Group versus individual liability: Short and long term evidence from Philippine microcredit lending groups

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 107, Issue , 2014, Pages 65-83

  Giné, Xavier ^a,e   Karlan, Dean S ^b,c,d,e  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c INNOVATIONS FOR POVERTY ACTION   (United States)

^d MIT Jameel Poverty Action Lab   (United States)

^e BUREAU FOR RESEARCH AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT   (United States)

Author keywords

Access to finance; Group lending; Group liability; Informal economies; Joint liability; Micro enterprises; Microfinance; Social capital

Indexed keywords

INFORMAL SECTOR; LENDING BEHAVIOR; MICROENTERPRISE; MICROFINANCE; SOCIAL CAPITAL;

PHILIPPINES;

EID: 84890835312     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.11.003     Document Type: Article

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