How to become an epistemic engineer: What shifts when we change the standard of proof ?

Law, Probability and Risk

Volumn 12, Issue 3-4, 2013, Pages 275-298

  Kotsoglou, Kyriakos N ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FREIBURG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Epistemological contextualism; Error distribution; Reasonable doubts; Risk allocation; Set of epistemic defeaters; Standard of proof

Indexed keywords

EID: 84887713590     PISSN: 14708396     EISSN: 1470840X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/lpr/mgt002     Document Type: Article

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