Preferences or private assessments on a monetary policy committee?

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 67, Issue , 2014, Pages 16-32

  Hansen, Stephen ^a   McMahon, Michael ^b   Velasco Rivera, Carlos ^c  

^a UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^c PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Committees; Monetary policy; Private information

Indexed keywords

EID: 84908481154     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.06.004     Document Type: Article

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