Protection of minority interest and the development of security markets

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 7-8, 1997, Pages 519-528

  Modigliani, Franco ^a   Perotti, Enrico ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85040485475     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199711/12)18:7/8<519::AID-MDE857>3.0.CO;2-M     Document Type: Article

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