Political markets and regulatory uncertainty: Insights and implications for integrated strategy

Academy of Management Perspectives

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 52-67

  Kingsley, Allison F ^a   Van Den Bergh, Richard G ^a   Bonardi, Jean Philippe ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LAUSANNE   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84888585175     PISSN: 15589080     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amp.2012.0042     Document Type: Conference Paper

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