Managerial incentive, organizational slack, and performance: Empirical analysis of Japanese firms' behavior

Journal of Management and Governance

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 245-284

  Mizutani, Fumitoshi ^a   Nakamura, Eri ^b  

^a KOBE UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

^b SHINSHU UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Managerial incentive; Organizational slack; Performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 84891664251     PISSN: 13853457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10997-012-9226-5     Document Type: Article

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