Where the Paths Meet: Remarks on Truth and Paradox

Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Truth and its Deformities

Volumn 32, Issue , 2009, Pages 169-198

  Beall, Jc ^a   Glanzberg, Michael ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Classical restriction strategy seeks to reevaluate truth bearers in semantic terms; Contextualist strategy combines features of classical restriction strategy and Tarskian strategy; Logic path concerns logical issues arising from truth theoretic paradoxes; Nature path concerns metaphysical questions about the "nature," (truth); Semantic view of truth a representative of a substantial and correspondence inspired answer to the nature question; Sentences bearers of truth; particularly, sentences of an interpreted language; Transparent view of truth a form of deflationism taking a skeptical stance towards the nature question; Where paths meet remarks on truth and paradox

Indexed keywords

EID: 84889287477     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9781444307276.ch10     Document Type: Chapter

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