From doves to hawks: A spatial analysis of voting in the monetary policy committee of the bank of England

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 49, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 731-758

  Hix, Simon ^a   Høyland, Bjørn ^b   Vivyan, Nick ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956586549     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: 14756765     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01916.x     Document Type: Article

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