Employment law and social equality

Michigan Law Review

Volumn 112, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 225-274

  Bagenstos, Samuel R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84886578408     PISSN: 00262234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (338)

1. Alec MacGillis, Coal Miner's Donor, New Republic, Oct. 25, 2012, at 18, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/108140/coal-miners-donor-mitt-romneybenefactor.
2. Alec MacGillis, Coal Miner's Donor, New Republic, Oct. 25, 2012, at 18, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/108140/coal-miners-donor-mitt-romneybenefactor.
3. Alec MacGillis, Coal Miner's Donor, New Republic, Oct. 25, 2012, at 19, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/108140/coal-miners-donor-mitt-romneybenefactor.
4. Alec MacGillis, Coal Miner's Donor, New Republic, Oct. 25, 2012, at 18, available at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/108140/coal-miners-donor-mitt-romneybenefactor.
5. cf. Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the Workplace: Using the First Amendment as Public Policy for Wrongful Discharge Actions, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 341-42 (1994) ("[In 1992, a] CEO sent faxes to regional managers strongly recommending that they purchase seats at a candidate's fundraiser if they intended to have a future with the corporation; one who failed to do so lost his job. ").
6. Lewis Maltby, Office Politics: Civic Speech Shouldn't Get Employees Fired, Legal Times, Aug. 29, 2005, available at http:// www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=900005435749&slreturn=20130419174324 ("William Niess, a Democrat in Wisconsin, refused to make a political contribution to the party favored by his boss. As a result, he was fired in 1996.").
7. Sabrina Eaton, Coal Miners Lost Pay When Mitt Romney Visited Their Mine to Promote Coal Jobs, Plain Dealer (Aug. 28, 2012, 5:40 AM) (updated 7:15 AM), http:// www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2012/08/coal_miners_lost_pay_when_mitt.html.
8. When I refer in this Article to "individual employment law, " or the shorthand "employment law, " I refer to those legal doctrines that govern the employment relationship but that do not prohibit group-based discrimination (which would be "employment discrimination law") and do not regulate unionization and collective bargaining (which would be "labor law"). For an argument that distinctions between these three pillars of workplace law are increasingly dissolving-a dissolution to which my argument would, at one level, contribute-see Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 163 (2007).
9. David Miller, Equality and Justice, 10 Ratio 222, 224 (1997).
10. For other recent elaborations of the theory, see Carina Fourie, What Is Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal, 18 Res Publica 107 (2012)
11. T.M. Scanlon, When Does Equality Matter? (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/ pdf/Intellectual_Life/ltw-Scanlon.pdf.
12. For a recent application to tort law, see Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse as Social Equality, 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 243 (2011).
13. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6-11 (1977)
14. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class 8 (1950).
15. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1 passim (1999).
16. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 276-78 (1983)
17. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics 287, 289 (1999), to refer to roughly the same idea.
18. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 837-70 (2003).
19. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 837-70 (2003).
20. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 837-70 (2003).
21. A focus on bolstering the rules of individual employment law thus responds to calls for universalistic social-welfare interventions, see, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Law and the Contradictions of the Disability Rights Movement 143-45 (2009).
22. Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 Ind. L.J. 1219 (2011) (arguing that universalistic protections may disserve equality interests).
23. Guy Davidov, The Goals of Regulating Work: Between Universalism and Selectivity, U. Toronto L.J. (forthcoming) (arguing that labor and employment law should not entirely abandon the selective approach in favor of a universalistic one).
24. See Alan Hyde, What Is Labour Law?, in Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law 37 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2006).
25. Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: Reflecting or Refracting Market Forces?, 76 Ind. L.J. 29 (2001).
26. Alan Hyde, Response to Working Group on Chapter 1 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: On Purposeless Restatement, 13 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 87, 89 (2009).
27. Steven L. Willborn et al., Employment Law: Cases and Materials 10 (5th ed. 2012).
28. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (2010).
29. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947 (1984).
30. Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1901 (1996).
31. Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 106, 120-22 (2002).
32. For an older example, see Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 Yale L.J. 1, 21 (1992) (discussing workplace safety protections).
33. Stewart J. Schwab, The Law and Economics Approach to Workplace Regulation, in Government Regulation of the Employment Relationship 91, 111 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997) (describing the dominant view "[o]utside the law-and-economics camp").
34. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563, 615-20 (1982).
