Feeding the horse: Unofficial economic activities within the police force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

African Security

Volumn 4, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 223-241

  Baaz, Maria Eriksson ^a   Olsson, Ola ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Corruption, the Democratic Republic of Congo; Police reform; Property violations; Security sector reform; Unofficial economic activities

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859499412     PISSN: 19392206     EISSN: 19392214     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2011.628629     Document Type: Article

References (77)

1. Male Congolese Police Officer, Interview (Kinshasa, October 2010).
2. Property violations come in different forms: pillage in raids, illegal detention and allegations for extortion purposes, imposition of illegal fees at detention centers, illegal taxation and fines at road blocks, etc. The people interviewed all stated that property violations clearly are the most widespread abuse, affecting most part of the population. See also Kirsten Johnson, Jennifer Scott, Bigy Rughita, et al., "Association of Sexual Violence and Human Rights with Physical and Mental Health in Territories of the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, " The Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) 304, no. 5 (2010): 553-562.
3. For reports on violence against civilians in the DRC (which tend to focus on sexual violence).
4. see for example Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: North Kivu No End to War on Women and Children (London: Amnesty International Publications, 2008).
5. Human Rights Watch, The War Within the War: Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls in Eastern Congo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002).
6. MONUC Human Rights Division, Human Rights Monthy Assessments (Kinshasa: UN Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo [MONUC], 2007-2008).
7. Bureau of Democracy Human Rights and Labor, 2009 Human Rights Report: Democratic Republic of the Congo (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 2009).
8. Réseau des Femmes pour un Développement Associatif, Réseau des Femmes pour la Défense des Droits et la Paix, and International Alert, Women's Bodies as a Battleground: Sexual Violence against Women and Girls During the War in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Kivu (1996-2003) (London: Réseau des Femmes pour un Développement Associatif, Réseau des Femmes pour la Défense de Droits et al Paix, International Alert, 2005).
9. Human Rights Watch, You Will Be Punished: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009).
10. Property violations are often accompanied with other forms of violence. For instance, physical violence is common in relation to arbitrary arrests and at detention centers. Moreover, conflict related property violations in the form of pillage is frequently accompanied with other forms of violence such as rape, abduction, and forced labor, demonstrating the interconnectedness of various forms of violence. See Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, The Complexity of Violence: A Critical Analysis of Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Sida & Nordic Africa Institute, 2010).
11. The fact that victims of both physical violence (even rape victims) and pillage in their testimonies often highlight the disastrous effects of the pillage should be a reminder of the need to allot more attention to this particular form of abuse committed by security sector staff. (Interviews and discussions with survivors of sexual violence and local NGO staff working with these mainly women survivors conducted between 2006-2010.)
12. According to a related smaller pilot study conducted in relation to the research project involving 30 women in the territory of Walungu, an estimated 15-20 percent of the incomes from selling agricultural produce at the market went to informal fees at road blocks erected by the FARDC (hence not calculating informal fees imposed by the police or other government employees).
13. Field interviews and Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Reform of the Army (London: Amnesty International Publications, 2007).
14. Henri Boshoff, Dylan Hendrickson, Sylvie More, et al., Supporting SSR in the DRC: Between a Rock and a Hard Place (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2010).
15. Human Rights Watch, Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone: Sexual Violence and Military Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009).
16. The assumed relation between "increasing professionalism" and sufficient, regular salaries is also manifested in various SSR interventions, such as EUSEC's (EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform) support to the reform of the armed forces' salary system by the introduction of biometric identity cards and the setting up of a new payment structure that aims at removing the payment and financial responsibilities from the chain of command.
17. Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, "Making Sense of Violence: Voices of Soldiers in the Congo (DRC), " The Journal of Modern African Studies 46, no. 01 (2008): 57-86.
18. Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, The Complexity of Violence: A Critical Analysis of Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
19. Jens C. Andvig and Karl Ove Moene, "How Corruption May Corrupt, " Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 13, no. 1 (1990): 63-76.
20. Pranab Bardhan, "Corruption and Development: A Review of the Issues, " Journal of Economic Literature 35, no. 3 (1997): 1320-1346.
21. Pranab Bardhan, "The Economist's Approach to the Problem of Corruption, " World Development 34, no. 2 (2006): 341-348.
