Discrimination at will: Job security protections and equal employment opportunity in conflict

Stanford Law Review

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 73-113

  Suk, Julie C ^a  

^a YESHIVA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 38049043474     PISSN: 00389765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (260)

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
2. When Title VII was being debated, conservatives' main objection to the legislation was that it would interfere with employers' freedom of contract. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1964),
3. reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2431-62 (minority report).
4. See Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547 (2003);
5. Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889 (2006);
6. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001).
7. See William R. Corbett, The "Fall " of Summers, the Rise of "Pretext Plus," and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305 (1996);
8. Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to "No Cause " Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177 (2003);
9. Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1995);
10. Parker, supra note 3.
11. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 156 (2003);
12. Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443 (1996);
13. Donna E. Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and Employment At-Will, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 351 (2001).
14. See, e.g., Molly Moore, Top French Tribunal Upholds Jobs Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2006, at A13;
15. Sebastian Rotella & Achrene Sicakyuz, 1 Million Across France March to Oppose Premier's Key Labor Law, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at A21;
16. Elaine Sciolino & Craig S. Smith, Protests in France over Youth Labor Law Turn Violent, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at A12;
17. Craig S. Smith, Opponents of New French Labor Law Step Up Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2006, at A9.
18. See Law No. 2006-396 of Mar. 31, 2006, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Apr. 2, 2006, p. 4950, art. 8.
19. See Elaine Sciolino, Chirac Will Rescind Labor Law That Caused Wide French Riots, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006, at A1. The legislature eventually adopted a new law that replaced the article that contained the CPE provision.
20. See Law No. 2006-457 of Apr. 21, 2006, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Apr. 22, 2006, p. 5993.
21. See Law No. 2006-396 of Mar. 31, 2006, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Apr. 2, 2006, p. 4950.
22. The initial report proposing the bill began with a discussion of the need to respond to the problems of unemployment and discrimination that had motivated the riots. See Laurent Hénart, Rapport no. 2825 fait au nom de la commission des affaires culturelles, familiales, et sociales sur le projet de loi (no. 2787) pour l'égalité des chances 7 (Jan. 25, 2006), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/rapports/r2825. asp.
23. The increasing violence of the riots, and their spread throughout the nation, were reported almost daily in most of the major U.S. newspapers for about two weeks in November 2005, often on the front page. See, e.g., Cassell Bryan-Low & John Carreyrou, France Authorizes Curfews as Riots Cast Doubt on Its Policing System, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2005, at A1;
24. David Ignatius, Op-Ed., Why France Is Burning, WASH. POST., Nov. 9, 2005, at A31;
25. Craig S. Smith, Chirac Appeals for Calm as Violent Protests Shake Paris's Suburbs, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at A11. The riots also caught the attention of U.S. legal scholars. See Posting of Richard Posner to the Becker-Posner Blog, The French Riots, http://www.becker- posner-blog.com/archives/2005/11/the_french_riot.html (Nov. 13, 2005, 6:08 P.M.).
26. Mark Landler, France Declares Emergency; Curfews to Be Imposed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A12.
27. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
28. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
29. See United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 203.
30. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 465, 465 (1968) (attributing this goal to the Truman Committee on Civil Rights in 1947).
31. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2 (2000).
32. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE PRESIDENCY: RACE AND GENDER IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 1960-1972, at 53-56 (1992).
33. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (2000).
34. The classic statement to this effect was made by Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause should be understood to prohibit group-disadvantaging state action). Cynthia Estlund has argued that Title VII should be understood as an "equal protection clause for the workplace."
35. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 331 (2005);
36. see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (2006) (arguing that the best explanation for employment discrimination law is its reflection of a broad goal of social change to eliminate group-based status inequalities).
37. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court, in inventing the disparate impact theory of liability, saw Title VII as requiring "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the view that the goal of Title VII was to eradicate group-based disadvantage in access to employment in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, in holding that voluntary employer affirmative action policies did not violate Title VII. The Court characterized the goals of the Civil Rights Act as "the integration of blacks into the mainstream of American society." 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
38. For a more detailed discussion of the distinctive features of U.S. antidiscrimination law as compared with the French model, see Julie Chi-hye Suk, Equal by Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295 (2007).