35. See Horacio Spector, Philosophical Foundations of Labor Law, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1119, 1144-47 (2006). Professor William Forbath has similarly shown how ideas of social equality played a crucial role in the adoption of (collective) labor law in the United States.
36. See Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative to Antipoverty Arguments?, 2009 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 5-6 (arguing that "ongoing resistance to economic reductionism in the realm of civil rights-as occurs in antidiscrimination law-is forging intellectual tools of wider significance" that help us see that economic "analysis arguably misses the point" when justifying the minimum wage). In a forthcoming piece, Brishen Rogers also defends the minimum wage, on the basis of social equality.
37. See Brishen Rogers, Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social Equality (Aug. 9, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
38. See Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative to Antipoverty Arguments?, 2009 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 5-6 (arguing that "ongoing resistance to economic reductionism in the realm of civil rights-as occurs in antidiscrimination law-is forging intellectual tools of wider significance" that help us see that economic "analysis arguably misses the point" when justifying the minimum wage). In a forthcoming piece, Brishen Rogers also defends the minimum wage, on the basis of social equality.
39. See Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 579.
40. David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 523-24 (2009).
41. See generally Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 169 (2011) (describing various conceptions of dignity in American law, of which equality is only one).
42. Richard Michael Fischl, Labor Law, the Left, and the Lure of the Market, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 947, 957-58 (2011).
43. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 837-70 (2003).
44. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 837-70 (2003).
45. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 837-70 (2003).
46. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 837-70 (2003).
47. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 276-78 (1983)
48. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6-11 (1977)
49. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 276-78 (1983)
50. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6-11 (1977)
51. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 276-78 (1983)
52. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6-11 (1977)
53. George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia 5 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1st Am. ed. 1952) (1938).
54. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 276-78 (1983)
55. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 276-78 (1983)
56. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics 287, 289 (1999), to refer to roughly the same idea.
57. For other recent elaborations of the theory, see Carina Fourie, What Is Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal, 18 Res Publica 107 (2012)
58. E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue 6, 411 (2000).
59. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 198-99, 273 (1977).
60. Deborah Hellman, When Is Discrimination Wrong? 6 (2008).
61. For other recent elaborations of the theory, see Carina Fourie, What Is Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal, 18 Res Publica 107 (2012)
62. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 276-78 (1983)
63. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1459, 1477-78 (2012).
64. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality 76-77 (1996).
65. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 837-70 (2003).
66. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6-11 (1977)
67. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 99, 140-42 (2007).
68. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1 passim (1999).
69. David Miller, Equality and Justice, 10 Ratio 222, 224 (1997).
70. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 837-70 (2003).
71. See, e.g., Mickey Kaus, The End of Equality (1992).
72. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics 287, 289 (1999), to refer to roughly the same idea.
73. David Miller, Equality and Justice, 10 Ratio 222, 224 (1997).
74. See Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative to Antipoverty Arguments?, 2009 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 5-6 (arguing that "ongoing resistance to economic reductionism in the realm of civil rights-as occurs in antidiscrimination law-is forging intellectual tools of wider significance" that help us see that economic "analysis arguably misses the point" when justifying the minimum wage). In a forthcoming piece, Brishen Rogers also defends the minimum wage, on the basis of social equality.
75. Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1588 (1997) (arguing against Professor Koppelman's view).
76. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality 76-77 (1996).
77. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 276-78 (1983)
78. David Miller, Equality and Justice, 10 Ratio 222, 224 (1997).
79. Debra Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets 101-02 (2010).
80. See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 154, 168-89 (1993).
81. Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities 131-53 (1996). Note that both Professor Anderson and Professor Radin frame their arguments in terms of commodification undermining the intrinsic value of the activity.
82. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics 287, 289 (1999), to refer to roughly the same idea.
83. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 276-78 (1983)
84. E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue 6, 411 (2000).
85. For a recent application to tort law, see Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse as Social Equality, 39 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 243 (2011).
86. For other recent elaborations of the theory, see Carina Fourie, What Is Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal, 18 Res Publica 107 (2012)
87. Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics 287, 289 (1999), to refer to roughly the same idea.
88. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1459, 1477-78 (2012).
89. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 188 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
90. Matthew W. Finkin, Menschenbild: The Conception of the Employee as a Person in Western Law, 23 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 577, 607 (2002).
91. Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities 131-53 (1996). Note that both Professor Anderson and Professor Radin frame their arguments in terms of commodification undermining the intrinsic value of the activity.
92. Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities 131-53 (1996). Note that both Professor Anderson and Professor Radin frame their arguments in terms of commodification undermining the intrinsic value of the activity.
93. Debra Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets 101-02 (2010).
94. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1405-06, 1413-15 (1967) (discussing the harm to workers of losing a job).
95. Marion Crain, Arm's-Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship, 35 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 163, 165-66 (2011) (same).
96. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1 passim (1999).
97. Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 523 (1997).
98. This point finds support in the findings of Professors Gordon and Lenhardt that, for many Latino immigrants, the need to keep a job in the United States makes them "reluctant to turn down jobs or to complain about work conditions. " Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1161, 1220-22 (2008).
99. Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1588 (1997) (arguing against Professor Koppelman's view).
100. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 837-70 (2003).
101. Of course, the share that workers can obtain depends on the bargaining power of the parties-which itself depends on legal rules such as support for collective bargaining-as well as on the political feasibility of other redistributive policies by the government. There is an important role for redistributive policies, but it largely lies outside individual employment law.
102. One might question whether it is necessary for the law to step in to force employers to do something that benefits them. In a perfectly competitive market, employers who engage in abusive practices that make it difficult to attract skilled workers will be driven out of business. But markets are not perfectly competitive, and they can take a long time to drive out abusive and inefficient practices. See John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1411, 1423-30 (1986) (arguing that, even if the market would eventually drive discriminating employers out of business, Title VII accelerates our arrival at that efficient long-run equilibrium).
103. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 837-70 (2003).
104. See Matthew W. Finkin, Life Away from Work, 66 La. L. Rev. 945, 974 (2006).
105. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 Va. L. Rev. 825, 837-70 (2003).
106. Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 40 (2007) ("On its face, Title VII provides no BFOQ defense for race. ").
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006).
108. For a good discussion of the cases in this area, see Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 147 (2004).
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (emphases added).
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (emphases added).
111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (emphases added).
112. Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities 131-53 (1996). Note that both Professor Anderson and Professor Radin frame their arguments in terms of commodification undermining the intrinsic value of the activity.
113. Joan C. Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify: That Is Not the Question, in Rethinking Commodification 362 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
114. Professor Willborn offers a number of reasons, from within economic theory, why mandatory terms may make workers better off. See Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 Neb. L. Rev. 101 (1988).
115. Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223 (2000).
116. Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proceedings) 177 (1989).
117. Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proceedings) 177 (1989).
118. See Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 73 (2007).
119. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 276-78 (1983)
120. Studs Terkel, Working xi (1974).
121. See Katherine V.W. Stone, From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation for the Changing Workplace 68-72 (2004).
122. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6-11 (1977)
123. See Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-901 to-915 (2011).
124. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (2010).
125. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1655, 1670 (1995).
126. Joseph E. Slater, The "American Rule" That Swallows the Exceptions, 11 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 53 (2007).
127. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947 (1984).
128. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 276-78 (1983)
129. Chris Bertram, Corey Robin & Alex Gourevitch, Let It Bleed: Libertarianism and the Workplace, Crooked Timber (July 1, 2012), http://crookedtimber.org/2012/07/01/let-it-bleedlibertarianism-and-the-workplace/.
130. See Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 579.
131. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (2010).
132. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1405-06, 1413-15 (1967) (discussing the harm to workers of losing a job).
133. Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 65, 78 (2000).
134. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 779, 791 (1994) (suggesting that critics of the employment-at-will rule invoke "notions of equality" or "civic equality and respect" when they "claim that the rule reflects an inadequate kind of valuation of workers because it subjects them to the whim of employers").
135. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947 (1984).
136. J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 837, 898-900.
137. See Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 146-48 (1999).
138. Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 6, 9 (2002).
139. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 105-06 (1997).
140. Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 447, 452.
141. Jesse Rudy, What They Don't Know Won't Hurt Them: Defending Employment-at-Will in Light of Findings That Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 307, 317-38 (2002).
142. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947 (1984).
143. Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 8, 50-51 (1993).
144. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 361, 371-72 (1994).
145. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 361, 371-72 (1994).
146. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 361, 371-72 (1994).
147. William B. Gould IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 BYU L. Rev. 885, 908 ("The first basic ingredient [in just-cause legislation] should be arbitration, its virtues being speed, economy, and informality. ").
