophical account; Vague terms

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922015484     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280391.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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