Why do countries commit to human rights treaties?

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 51, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 588-621

  Hathaway, Oona A ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Democracy; Human rights; International law; Torture; Treaties

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547426827     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002707303046     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. Alter, Karen. 2001. Establishing the supremacy of European law: The making of an international rule of law in Europe. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
2. Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker. 1998. Taking time seriously: Time-series-cross-section analysis with a binary dependent variable. American Journal of Political Science 42 (4). 1260-88.
3. Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M., and Christopher J. W. Zorn. 2001. Duration models and proportional hazards in political science. American Journal of Political Science 45 (4). 972-88.
4. Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical analysis. Political Analysis 14: 63-82.
5. Braumoeller, Bear F. 2004. Hypothesis testing and multiplicative interaction terms. International Organization 58: 807-20.
6. Camp-Keith, Linda. 1999. The United Nations international covenant on civil and political rights: Does it make a difference in human rights behavior? Journal of Peace Research 36 (1). 95-118.
7. Cingranelli, David L., and David L. Richards. 2004. The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database. http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ (accessed on May 1, 2007 ).
8. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, Senate Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).
9. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Dec. 3, 1981).
10. Dai, Xinyuan. 2005. Why comply? The domestic constituency mechanism. International Organization 59: 363-98.
11. Davis, Kevin E. 2005. What can the rule of law variable tell us about rule of law reforms? New York University Law and Economics Research Paper Series.
12. Donnelly, Jack. 1986. International human rights: A regime analysis. International Organization 40 (3). 599-642.
13. Downs, George W., and Michael A. Jones. 2002. Reputation, compliance, and international law. Journal of Legal Studies 31: 95-114.
14. Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National interests in international society. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
15. Freedom House. 2003. Freedom in the world country ratings, 1972-1973 to 2001-2002. http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/FHSCORES.xls. (accessed on January 1, 2004 ).
16. Gibney, Michael. 2004. Political terror scale, 1980-2004. http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/facultystaff/Gibney%20Doc/ Political%20Terror%20Scale%201980-2004.xls (accessed on December 1, 2006 ).
17. Golder, Matt. 2006. Presidential coattails and legislative fragmentation. American Journal of Political Science 50: 34-48.
18. Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane, eds. 1993. Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
19. Goodliffe, Jay, and Darren G. Hawkins. 2006. Explaining commitment: States and the convention against torture. The Journal of Politics 68 (2). 358-71.
20. Guzman, Andrew. 2002. A compliance-based theory of international law. California Law Review 90 (6). 1823-87.
21. Hafner-Burton, Emilie, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 2005. Human Rights Practices in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises. American Journal of Sociology 110 (5). 1373-1411.
22. _. Forthcoming. Justice lost! The failure of international human rights law to matter where needed most. Journal of Peace Research.
23. Hathaway, Oona A. 2002. Do human rights treaties make a difference? Yale Law Journal 111: 1935-2042.
24. _. 2003 a. The cost of commitment. Stanford Law Review 55 (5). 1821-62.
25. _. 2003 b. Testing conventional wisdom. European Journal of International Law 13 (1). 185-200.
26. _. 2004. The international law of torture. In Torture: Philosophical, political, and legal perspectives, edited by Sanford Levinson, 199-212. New York: Oxford University Press.
27. _. 2005. Between power and principle: An integrated theory of international law, University of Chicago Law Review 72 (2). 469-536.
28. Hathaway, Oona A., and Harold H. Koh. 2004. Foundations of international law and politics. New York: Foundation Press.
29. Hathaway, Oona A., and Ariel Lavinbuk. 2006. Rationalism and revisionism in international law. Harvard Law Review 119 (5). 1404-43.
30. Hettinger, Virginia A., and Christopher J. W. Zorn. 1999. Signals, models, and congressional overrides of the Supreme Court. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 15-17.
31. Human Rights Internet. 1991. Master list of human rights organizations and serial publications 3-58.. 1994. Master list of human rights organizations and serial publications 143-95.
32. _. 2000. Human Rights Databank. http://www.hri.ca/welcome.asp. (accessed on July 1, 2000 ).
33. _. 2003. Human Rights Databank. http://www.hri.ca/welcome.asp. (accessed on July 16, 2003). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, Senate Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
34. Jessup, Philip C. 1956. Transnational law. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
35. Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
36. Keohane, Robert. O. 1983. The demand for international regimes. In International regimes, edited by Stephen Krasner, 141-71. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
37. _. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
38. Koh, Harold H. 1997. Why do nations obey international law? Yale Law Journal 106 (8). 2599-659.
39. Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. The rational design of international institutions. International Organization 55 (4). 761-800.
40. Krasner, Stephen D. 1983. Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables. In International regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner, 1-21. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
41. Kratochwil, Friedrich, and John G. Ruggie. 1986. International organization: A state of the art on an art of the state. International Organization 40 (4). 753-75.
42. Landman, Todd. 2001. Measuring the international human rights regime. Paper presented at the 97th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30-September 2.
43. _. 2005. Protecting human rights: A comparative study. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
44. _. 2006. Studying human rights. New York: Routledge.
45. Lutz, Ellen L., and Kathryn Sikkink. 2000. International human rights law and practice in Latin America. International Organization 54 (3). 633-59.
46. Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2005. Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2003. http://www.bsos.umd.edu/ cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm (accessed on June 30, 2005 ).
47. Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics. International Organization 51 (4). 513-53.
48. _. 2000. The origins of human rights regimes: Democratic delegation in postwar Europe. International Organization 54 (2). 217-52.
49. Neumayer, Eric. 2005. Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (6). 925-53.
50. Parzen, Emanuel. 1961. An approach to time series analysis. Annals of mathematical statistics 32: 951-89.
51. Schmidt, Peter, and Ann D. Witte. 1989. Predicting criminal recidivism using ''split population'' survival time models. Journal of Econometrics 40: 141-59.
52. Sikkink, Kathryn. 1998. Transnational politics, international relations theory, and human rights. Political Science 31 (3). 516-23.
53. Simmons, Beth. 2000. International law and state behavior: Commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs. American Political Science Review 94 (4). 819-35.
54. _. 2002. Why commit? Explaining state acceptance of international human rights obligations. Paper prepared for meeting of the Conference on Delegation to International Organizations, May 3-4, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
55. Skogly, Sigrun I. 2001. The human rights obligations of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. London: Cavendish.
56. Slaughter, Anne -Marie. 1995. International law in a world of liberal states. European Journal of International Law 6 (4). 503-38.
57. _. 2000. A liberal theory of international law. American Society of International Law Procedure 94: 5-23.
58. United Nations Treaty Collection. 2005. http://untreaty.un.org/English/ treaty.asp (accessed on May 1, 2007 ).
59. United Nations Treaty Series Overview. 2003. http://untreaty.un.org/ English/overview.asp. (accessed on July 1, 2003 )
60. United States Department of State. 2001. Country Reports on Human Rights. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/c1470.htm (accessed on July 1, 2004 ).
61. von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance. American Political Science Review 99: 611.
62. Vreeland, James Raymond. 2000. Institutional determinants of IMF agreements. http://pantheon.yale.edu/jrv9/IMFVeto.html (accessed on June 1, 2003 ).
63. _. 2003. Why do governments and the IMF enter into agreements? International Political Science Review: Special Issue on the Political Economy of International Finance 24 (3). 321-43.
64. World Bank. 2005. World Development Indicators Online. http://www.worldbank.org/data/onlinedatabases/onlinedatabases.html (accessed on July 16, 2005 ).