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Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 23-46

Credibility and flexibility with independent monetary policy committees

Author keywords

Monetary policy committees; Reputation

Indexed keywords


EID: 33644784949     PISSN: 00222879     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/mcb.2006.0021     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (19)

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