Optimal income taxation with adverse selection in the labour market

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 81, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 1296-1329

  Stantcheva, Stefanie ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Hidden types; Labour market; Optimal taxation; Rat race; Redistribution; Screening

Indexed keywords

COMPENSATION SYSTEM; INCOME; LABOR MARKET; LABOR POLICY; OPTIMIZATION; TAX SYSTEM;

RATTUS;

EID: 84905180393     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdu005     Document Type: Article

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