Contract structure, risk-sharing, and investment choice

Econometrica

Volumn 81, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 883-939

  Fischer, Greg ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Contract design; Experiment; Informal insurance; Investment choice; Microfinance; Risk sharing

Indexed keywords

EID: 84877884649     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA9100     Document Type: Article

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