39. Indeed, the defenders of employment at will view the limits imposed on it by antidiscrimination, labor, and wrongful discharge doctrine to be excessive. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 9 (1990);
40. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984);
41. Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901 (1996).
42. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
43. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
44. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
45. For instance, New York's employment discrimination statute includes sexual orientation as a prohibited category. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2007).
46. Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1669 (1996).
47. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
48. For example, New York has a whistleblower statute, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 2007), and New Jersey has a Conscientious Employee Protection Act that protects employees who engage in whistle-blowing activities, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to 19-8 (West 2007).
49. See, e.g., Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
50. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to "Just Cause"Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 519, 520 (1978) ("[T]he common law rule of employer discretion has been superseded by the principle that personnel decisions must be based on just cause. The just cause standard arose initially under Title VII . . . .");
51. Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 20 (1979) (arguing that McDonnell Douglas's requirement that an employer-defendant put forth a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" after a plaintiffs prima facie case effectively produced a just-cause standard).
52. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
53. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Where There's At-Will, There Are Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing Incoherence of Employment at Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 295 (2005);
54. Joseph E. Slater, The "American Rule" that Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 53 (2007);
55. Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65 (2000).
56. In the United States, the only state that adopts a just-cause standard for the discharge of employees by statute is Montana. See Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (2005).
57. Cf. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that an employer policy prohibiting employees from wearing all-braided hairstyles is not a violation of Title VII).
58. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
59. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991).
60. Id. at 998.
61. See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII: A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1990);
62. Corbett, supra note 4;
63. Derum & Engle, supra note 4;
64. Estlund, supra note 28;
65. Malamud, supra note 4;
66. McGinley, supra note 5;
67. Young, supra note 5.
68. For example, Cynthia Estlund points out that "the legal right to fire for bad reasons has been virtually decimated." Estlund, supra note 28, at 1655.
69. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
70. Under McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case without direct evidence by proving (1) that he was a member of a protected group, (2) that he was qualified for the job, (3) he applied for the job and was rejected, and (4) the job continued to remain open. Id. at 802.
71. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993).
72. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
73. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
74. In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, the Supreme Court stated that: A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors . . . . [W]e are willing to presume this largely because we know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. 438 U.S. at 577 (citation omitted). In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court extended this reasoning by explicitly noting that a plaintiff can show that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer than the proffered reason simply by showing that the proffered explanation was unworthy of credence. 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). As Malamud notes, the circuits applied Burdine very differently with regard to the question of whether a plaintiff who convinced the fact finder that the employer's proffered reason was false was then entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Malamud, supra note 4, at 2234 n.23.
75. 509 U.S. at 519.
76. It should be noted, however, that scholars began to notice the significance of employment at will as a barrier to the success of Title VII prior to Hicks. See, e.g., Blumoff & Lewis, supra note 40, at 70-72.
77. See Corbett, supra note 4, at 330 (arguing that Hicks was evidence of the Supreme Court's refusal to displace employment at will to the extent necessary to effectuate Title VII's goal);
78. Estlund, supra note 28, at 1679 (arguing that employment at will undermines Title VII);
79. McGinley, supra note 5 (urging the adoption of a national discharge policy prohibiting employers from discharging an employee without just cause, for the sake of achieving race and gender equality);
80. Young, supra note 5 (proposing greater general protections for employee job security, including prior notice of dismissal or pay in lieu of notice, in light of the collaborative role played by employment at will in the subordination of women and people of color). Deborah Malamud observed that "wrongful, or at least undefendable, employer actions are significant problems in the American workplace, even outside of the setting of actionable discrimination." Malamud, supra note 4, at 2255.
81. See McGinley, supra note 5, at 1511-12;
82. see also Young, supra note 5.
83. McGinley borrows from the job security laws of the Virgin Islands, France, and Germany. See McGinley, supra note 5, at 1511, 1514 n.413, 1519-21. McGinley acknowledges, however, that the labor laws of France and Germany are more restrictive of the employer's prerogative than her own proposal. Id. at 1520-21. Young notes that "the United States stands virtually alone among Western industrialized nations in its failure to furnish its workers adequate job security." Young, supra note 5, at 355;
