China and the Insecurity of Development in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

International Peacekeeping

Volumn 20, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 551-569

  Curtis, Devon ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^b EMMANUEL COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84890431473     PISSN: 13533312     EISSN: 1743906X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2013.853950     Document Type: Article

References (100)

1. Barack Obama, Joint press conference at the Presidential Palace, Dakar, Senegal, 27 June 2013 (at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/27/remarks-president-obamaand-president-sall-republic-senegal-joint-press-).
2. Xi Jinping, speech at the Julius Nyerere Convention Centre, Dar es Salaam, 25 March 2013 (at:www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1025803.shtml).
3. Erin Conway-Smith, 'Obama in Africa: China 1, US 0', Global Post [online], 1 July 2013 (at: www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/south-africa/130630/barackobama-africa-tour-china-xi-jingping)
4. Solomon Dersso, 'Obama Finally Scrambles over Africa', Al-Jazeera [online] (at: www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/2013626144327559791.html), 30 June 2013
5. Edward Luce, 'Obama's Trip to Africa is Too Little and Very Late', Financial Times [London], 30 June 2013 (at: www.ft.com/cms/s/0/621a46dc-de93-11e2-b990-00144feab7de.html#axzz2jPTcfuto).
6. Ntandoyenkosi Ncube, 'US Trying to "Play Catch-up" with China's Strong Presence in Africa: Expert', Xinhua news [online], 26 June 2013 (at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-06/26/c_132486161.htm).
7. The 'West' is a nebulous term with unclear boundaries. In this article it is used to describe donor countries in Europe and North America, recognizing that it is an imagined category that disguises empirical differences within and between countries.
8. Chinese imports from Africa are rising rapidly, particularly from resource-rich regions. See WTO, International Trade Statistics, merchandise trade (at: http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Country 1/4 CN&). In 2008, exports to China from the DRC were 1024.8 and in 2010 they were 2160.5 (figures are in million new Congolese francs, f.o.b.). African Development Bank, quoted in Africa South of the Sahara 2013 (at: www.europaworld.com).
9. Infrastructure for minerals' loans involve the extension of credit lines for infrastructure, in exchange for access to minerals. In the last summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in July 2012, then Chinese President Hu Jintao pledged US$20 billion in new loans for infrastructure, agriculture and manufacturing in Africa over the next three years (at:www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys/t953114.htm).
10. A detailed discussion of Western economic interests is beyond the scope of this article. 8. For a discussion of liberal peacebuilding and associated debates, see Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty, Special Issue, 'The Liberal Peace and Post-War Reconstruction', Global Society, Vol.21, No.4, 2007.
11. For a discussion of this period, see Filip Reyntjens, 'Democratic Republic of Congo: Political Transition and Beyond', African Affairs, Vol.106, No.423, 2007, pp.307-17.
12. Aside from very broad objectives such as the creation and maintenance of a safe and secure environment, the specific ends and means of stabilization are disputed. See, for example, the UK Stabilisation Unit (at: www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk
13. US Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (at: http://www.state.gov/j/cso/).
14. Earlier operations used the term, such as NATO's Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia from 1996, but the United Nations only began to emphasize stabilization in 2004, with the Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).
15. Tshonda Omasombo and Rashidi Obotela, 'La derniére transition politique en RDC', in Filip Reyntjens and Stefaan Marysse, (eds), L'Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 2005-2006, Paris: l'Harmattan, 2006, pp.233-59.
16. Catherine Gegout, 'The West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996-2006)', International Peacekeeping, Vol.16, No.2, 2009, pp.231-44.
17. The ISSSS grew out of an earlier UN Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy. Implementing partners include UN agencies, international NGOs and MONUSCO, and most programme activities are in eastern DRC. The ISSSS is funded by UN mission resources and bilateral donors. Emily Paddon and Guillaume Lacaille, 'Stabilising the Congo', Forced Migration Policy Briefing 8, Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, 2011.
18. For instance, Dambisa Moyo uncritically presents Chinese engagement in Africa as an alternative to what she sees as problematic Western aid strategies.
19. Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How there is Another Way for Africa, London: Penguin, 2009.
20. On the other hand, for an extremely critical view of China's 'rise', see Peter Navarro, The Coming China Wars: Where they Will be Fought and How they Can be Won, Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 2008.
21. The Chinese policy of non-interference encompasses the idea that China should not prescribe other countries' national policies, thus avoiding political conditionalities such as good governance and human rights provisions.
22. This was not the first time that the Chinese had been involved in the Congo. Under the Mobutu regime, China built high-profile buildings, such as the football stadium in Kinshasa and the 'People's Palace'. Nonetheless, after the 2006 elections in the DRC, China began to play a much bigger role.
23. The financing of this arrangement follows the basic structure of 'infrastructure for minerals'. For a discussion of other Chinese 'infrastructure-for-resources' deals in Africa, see Ana Cristina Alves, 'China's "Win-Win" Cooperation: Unpacking the Impact of Infrastructure-for-Resources Deals in Africa', South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol.20, No.2, 2013, pp.207-26
24. Theophile Dzaka-Kikouta, 'L'investissement chinois en Afrique centrale', Outre-terre, Vol.4, No.30, 2011, pp.207-26.
25. The 2008 agreement can be accessed online (at: www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/China-DRC%20April%202008%20contract%20French%20and%20Chinese_0.pdf).
26. Stefaan Marysse and Sara Geenen, Win-win orUnequal Exchange? The Case of the Sino-Congolese Cooperation Agreements', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.47, No.3, 2009, pp.371-96.
27. Thierry Vircoulon, 'Autopsie d'une controverse international. Le partenariat sino-congolais sous le feu des critiques', Les Temps Modernes, janvier-mars, 657, 2010.
28. Johanna Jansson, 'The Sicomines Agreement: Change and Continuity in the Democratic Republic of Congo's International Relations', Occasional Paper No. 97, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2011.
29. Jansson (see n.19 above), p.7.
30. Marysse and Geenen (see n.19 above).
31. Global Witness, China and Congo: Friends in Need, March 2011.
32. Other investors in the DRC's mining sector did not have this kind of government guarantee. 23. The revised agreement can be accessed online (at: www.globalwitness.org/library/congo-chinaagreement-publication-new-documents).
33. Stefaan Marysse and Sara Geenen, 'Triangular Arm Wrestling: Analysis and Revision of the Sino-Congolese Agreements' in A. Ansoms and S. Marysse, (eds), Natural Resources and Local Livelihoods in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: A Political Economy Perspective, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp.237-48
34. Johanna Jansson, 'The Sicomines Agreement Revisited: Prudent Chinese Banks and Risk- Taking Chinese Companies' Review of African Political Economy, Vol.40, No.135, 2013, pp.152-62.
35. In the original agreement, the interest rate had been 6.6 per cent. Under the new agreement, the Chinese parties to the agreement will cover any interest amount in excess of 4.4 per cent. Jansson (see n.23 above), p.155.
36. The renegotiation of the agreement was a condition to reach the completion point in the HIPC initiative, which enabled DRC to be eligible for debt alleviation. Marysse and Geenen (see n.19 above).
37. For a list of completed projects, see Jansson (n. 23 above), p.156.
38. For a discussion of the reasons for Exim Bank's withdrawal and its implications, see Jansson (see n.23 above), pp.155-8.
39. Global Witness (see n.21 above), p.4.
40. A number of authors point to the complexity of Chinese involvement in Africa. See, for instance, Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
41. Giles Mohan and Marcus Power, 'New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese Engagement', Review of African Political Economy, Vol.35, No.115, 2008, pp.23-42.
42. Bates Gill and James Reilly, 'The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa', The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, No.3, 2007, pp.37-52.
43. Johanna Jansson, 'Views from the "Periphery": The Manifold Reflections of China's Rise in the DR Congo', in X. Li and S.F. Christensen, (eds), The Rise of China: The Impact on Semi-periphery and Periphery Countries, Aalborg: Aalborg University Press, 2012, pp.182-3.
