Substantive versus procedural liberalism: Exploring a dilemma of contemporary liberal thought

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 165, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 535-557

  Wegner, Gerhard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ERFURT   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349823256     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/093245609789472005     Document Type: Article

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