22. This is an assumption that has been criticized by several scholars. See for instance Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein, and Jan Teorell, The Failure of Anti-Corruption Policies: A Theoretical Mischaracterization of the Problem, QoG Working Paper Series (Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, 2010).
23. Eriksson Baaz and Stern, The Complexity of Violence.
24. Ann Laudati, Unearthing the 'Politics of the Belly' from Below: The Role of Peripheral Economies in Eastern DRC (draft manuscript, forthcoming).
25. Current salaries are undoubtedly insufficient for making a living. In Bukavu, just feeding a family two (very simple) meals a day was calculated to be around five U.S. dollars per day, hence one hundred and fifty U.S. dollars per month. Hence, food alone amounts to the triple amount of the monthly salary of approximately forty-five U.S. dollars. Given that many do not have access to free housing in the police camps (due to lack of space/underdimensioned camps), many have to pay rent at the absolute minimum rent of fifteen U.S. dollars per month (most seem to pay between forty and fifty U.S. dollars per month). In addition to this, school fees amounts to at least five to ten U.S. dollars per month per child. Adding other expenses such as clothing, transport, and health care, monthly minimum subsistence for a family of five amounts to at least between two hundred and fifty and three hundred U.S. dollars. In Kinshasa where the costs are higher, the equivalent minimum amount would be around four hundred U.S. dollars.
26. In a press release by Enough Project on the civilian costs of the Kimia II military operations, it is concluded that "even when units are paid, the salaries are inadequate to disincentivize looting. Integrated units taking part in Kimia II that have been paid their fifty U.S. dollars per month salaries are still preying on the population they are supposed to protect. " Enough Project, "An Uneasy Alliance in Eastern Congo and its High Cost for Civilians: Operation Kimia II, " Sept 2009, www.enoughproject.org/publications/Uneasy-Alliance.
27. Global Witness, Faced with a Gun What Can You Do? War and the Militarisation of Mining in Eastern Congo (London: Global Witness, 2009).
28. Timothy Raeymaekers and Koen Vlassenroot, " 'Divisez par Deux': Conflict and Artisan Mining in Kamituga (South Kivu), " in L'Afrique des Grands Lacs-Annuaire 2004-2005, eds. Filip Reyntjens and Stefaan Marysse (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005).
29. Ingrid Samset, "Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict? Diamonds and War in the DRC, " Review of African Political Economy 29, no. 93/94 (2002): 463-480.
30. David Sullivan and Noel Atama, Digging In: Recent Developments on Conflict Minerals (Washington: Enough, 2010).
31. UN Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (New York: United Nations, 2009).
32. Koen Vlassenroot and Sandrine Perrot, Informal Political Structures and the Ugandan Army in the Democratic Republic of Congo, African Programme Report (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2010).
33. Koen Vlassenroot and Hans Romkema, "The Emergence of a New Order? Resources and War in Eastern Congo, " Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (October 2002).
34. UN Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (New York: United Nations, 2009).
35. UN Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC (New York: United Nations, 2010).
36. Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, "Researching the Practical Norms and Real Governance in Africa, " in Africa Power and Politics, ed. Richard Crook (Africa Power and Politics Programme and Overseas Development Institute, 2008).
37. The research was enabled through funding from Gothenburg Centre for Globalization and Development (GCGD) to support interdisciplinary collaborative research projects. Part of the data was also conducted in combination with another research project on gender and police reform financed by the Nordic Africa Institute. The aim of the study was to do an initial mapping of the organization and levels of incomes received from unofficial income activities and explore the possibility of conducting a more large scale survey. The article is based on semistructured interviews and more informal discussions (both individual and in groups) with civilians and members of the police. In total fifty-three police officers were interviewed (twenty-five in Kinshasa and twenty-eight in Bukavu), a majority being traffic police and the judicial police responsible for arrests and investigations (OPJs). A few (five) of the police officers interviewed had recently been forced to resign or resigned voluntarily from the police at the time of the interviews. The groups with civilians included (1) civilians (equal representation of men and women) active in community networks (NAPO) picked randomly, (2) taxi drivers, and (3) present or very recent detainees and their families. In total eighty-seven civilians were interviewed (forty-five in Kinshasa and forty-two in Bukavu). Approximately half of the interviews were conducted by Maria Eriksson Baaz (in Lingala) while the others were conducted through the assistance of two human rights organizations (RECIC-Kinshasa and Groupe Jeremy). In Kinshasa a majority of the interviews with civilians and police were conducted in three communes in the outskirts of Kinshasa with high density of population and low incomes.
38. See for example Olivier de Sardan, Researching the Practical Norms and Real Governance in Africa.
39. Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein, and Jan Teorell, The Failure of Anti-Corruption Policies: A Theoretical Mischaracterization of the Problem, QoG Working Paper Series (Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, 2010).
40. Daniel Jordan Smith, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007).
41. Michael Johnston and Kpundeh J Sarh, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
