Was Three Mile Island a 'normal accident'?

Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 65-72

  Hopkins, Andrew ^a  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012952029     PISSN: 09660879     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5973.00155     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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