Justifications of game theoretic equilibrium notions

Knowledge, Beliefs and Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2006, Pages 83-106

  Walliser, Bernard ^a  

^a ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES   (France)

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EID: 84882043296     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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