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Volumn 128, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 175-187

Outsourcing structures and information flow in a three-tier supply chain

Author keywords

Consignment; Information asymmetry; Outsourcing; Turnkey

Indexed keywords

CONSIGNMENT; CONTRACT MANUFACTURERS; END-PRODUCTS; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; INFORMATION FLOWS; OPTIMAL DECISIONS; ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS; PRIOR INFORMATION; PRIVATE INFORMATION; PRODUCTION COST; STACKELBERG; TURNKEY;

EID: 77957818023     PISSN: 09255273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2010.06.017     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (65)

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