148. E.g., Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 351, 426-27 (2002).
149. Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 671, 676 (1996) ("[A]ny meaningful protection of employee privacy requires limitation of an employer's power to fire at will. ").
150. Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 901, 901 (2012).
151. For a general treatment of these issues, see Matthew W. Finkin, Privacy in Employment Law (3d ed. 2009).
152. For a good recent example of this attitude, see Steven L. Willborn, Consenting Employees: Workplace Privacy and the Role of Consent, 66 La. L. Rev. 975 (2006).
153. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 26, 39 (1976).
154. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 957, 968 (1989).
155. Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 Geo. L.J. 2087, 2092 (2001) ("To equate privacy with dignity is to ground privacy in social forms of respect we owe each other as members of a common community. ").
156. Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 La. L. Rev. 1111, 1120 (2006) (referring to privacy in the context of employer-mandated dress codes).
157. Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 901, 901 (2012).
158. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
159. See Mark Tushnet, Legal Conventionalism in the U.S. Constitutional Law of Privacy, 17 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 141, 154-60 (2000).
160. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
161. Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 901, 901 (2012).
162. James A. Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance: Employer Regulation of Off-Duty Behavior, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 133, 146-53 (2008). These norms were very much contested in the negotiations surrounding the wellness provisions of the Affordable Care Act, which ultimately gave employers more power than they previously held to financially incentivize healthy conduct by their employees.
163. See John E. McDonough, Inside National Health Reform 191-94 (2011).
164. For a good discussion of the expansion of workplace drug testing and the legal response to it, see Pauline T. Kim, Collective and Individual Approaches to Protecting Employee Privacy: The Experience with Workplace Drug Testing, 66 La. L. Rev. 1009 (2006).
165. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2007) (generally prohibiting employers from "terminat[ing] the employment of any employee due to that employee's engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours").
166. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-40s (2007) (generally providing that "[n]o employer or agent of any employer shall require, as a condition of employment, that any employee or prospective employee refrain from smoking or using tobacco products outside the course of his employment, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment for smoking or using tobacco products outside the course of his employment").
167. See John E. McDonough, Inside National Health Reform 191-94 (2011).
168. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 293, 304 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (rejecting claim that "femininity, or more accurately female sex appeal, " is a BFOQ for the job of flight attendant).
169. Brian Bennett, Al Qaeda's Yemen Branch Has Aided Somalia Militants, U.S. Says, L.A. Times, July 18, 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/18/world/la-fg-bin-laden-somalia-20110718 (suggesting interest on the part of al Qaeda's leadership).
170. See Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private Lives, 66 La. L. Rev. 1035, 1052-56 (2006) (arguing that employers should be sharply limited in their ability to regulate worker conduct off the job).
171. Cf. A.G. Sulzberger, Hospitals Shift Smoking Bans to Smoker Ban, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/11/us/ 11smoking.html (discussing Cleveland Clinic's ban on hiring smokers).
172. For example, a professional football team may prohibit its starting quarterback from riding a motorcycle without a helmet. See Big Ben in Serious Condition After Motorcycle Accident, ESPN (June 13, 2006, 3:59 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/ story?id=2480830.
173. Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 901, 901 (2012).
174. Of course, an employer must have a means of protecting itself against criminal liability should an employee, for example, download child pornography on the employer's computer. But employers can serve that interest without intruding on all of an employee's private communications.
175. See Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private Lives, 66 La. L. Rev. 1035, 1052-56 (2006) (arguing that employers should be sharply limited in their ability to regulate worker conduct off the job).
176. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
177. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
178. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
179. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
180. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
181. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
182. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
183. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
184. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
185. See Al Lewis & Vik Khanna, Is It Time to Re-Examine Workplace Wellness 'Get Well Quick' Schemes?, Health Affairs Blog (Jan. 16, 2013, 11:15 AM), http://healthaffairs.org/ blog/2013/01/16/is-it-time-to-re-examine-workplace-wellness-get-well-quick-schemes/.
186. For empirically informed reasons to doubt that assumption, see Jill R. Horwitz, Brenna D. Kelly & John E. DiNardo, Wellness Incentives in the Workplace: Cost Savings Through Cost Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 Health Aff. 468 (2013).
187. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
188. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
189. For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1517, 1591-95 (2009).
190. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
191. See Steven Greenhouse, Here's a Memo from the Boss: Vote This Way, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/27/us/politics/bossesoffering-timely-advice-how-to-vote.html.
192. Nate C. Hindman & Christina Wilkie, Wynn Employee Voter Guide Pressures Workers to Vote Right, Huffington Post (Oct. 26, 2012, 8:38 AM) (updated 11:20 PM), http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/25/wynn-employee-voter-guide_n_2018595.html.
193. Timothy Noah, Bumper Sticker Insubordination, Slate (Sept. 14, 2004, 6:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2004/09/ bumper_sticker_insubordination.html.
194. See Mike Elk, Koch Sends Pro-Romney Mailing to 45,000 Employees While Stifling Workplace Political Speech, In These Times (Oct. 14, 2012), http://inthesetimes.org/article/ 14017/koch_industries_sends_45000_employees_pro_romney_mailing ("When McKinney applied for a foreman job at the plant in May, he says, his supervisor informed him that a higher-up said he wouldn't get the job because he was 'too political.' 'They said I should be aware of what I am posting online,' says McKinney.").
195. See Steven Greenhouse, Here's a Memo from the Boss: Vote This Way, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/27/us/politics/bossesoffering-timely-advice-how-to-vote.html.
196. For examples, see Andy Kroll, CEO of International Corporation Sends Romney Fundraising Pitch to His Employees, Mother Jones (Oct. 25, 2012, 11:42 AM), http:// www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/10/romney-fundraising-email-ceo-incomm-brooks-smith.
197. Arthur Allen, CEO of ASG, Sent Email Pressuring Employees to Donate to Mitt Romney, Huffington Post (Oct. 20, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/20/ arthur-allen_n_1992370.html.
198. Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Election Bosses: How to Stop Employers from Telling Workers Whom to Vote for, Slate (Nov. 2, 2012, 6:31 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news _and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/11/how_congress_can_stop_employers_from_telling_work ers_how_to_vote.html.
199. 721 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir. 1983).
200. See, e.g., Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 736 (Idaho 2003) (employee fired for publicly opposing land development project that his employer supported).
201. Eugene Volokh, Private Employees' Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 295, 301 (2012).
202. See Stephen D. Sugarman, "Lifestyle" Discrimination in Employment, 24 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 377, 389 (2003) ("Maybe the employee's political activities and public statements have been considered extremely offensive (such as being a grand dragon of the KKK, or speaking out in support of pornography or pedophilia), and the employer may say it is responding to pressures from other employees and customers. Other times, the worker's politics may simply be in conflict with those of a boss who prefers to have like-minded people working for the enterprise. " (footnote omitted).
203. Timothy Noah, Can Your Boss Fire You for Your Political Beliefs?, Slate (July 1, 2002, 7:14 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/chatterbox/2002/07/can_your_boss_fire _you_for_your_political_beliefs.html (describing the case of a sewing-machine operator who was fired by Goodwill Industries in 2002 for supporting the Socialist Workers Party).
204. See David C. Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private Employee Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 9-13 (1998) (discussing the pressures toward worker self-censorship).
205. Lewis Maltby, Office Politics: Civic Speech Shouldn't Get Employees Fired, Legal Times, Aug. 29, 2005, available at http:// www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=900005435749&slreturn=20130419174324 ("William Niess, a Democrat in Wisconsin, refused to make a political contribution to the party favored by his boss. As a result, he was fired in 1996.").
206. See Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 689, 692 ("It makes little difference... whether a person who speaks out is discharged by a public or private employer. Political discussion is equally impoverished, the marketplace of ideas similarly distorted, and respect for the person no less denied. ").
207. Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 Ind. L.J. 101, 111 (1995).
208. Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 La. L. Rev. 237 (2009).
209. Cf. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 710 (1991) (arguing, from a civic republican perspective, that "citizens should be protected from employers' compulsion or penalization of political activity" and that the law should provide "speedy and effective legal remedies from discharge, reduction in job benefits, and other employer-controlled penalties for political activity").
210. See Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 4.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009).
211. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896-901 (3d Cir. 1983).
212. See Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 618-20 (3d Cir. 1992).
213. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 738-39 (Idaho 2003) ("[T]he public policy adopted in Novosel has not been endorsed by any other court, not even the Pennsylvania state courts within the federal district of the Circuit that issued Novosel. ").
214. Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 578, 589 (W. Va. 1998) ("Novosel is dubious authority today. ").
215. Eugene Volokh, Private Employees' Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 295, 301 (2012).
216. Eugene Volokh, Private Employees' Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 295, 301 (2012).
217. Eugene Volokh, Private Employees' Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 295, 301 (2012).
218. In 1982, for example, the Boston Symphony Orchestra canceled a contract with Vanessa Redgrave to narrate a performance of "Oedipus Rex" after subscribers and community members protested Redgrave's support for the Palestine Liberation Organization. See Redgrave v. Bos. Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1988) (rejecting Redgrave's civil rights claim but affirming a judgment in her favor for breach of contract).
219. Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Speech, Corporate Speech, and Political Speech: A Response to Professor Sachs, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 206, 206 (2012).
220. In 1986, for example, the large defense contractor Raytheon fired its chief lobbyist after he spoke at a press conference and advocated a reduction in defense spending. See Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574 N.E.2d 370, 371-72 (Mass. 1991) (rejecting the lobbyist's wrongful termination claim).
221. Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's Control of Its Workers' Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 Duke L.J. 1, 41-43 (2009) (describing evidence that onlookers often attribute the views of one's associates to oneself).
222. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
223. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
224. See Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private Lives, 66 La. L. Rev. 1035, 1052-56 (2006) (arguing that employers should be sharply limited in their ability to regulate worker conduct off the job).
225. See Kevin Drum, Starbucks CEO Should Leave His Baristas Alone, Mother Jones (Dec. 28, 2012, 11:31 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/12/starbucks-ceoshould-leave-his-baristas-alone.
226. Cf. Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1537 (1998) (arguing that imposing First Amendment norms on private entities may actually threaten First Amendment values).
227. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
228. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006) (reaffirming this aspect of PruneYard).
229. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 576-77, 580 (1995) (reaffirming this aspect of PruneYard, but holding that the First Amendment prohibited the state from requiring operators of "an expressive parade" to include participants expressing a message with which they disagreed, where inclusion of those participants would dilute "the parade's overall message" and disavowal by the parade operators would be impractical).
230. Cf. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1986) (plurality opinion) (requiring utility company to include in its billing mailer statements from third parties chosen specifically because they disagree with the company's views is viewpoint-discriminatory and impermissibly burdens the company's right to express its views).
231. See Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private Lives, 66 La. L. Rev. 1035, 1052-56 (2006) (arguing that employers should be sharply limited in their ability to regulate worker conduct off the job).
232. 530 U.S. 640, 653-54, 656 (2000).
233. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
234. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 712 (2012).
235. Cf. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 69 (concluding that permitting military personnel to recruit at law schools did not violate Dale because recruiters are "outsiders who come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students-not to become members of the school's expressive association").
236. Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1515 (2001). There is a substantial argument that Professor Carpenter's reading of Dale is too broad and unduly limits state power over even noncommercial associations.
237. See Andrew Koppelman, Should Noncommercial Associations Have an Absolute Right to Discriminate?, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 27 (2004). If that argument is correct, my proposal should stand on even firmer constitutional ground.
238. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886-87 (2010).
239. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991).
240. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991).
241. See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004) (per curiam).
242. Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's Control of Its Workers' Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 Duke L.J. 1, 41-43 (2009) (describing evidence that onlookers often attribute the views of one's associates to oneself).
243. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 151 (2012) (addressing those issues).
244. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 433, 445-46 (2009) ("All jurisdictions that recognize the public policy exception apply it where the employee informs a government agency about her suspicions. ").
245. Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party Effects, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1943, 1966-67 (1996) (collecting cases).
246. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 319, 376 (2005) ("Sarbanes-Oxley represents the gold standard in protection of employee whistleblowers.... ").
247. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 73, 85-95.
248. For a comprehensive survey of state statutory and common law whistleblower protections, and of federal whistleblower statutes enacted as of 2004, see Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 1029, 1087-123 (2004).
249. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2006) ("No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by [the Occupational Safety and Health Act]. "); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].... ").
250. For a comprehensive survey of state statutory and common law whistleblower protections, and of federal whistleblower statutes enacted as of 2004, see Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 1029, 1087-123 (2004).
251. Connecticut is the only state that gives employees general free-speech protection against private employers. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q (2009).
252. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)-(B), (a)(2) (antiretaliation provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
253. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)-(B), (a)(2) (antiretaliation provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
254. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 433, 445-46 (2009) ("All jurisdictions that recognize the public policy exception apply it where the employee informs a government agency about her suspicions. ").
255. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 276-80 (2009) (reading Title VII's opposition clause broadly in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the word "oppose").
256. See Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 4.02 reporters' notes cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) (collecting cases).
257. See Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 4.02 reporters' notes cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) (collecting cases).
258. See Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 4.02 reporters' notes cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) (collecting cases).
259. See Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 4.02 reporters' notes cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) (collecting cases).
260. See Cynthia Estlund, Working Together: How Workplace Bonds Strengthen a Diverse Democracy (2003).
261. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 18, 40 (2005).
262. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 180 (2005).
263. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 319, 376 (2005) ("Sarbanes-Oxley represents the gold standard in protection of employee whistleblowers.... ").
264. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 433, 445-46 (2009) ("All jurisdictions that recognize the public policy exception apply it where the employee informs a government agency about her suspicions. ").
265. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q (2009).
266. See Schumann v. Dianon Sys., Inc., 43 A.3d 111, 121-23 (Conn. 2012).
267. George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech in Remedial Perspective, 24 J.L. & Pol. 129, 144 (2008).
268. George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech in Remedial Perspective, 24 J.L. & Pol. 129, 144 (2008).
269. George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech in Remedial Perspective, 24 J.L. & Pol. 129, 144 (2008).
270. See Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 4.02(c) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009).
271. See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court's Antiretaliation Principle, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 375, 446-51 (2010).
272. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 433, 445-46 (2009) ("All jurisdictions that recognize the public policy exception apply it where the employee informs a government agency about her suspicions. ").
273. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 433, 445-46 (2009) ("All jurisdictions that recognize the public policy exception apply it where the employee informs a government agency about her suspicions. ").
274. Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 41, 56-57 (1999).
275. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 24-25 (2006).
276. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 433, 445-46 (2009) ("All jurisdictions that recognize the public policy exception apply it where the employee informs a government agency about her suspicions. ").
277. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 24-25 (2006).
278. The most notable of these have been 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (holding that a collective bargaining agreement could require arbitration of individual employees' claims under the federal employment discrimination laws).
279. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act applies to all employment contracts except those of transportation workers).
280. See Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 579.
281. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 637, 695 (1996).
282. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 189 (1997).
283. Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 430 (2006)
284. Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 Rutgers L.J. 399, 400-01 (2000).
285. See Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (out) Rights, 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 803, 829-33 (2009).
286. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1631, 1672 (2005).
287. Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1039, 1063 (1998).
288. See Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 579.
289. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 559, 563-66 (2001).
290. David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 73 (1999).
291. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's Better Than It Looks, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 783 (2008).
292. Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 813 (2008).
293. Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 813 (2008).
294. For a particularly powerful rebuttal, see David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1247 (2009).
295. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 319, 376 (2005) ("Sarbanes-Oxley represents the gold standard in protection of employee whistleblowers.... ").
296. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
297. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
298. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 623 passim (2012).
299. Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication in a Post-Concepcion Era, 56 St. Louis U. L.J. 1203, 1224-26 (2012).
300. See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 157, 175-82 (2006) (arguing, before Concepcion, that mandatory arbitration clauses with class-action bans make certain consumer claims impossible to vindicate).
301. Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Justice: Economic Analysis passim (Chi. Inst. for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 628, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=2197013 (expressing skepticism about this conclusion).
302. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 319, 376 (2005) ("Sarbanes-Oxley represents the gold standard in protection of employee whistleblowers.... ").
303. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012).
304. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012).
305. Andrus v. D.R. Horton, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00098-JCM-VCF, 2012 WL 5989646, at *4 n.1 (D. Nev. Nov. 12, 2012) (noting that the Fifth Circuit had stayed the Board's decision).
306. For a defense of the Board's decision on statutory grounds, see Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted Action Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 1013 (2013).
307. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(l), 212 (2006) (child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
308. John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, ch. 11, § 9, at 1109 (Batoche Books 2001) (1848).
309. Kaushik Basu, Child Labor: Cause, Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on International Labor Standards, 37 J. Econ. Literature 1083, 1093-95 (1999)
310. Mark Blaug, The Classical Economists and the Factory Acts-A Re-Examination, 72 Q. J. Econ. 211 (1958).
311. Mark Blaug, The Classical Economists and the Factory Acts-A Re-Examination, 72 Q. J. Econ. 211 (1958).
312. Mark Blaug, The Classical Economists and the Factory Acts-A Re-Examination, 72 Q. J. Econ. 211 (1958).
313. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), available at http://presspubs. uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18s35.html.
314. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) ("[S]ome degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. Further, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. ").
315. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship. ").
316. It was precisely this concern about creating a self-perpetuating underclass that led the Court to strike down a law barring free public education of the children of undocumented immigrants. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-23 (1982).
317. But see Marjorie Elizabeth Wood, Pitting Child Safety Against the Family Farm, N.Y. Times (May 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/opinion/pitting-child-safetyagainst-the-family-farm.html (noting controversy over the Obama Administration's quickly abandoned efforts to impose new child-labor restrictions on hazardous agricultural employment).
318. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) (maximum-hours provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
319. Matthew S. Bewig, Lochner v. The Journeyman Bakers of New York: The Journeyman Bakers, Their Hours of Labor, and the Constitution, 38 Am. J. Legal Hist. 413, 443 (1994).
320. Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 42 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roy Rosenzweig, Eight Hours for What We Will 1 (1983).
321. Matthew S. Bewig, Lochner v. The Journeyman Bakers of New York: The Journeyman Bakers, Their Hours of Labor, and the Constitution, 38 Am. J. Legal Hist. 413, 443 (1994).
322. See Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers 316 (1992) (reprinting a poster that rendered the slogan as "Eight hours for work! Eight hours for sleep! Eight hours for home and citizenship!").
323. Todd D. Rakoff, A Time for Every Purpose: Law and the Balance of Life 68 (2002) ("In the present day, the fundamental reason to set a legal limit to work time is to make time available for other important social activities. ").
324. Todd D. Rakoff, A Time for Every Purpose: Law and the Balance of Life 68 (2002) ("In the present day, the fundamental reason to set a legal limit to work time is to make time available for other important social activities. ").
325. Todd D. Rakoff, A Time for Every Purpose: Law and the Balance of Life 68 (2002) ("In the present day, the fundamental reason to set a legal limit to work time is to make time available for other important social activities. ").
326. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 319, 376 (2005) ("Sarbanes-Oxley represents the gold standard in protection of employee whistleblowers.... ").
327. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 117 (2011).
328. Todd D. Rakoff, A Time for Every Purpose: Law and the Balance of Life 68 (2002) ("In the present day, the fundamental reason to set a legal limit to work time is to make time available for other important social activities. ").
329. See Adam T. Klein et al., The DOL's New FLSA White Collar Exemption Regulations and Working with the DOL on FLSA Actions, 10 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 459, 462 (2006) (noting that under the new Department of Labor regulations the white-collar exemptions can apply to an employee with a salary as low as $23,660 per year).
330. Drew Frederick, Comment, Exempt Executives? Dollar General Store Managers' Embattled Quest for Overtime Pay Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 277 (2011).
331. To be sure, the problem of crowding out civic life exists for workers who are covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") as well. See Shirley Lung, Overwork and Overtime, 39 Ind. L. Rev. 51 (2005) (responding to the problem by arguing for a statutory right to refuse overtime).
332. See Scott D. Miller, Work/Life Balance and the White-Collar Employee Under the FLSA, 7 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 5 (2003).
333. Juliet B. Schor, Worktime in Contemporary Context: Amending the Fair Labor Standards Act, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 157, 170 (1994).
334. Todd D. Rakoff, A Time for Every Purpose: Law and the Balance of Life 68 (2002) ("In the present day, the fundamental reason to set a legal limit to work time is to make time available for other important social activities. ").
335. Todd D. Rakoff, A Time for Every Purpose: Law and the Balance of Life 68 (2002) ("In the present day, the fundamental reason to set a legal limit to work time is to make time available for other important social activities. ").
336. See Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New Deal Hours Legislation, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 2212 (1998).
337. See Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New Deal Hours Legislation, 96 Mich. L. Rev. At 2319-20. (1998).
338. It does suggest, however, that Professor Malamud is probably correct in urging that it is "time to genuinely rethink the FLSA and its upper-level exemptions, not merely to 'simplify' them or remake them to maximize employer 'flexibility.'" Id. at 2319-20