44. Dzaka-Kikouta estimates that before the global financial crisis there were approximately 5,000 Chinese who were resident in Lubumbashi in Katanga. This figure went down to 1,000 by May 2009. Dzaka-Kikouta (see n.18 above), pp.217-18.
45. Author interview with EU official, Goma, DRC, 13 January 2012.
46. Dzaka-Kikouta (see n.18 above), p. 214-15.
47. As Jansson points out, even the Chinese Exim Bank, which uses credit lines to secure business for Chinese firms and facilitate the export of Chinese goods, has similar aims to other national export credit agencies. Jansson (see n.23 above), p.154.
48. Author interview with Chinese Ambassador to Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda, 11 January 2012.
49. Author interview with EU official, Brussels, Belgium, 27 March 2013.
50. Unpublished internal EU document, 2013.
51. Emma Mawdsley, Laura Savage and Sung-Mi Kim, 'A 'Post-Aid World'? Paradigm Shift in Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation at the 2011 Busan High Level Forum', The Geographical Journal, 2013, doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4959.2012.00490.x.
52. For an argument claiming that China is not an exceptional actor in foreign aid, see Arjan de Haan and Ward Warmerdam, 'New Donors and Old Practices: The Role of China in the Multilateral System', in Hany Besada and Shannon Kindornay (eds), Multilateral Development Cooperation in a Changing Global Order, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp.215-40.
53. For instance, Jonathan Holslag and Sara van Hoeymissen say that on security issues 'there will be no convergence in terms of policies in the foreseeable future' and that China's contribution to UN peacekeeping missions provides China with an opportunity to gain military experience, collect intelligence and guard economic interests. Jonathan Holslag and Sara van Hoeymissen, The Limits of Socialization: The Search for EU-China Cooperation towards Security Challenges in Africa, Brussels: Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, 2010. p.11.
54. Roger Mac Ginty, 'Hybrid Peace: The Interaction between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace', Security Dialogue, Vol.41, No.4, 2010, p.395.
55. Miwa Hirono and Marc Lanteigne, 'Introduction: China and UN Peacekeeping', International Peacekeeping, Vol.18, No.3, June 2011, pp.250-1.
56. Yin He, 'China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations', Asia Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, July 2007.
57. Stefan Stähle, 'China's Shifting Attitude towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', The China Quarterly, Vol.195, 2008, pp.631-55.
58. Mohan and Power (see n.29 above), p.37.
59. Author interview with Chinese Ambassador to Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda, 11 January 2012.
60. See also discussion in Jerker Hellström, 'China's Role in the Democratic Republic of Congo', unpublished paper, 2010.
61. Sarah Raine, 'China's Africa Challenges', Adelphi Paper, 49, p.404, 2009.
62. Jansson (see n.19 above), pp.16-17.
63. Hirono and Lanteigne argue that China's contribution to UN peacekeeping is related to how the Chinese government sees its international standing (see n.42 above), p.246.
64. This figure has remained reasonably constant since China began contributing to the UN mission in the DRC (at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml).
65. See also, International Crisis Group, 'China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping', Asia Report 166, 17 April 2009.
66. Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, China's Expanding Role in Peacebuilding: Prospects and Policy Implications, SIPRI Policy Paper 25, 2009.
67. Saferworld, China's Growing Role in Peace and Security, January 2011.
68. Wu Zhengyu and Ian Taylor, 'From Refusal to Engagement: Chinese Contributions to Peacekeeping in Africa', Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol.29, No.2, 2011, pp.137-54.
69. Former Chinese Special Envoy to Africa Liu Guijin believes that China may send combat troops to UN peacekeeping missions in the future. Telephone interview with the author, 10 May 2013.
70. Yan Meng and Yao Chun, 16th Chinese Peacekeeping Force to Congo (K) Sets Out', China Military Online, 9 August 2013 (at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/8358395.html).
71. UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (S/RES/2098 (2013)), 28 March 2013.
72. See statement by Li Baodung, Representative of China to the Security Council (at: www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10964.doc.htm).
