Monitored by your friends, not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 85, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 289-305

  Dominguez Martinez, Silvia ^a,b   Sloof, Randolph ^a,b   Von Siemens, Ferdinand A ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b TINBERGEN INSTITUTE   (Netherlands)

^c GOETHE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^d CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Delegation; Real authority; Strategic ignorance

Indexed keywords

EID: 84896513960     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.003     Document Type: Article

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