Operator competence and capacity - Lessons from the Montara blowout

Safety Science

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 563-574

  Hayes, Jan ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

Barriers; Blowout; Oil industry; Organisational accident; Safety legislation

Indexed keywords

AUSTRALIA; BARRIERS; MULTIPLE BARRIER; OFFSHORE WATER; OIL INDUSTRIES; REGULATORY POLICIES; SAFETY LEGISLATION; SENSEMAKING; TECHNICAL COMPETENCE; TECHNICAL INTEGRITY; TIMOR SEA; TRIAL AND ERROR; WELL CONTROL;

BLOWOUTS; RISK ASSESSMENT;

LAWS AND LEGISLATION;

ARTICLE; AUSTRALIA; BLOWOUT; COMPETENCE; DECISION MAKING; LAW; LEARNING; OCCUPATIONAL HAZARD; OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY; POLICY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RISK ASSESSMENT; SEASHORE;

EID: 84855339561     PISSN: 09257535     EISSN: 18791042     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2011.10.009     Document Type: Article

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