73. International Crisis Group, 'Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda', Africa Briefing, No.73, 8 April 2010.
74. 'Nkunda's Anti-Beijing Card', Africa-Asia Confidential, Vol.2, No.2, December 2008 (at: www.africa-asia-confidential.com/article/id/170/Nkunda%27s_anti-Beijing_card).
75. Interestingly, in recalling this meeting, Liu Guijin commented on the longstanding links between China and the DRC, noting that President Kabila was trained in China. This feeds into the Chinese narrative of well-established connections and solidarity between the two countries. Telephone interview with the author, 10 May 2013.
76. Negotiations between Rwanda and the DRC were already at an advanced stage. A few days after Liu Guijin's visit, Rwanda and the DRC reached an agreement. In March 2009 a peace agreement between the Congolese government and the CNDP was signed. Laurent Nkunda was removed as CNDP leader and placed under house arrest in Rwanda.
77. Oliver Richmond and Ioannis Tellidis, 'The BRICS And International Peacebuilding and Statebuilding', NOREF Report, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, January 2013.
78. There are 24 Chinese military advisers in Kamina conducting training for the FARDC. China will train members of battalion 621 and 622 as part of broader security sector reform. The plan is that South Africa, the US, Belgium and France will conduct training for other FARDC battalions in other locations. EUSEC, Presentation on FARDC reform (Powerpoint slides), April 2013.
79. Saferworld, (see n.49 above).
80. UN Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2009 (S/2009/603). In 2010, China and the DRC announced a $1.5 million military aid deal.
81. Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, Heroism in Colonial Africa, Boston, MA: Houghton, 1998.
82. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.
83. John Clark, 'Zaire: The Bankruptcy of the Extractive State', in Villalon and Huxtable (eds), The African State at a Critical Juncture, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997.
84. Michael Nest, with Francois Grignon and Emizet Kisangani, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005.
85. See Timothy Raeymaekers and Koen Vlassenroot, 'Kivu's Intractable Security Conundrum,' African Affairs, Vol.108, No.432, 2009, pp.475-84.
86. Mwanke was also centrally important in negotiations between Congo and Rwanda. He died in a plane crash in February 2012, which some observers believe may have been a contributing factor to the re-escalation of tensions between Congo and Rwanda.
87. Theodore Trefon, Uncertainty and Powerlessness in Congo 2012,' Review of African Political Economy, Vol.40, No.135, 2013, p.146. International donors have contributed approximately half of the entire state budget in recent years.
88. Denis Tull, 'Troubled State-building in the DR Congo: The Challenge from the Margins', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.48, No.4, 2010, pp.643-61.
89. See, for instance, Paddon and Lacaille (see n.14 above).
90. International Crisis Group, Eastern Congo: Why Stabilization Failed', 4 October 2012.
91. Séverine Autesserre, 'Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended Consequences', African Affairs, Vol.111, No.443, 2012, pp.202-22.
92. Theodore Trefon, Congo Masquerade: The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure, London: Zed Books, 2011.
93. Theodore Trefon, 'Public Service Provision in a Failed State: Looking Beyond Predation in the Democratic Republic of Congo', Review of African Political Economy, Vol.36, No.119, 2009, pp.9-21.
94. Maria Eriksson Baaz and Ola Olsson, 'Feeding the Horse: Unofficial Economic Activities within the Police Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', African Security, Vol.4, No.4, 2011, pp.223-41.
95. Author interview with official at UN mission, Goma, DRC, 13 January 2012.
96. Baaz and Olsson's discussion of the police force (see n.68 above).
97. See, for instance, Human Rights Watch, You will be Punished: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009.
98. Trefon (see n. 64 above), pp.141-51.
99. Author's translation from French. Ambassador Wang Yingwu, 1 January 2012 (at: cd.chineseembassy.org/fra/dszc/t892104.htm).
100. Timothy Raeymaekers, 'Why History Repeats Itself in Eastern DR Congo', E-IR info, 20 December 2012.