A few good agents: Multi-agent social learning

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 1, Issue , 2008, Pages 334-341

  Oh, Jean ^a   Smith, Stephen F ^b  

^a Language Technologies Institute Carnegie Mellon University ^*  (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Adaptation; Coordination; Price of anarchy; Price of monarchy; Social learning

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; OPTIMIZATION;

ADAPTATION; COORDINATION; PRICE OF ANARCHY; PRICE OF MONARCHY; SOCIAL LEARNING;

COSTS;

EID: 84899896389     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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