Is there a "Depth versus Participation" dilemma in international cooperation?

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 477-497

  Bernauer, Thomas ^a   Kalbhenn, Anna ^b   Koubi, Vally ^a,c   Spilker, Gabriele ^a  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

International environmental agreements; Treaty design characteristics

Indexed keywords

EID: 84886598533     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-013-9165-1     Document Type: Article

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