Cognitive economics

Cognitive Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-185

  Walliser, Bernard ^a  

^a PARIS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84895411467     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-71347-0     Document Type: Book

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