Public versus private risk sharing

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 146, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 920-956

  Krueger, Dirk ^a,b,c   Perri, Fabrizio ^b,c,d,e  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^e FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS   (United States)

Author keywords

Incomplete markets; Insurance; Limited enforcement; Progressive taxation

Indexed keywords

EID: 79956303056     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.013     Document Type: Article

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