Many many problems

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 53, Issue 213, 2003, Pages 481-501

  Weatherson, Brian ^a  

^a BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 48349093723     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00327     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. S. Schiffer, 'Two Issues of Vagueness', Monist, 81 (1998), pp. 193-214,
2. also 'Vagueness and Partial Belief'
3. V. McGee and B. McLaughlin, 'The Lessons of the Many', Philosophical Topics, 28 (2000), pp. 129-51;
4. N. McKinnon, 'Supervaluations and the Problem of the Many', The Philosophical Quarterly, 52 (2002), pp. 320-39;
5. R. Sorensen, 'Direct Reference and Vague Identity', Philosophical Topics, 28 (2000), pp. 175-94.
6. See R. Keefe, Theories of Vagueness (Cambridge UP, 2000), ch. 7.
7. W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (MIT Press, 1960), pp. 26-79;
8. H. Putnam, 'Models and Reality', Journal of Symbolic Logic, 45 (1980), pp. 464-82;
9. S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), pp. 7-55.
10. Putnam, 'Meaning and Reference', Journal of Philosophy, 70 (1973), pp. 699-711;
11. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Harvard UP, 1980), pp. 116-28;
12. D. Lewis, 'New Work for a Theory of Universals', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61 (1983), pp. 343-77,
13. 'Putnam's Paradox', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62 (1984), pp. 221-36.
14. R. Jeshion, 'Acquaintanceless De Re Belief', in M. O'Rourke et al. (eds), Truth and Meaning (New York: Seven Bridges, 2001), pp. 53-74, at p. 67. I do not know if Jeshion would accept the corollary that if belief is too unstructured to allow for the possibility of such organizational roles, then there is no de re belief, but I do accept this.
15. See Z.G. Szabó, 'Descriptions and Uniqueness', Philosophical Studies, 101 (2000), pp. 29-57.
16. F. Jackson, 'Responses', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62 (2001), pp. 653-64, at p. 657.
17. G. Priest, 'What Is So Bad About Contradictions?', Journal of Philosophy, 95 (1998), pp. 410-26.
18. B. Russell, 'Vagueness', Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, 1 (1923), pp. 84-92.
19. G. Evans, 'Can There be Vague Objects?', Analysis, 38 (1978), p. 208;
20. N. Salmon, Reference and Essence (Princeton UP, 1981), pp. 243-6;
21. D. Lewis, 'Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood', Analysis, 48 (1988), pp. 128-30.
22. M. Heller, 'Against Metaphysical Vagueness', Philosophical Perspectives, 10 (1996), pp. 177-85.
23. T. Sider, 'All the World's a Stage', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75 (1997), pp. 433-53.
24. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), ch. 4.
25. A. Gibbard, 'Contingent Identity', Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4 (1975), pp. 187-222.
26. Kit Fine, in 'Compounds and Aggregates', Noûs, 28 (1994), pp. 137-58, says exactly this.
27. Sider, 'Maximality and Intrinsic Properties', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63 (2001), pp. 357-64.
28. J. Fodor and E. LePore, 'What Cannot be Valuated Cannot be Valuated, and it Cannot be Supervaluated Either', Journal of Philosophy, 93 (1996), pp. 516-35.
29. T. Williamson, Vagueness (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 146-53;
30. D. Hyde, 'From Heaps and Gaps to Heaps of Gluts', Mind, 106 (1997), pp. 641-60.
31. S. Read, 'Harmony and Autonomy in Classical Logic', Journal of Philosophical Logic, 29 (2000), pp. 123-54;
32. M. Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (Harvard UP, 1991), pp. 215-20.
33. Lewis, 'Languages and Language', in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1975), pp. 3-35.
34. T. Merricks, 'Varieties of Vagueness', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62 (2001), pp. 145-57.
35. See H. Field, 'Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle', Noûs, 34 (2000), pp. 1-30.