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Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 1148-1182

Delegation, control, and the study of public bureaucracy

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EID: 84900841476     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter
Times cited : (28)

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