42. Andvig and Moene, "How Corruption May Corrupt. "
43. See for example William Reno, "Transforming West African Networks for Postwar Recovery, " Comparative Social Research 27 (2010): 127-149.
44. Mats Utas, ed., Bigmanity and Network Governance in African Conflicts (London: Zed Books, forthcoming February 2012).
45. See for example Ministére de l' Interieur et Sécurité, La Police de Proximité en République Démocratique du Congo: Guide Pratique (Kinshasa: Comité de suivi de la reforme de la Police, in cooperation with EUPOL RD Congo, 2010).
46. Boshoff, Hendrickson, More, et al., Supporting SSR in the DRC.
47. Laura Davis, Justice-Sensitive Security System Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Country Case Study DRC, IFP Security Cluster (Brussels: Initiative for Peacebuilding, 2009).
48. Maria Eriksson Baaz, The Price for Peace? Military Integration and Continued Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Stockholm: The Swedish Defence College, Africa Programme, February 2011, No 2).
49. Englebert P. (2003), Why Congo persists: sovereignty, globalization and the violent reproduction of a weak state, Queen Elisabeth House working paper series, No. 95.
50. 2 cited in Theodore Trefon, "Public Service Provision in a Failed State: Looking Beyond Predation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, " Review of African Political Economy 36, no. 119 (2009): 9-21.
51. See for example Colette Braekman, Le Dinosaure: le Zaïre de Mobutu (Paris: Fayard, 1992).
52. Jacques Ebenga and Thierry N'Landu, "The Congolese National Army: In Search of an Identity, " in Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa, ed. Martin Rupiya (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 63-84.
53. Eriksson Baaz, The Price for Peace?
54. Theodore Trefon, "Public Service Provision in a Failed State: Looking Beyond Predation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, " Review of African Political Economy 36, no. 119 (2009).
55. Female traffic police officer, interview (Kinshasa, October 2010). As a comparison, the most recent estimates of GDP per capita in DRC suggest an average monthly income per person of about thirty-three U.S. dollars.
56. See for example Gauthier de Villers, "Introduction, " in Manières de Vivre: Économie de la "Débrouille" Dans les Villes de Congo/Zaïre, eds. Gauthier de Villers, Bogumil Jewsiewicki, and Laurent Monnier (Paris: CEDAF & Harmattan, 2002).
57. René Lemarchand, "The Tunnel at the End of the Light, " Review of African Political Economy 29, no. 93 (2002): 389-398.
58. Janet MacGaffey and Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga, Congo-Paris: Transnational Traders on the Margins of the Law, African Issues (Oxford: International African Institute & James Currey, 2000).
59. See Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, The Complexity of Violence: A Critical Analysis of Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Sida & Nordic Africa Institute, 2010).
60. UN Security Council, Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC (New York: United Nations, 2010).
61. The figure most often mentioned was five vehicles a day.
62. Female police officer, interview (Bukavu, February 2011).
63. Male police officer, interview (Kinshasa, October 2010).
64. Eriksson Baaz and Stern, Making Sense of Violence.
65. Eriksson Baaz and Stern, The Complexity of Violence.
66. Male taxi driver, interview (Kinshasa, November 2010).
67. Brian, while poorer than the jealous husband, was lucky. Through his connections with civil society activists and lawyers he was finally let out of prison after long negotiations and legal proceedings.
68. When discussing problems encountered at work, the traffic police argued that one of their main difficulties was the increasing numbers of "untouchables" driving on the streets. Untouchables are people in power positions (particularly top politicians such as ministers and parliamentarians and officers within the police and the army) and their family and friends. If a traffic police officer stops an untouchable, and particularly if she or he insists in her or his allegations when the untouchable has pronounced herself or himself, the consequences can be serious, including detention, discharge, and physical abuse.
69. The costs for opening a case or filing a complaint in Kinshasa was often stated to be around ten U.S. dollars and above (while the costs of a pen and papers would not be more than a maximum of one to two U.S. dollars).
70. Theodore Trefon, "Public Service Provision in a Failed State: Looking Beyond Predation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, " Review of African Political Economy 36, no. 119 (2009), 10.
71. Koen Vlassenroot and Hans Romkema, "The Emergence of a New Order? Resources and War in Eastern Congo, " Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (October 2002)
72. Ann Laudati, Unearthing the 'Politics of the Belly' from Below: The Role of Peripheral Economies in Eastern DRC, 11.
73. Mats Utas, "Introduction, " in Bigmanity and Network Governance in African Conflicts, ed. Mats Utas (London: Zed Books, forthcoming February 2012).
74. These requests can range from everything from demands for financial support in times of family crises (funerals, health issues) to asking a love one to be redeployed since one suspects he or she found another lover at the present deployment site.
75. Utas, "Introduction. "
76. Anna Persson, Bo Rothstein, and Jan Teorell, The Failure of Anti-Corruption Policies: A Theoretical Mischaracterization of the Problem, QoG Working Paper Series (Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, 2010).
77. In fact, some civilians interviewed argued that simply raising salaries of security sector staff could actually risk raising the levels of unofficial fees and fines, arguing that the levels of these fines are calculated in relation to the levels of salaries.