The governance role of multiple large shareholders: Evidence from the valuation of cash holdings

Journal of Management and Governance

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 419-451

  Attig, Najah ^a   El Ghoul, Sadok ^b   Guedhami, Omrane ^c   Rizeanu, Sorin ^d  

^a SAINT MARY S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Cash holdings; Corporate governance; Firm performance; Multiple large shareholders

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875418712     PISSN: 13853457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10997-011-9184-3     Document Type: Article

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