A decade of dissent: Explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members

Public Choice

Volumn 146, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 413-442

  Harris, Mark N ^a   Levine, Paul ^b   Spencer, Christopher ^c  

^a MONASH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SURREY   (United Kingdom)

^c LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Appointment channels; Bank of England; Career background effects; Dissent voting; Monetary Policy Committee; Unobserved heterogeneity

Indexed keywords

EID: 78751585394     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9597-6     Document Type: Article

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