Hierarchical screening for capacity allocation in supply chains: The role of distributors

Production and Operations Management

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 405-419

  Chen, Ying Ju ^a   Deng, Mingcherng ^b   Huang, Ke Wei ^c  

^a DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS RESEARCH   (United States)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^c NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

Author keywords

capacity allocation; hierarchy; mechanism design; supply chains

Indexed keywords

EID: 84896398889     PISSN: 10591478     EISSN: 19375956     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/poms.12063     Document Type: Article

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