Depth versus rigidity in the design of international trade agreements

Journal of Theoretical Politics

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 468-495

  Johns, Leslie ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

International law; international organization; international trade

Indexed keywords

EID: 84907169864     PISSN: 09516298     EISSN: 14603667     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0951629813505723     Document Type: Article

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