Operational decision-making in high-hazard organizations: Drawing a line in the sand

Operational Decision-Making in High-Hazard Organizations: Drawing a Line in the Sand

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 1-168

  Hayes, Jan ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

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EID: 84899302216     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

References (133)

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