Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 67, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 665-681

  Suvorov, Anton ^a   van de Ven, Jeroen ^b  

^a NEW ECONOMIC SCHOOL   (Russian Federation)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Discretionary rewards; Feedback; Moral hazard; Self confidence; Subjective performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349317160     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.002     Document Type: Article

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