84. see also Clyde W. Summers, Worker Dislocation: Who Bears the Burden? A Comparative Study of Social Values in Five Countries, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033 (1995);
85. Madeleine M. Plasencia, Comment Employment at Will: The French Experience as a Basis for Reform, 9 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 294 (1988).
86. See ESTLUND, supra note 5;
87. Derum & Engle, supra note 4 (arguing that both employment at will and the difficulties faced by Title VII in addressing unconscious bias have detracted from employment discrimination law's ability to combat discrimination);
88. Slater, supra note 34.
89. See ESTLUND, supra note 5, at 152.
90. See id.; Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 38;
91. Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513, 519 (1987).
92. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 38, at 1015, 1016 fig.6.
93. Id. at 1024.
94. Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1489 (1996).
95. ESTLUND, supra note 5, at 156.
96. Estlund also develops this view in Estlund, supra note 28, at 1679.
97. ESTLUND, supra note 5, at 145.
98. See EPSTEIN, supra note 23.
99. Id. at 148.
100. See, e.g., Blumrosen, supra note 32, at 565;
101. Peck, supra note 32, at 49. More recently, Cynthia Estlund argued that "the legal rights of employees and the corresponding limitations on employer power that have developed since 1964 provide rudimentary analogues to the constitutional rights of citizens as against the government[,]" suggesting that the right against discrimination is part of a more universal right.
102. Estlund, supra note 20, at 332-33. Ann McGinley argues: An employee who is discharged without just cause is an innocent victim of the employment at will doctrine. Dismissed employees suffer economic loss, relocation costs, depression, and loss of self esteem . . . . The average worker finds herself in the same position as that of blacks and women before the existence of the antidiscrimination laws. McGinley, supra note 5, at 1500. McGinley sees the employee discharged for a bad reason as suffering essentially the same injury as an employee who is discriminated against on the basis of race, sex, or other group traits.
103. For a discussion of the French employment law controversy from an American perspective, see William Pfaff, France: The Children's Hour, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 11, 2006, at 40.
104. See Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 503 (1997) (detailing the unstable nature of most Americans' employment).
105. C. TRAV. art. L122-45.
106. See C. TRAV. art. L122-4 to 122-49.
107. Note that French law also imposes criminal liability for intentional discrimination in employment. See infra note 74.
108. Law No. 82-689 of Aug. 4, 1982, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 6, 1982, p. 2519.
109. Id.;
110. see also C. TRAV. art. L122-40.
111. C. TRAV. art. L122-45 (translated by author). The French text reads: Aucune personne ne peut être écartée d'une procédure de recrutement ou de l'accès à un stage ou à une période de formation en entreprise, aucun salarié ne peut être sanctionné, licencié ou faire l'objet d'une mesure discriminatoire, directe ou indirecte, notamment en matière de rémunération, au sens de l'article L. 140-2, de mesures d'intéressement ou de distribution d'actions, de formation, de reclassement, d'affectation, de qualification, de classification, de promotion professionnelle, de mutation ou de renouvellement de contrat en raison de son origine, de son sexe, de ses moeurs, de son orientation sexuelle, de son âge, de sa situation de famille ou de sa grossesse, de ses caractéristiques génétiques, de son appartenance ou de sa non-appartenance, vraie ou supposée, à une ethnie, une nation ou une race, de ses opinions politiques, de ses activités syndicales ou mutualistes, de ses convictions religieuses, de son apparence physique, de son patronyme ou en raison de son état de santé ou de son handicap.
112. "Indirect" discrimination, a concept imported into French law from European directives which were themselves influenced by British law, corresponds roughly to the American notion of "disparate impact" discrimination, developed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that facially neutral practices with a disproportionate impact on blacks violate Title VII if they cannot be justified by reference to business necessity).
113. C. PÉN. art. 225-2 makes discrimination punishable by three years' imprisonment or €45,000 when it consists of "refusal to hire, disciplining, and termination." Article 225-1 defines discrimination as any distinction operated between physical persons by reason of their origin, their sex, their family situation, pregnancy, their physical appearance, their family name, their state of health, their handicap, their genetic characteristics, their morals, the sexual orientation, their age, their political opinions, their union activities, their membership or non-membership, real or supposed, in a particular ethnicity, nation, race, or religion.
114. C. PÉN. art. 225-1 ("Constitue une discrimination toute distinction opérée entre les personnes physiques à raison de leur origine, de leur sexe, de leur situation de famille, de leur grossesse, de leur apparence physique, de leur patronyme, de leur état de santé, de leur handicap, de leurs caractéristiques génétiques, de leurs moeurs, de leur orientation sexuelle, de leur âge, de leurs opinions politiques, de leurs activités syndicales, de leur appartenance ou de leur non-appartenance, vraie ou supposée, à une ethnie, une nation, une race ou une religion dé terminée.") Article 225-1 repeats the exact same language as applied to "moral persons," which includes corporations. Id.
115. Law No. 72-546 of July 1, 1972, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 2, 1972, p. 6803.
116. The 1972 law modified the freedom of the press statute of 1881, which already prohibited attacks in the press against racial and religious groups. The 1972 statute strengthened this regulation of racist speech by criminally prohibiting speech provoking racial hatred, as well as defamation and insults of a racial nature, when they were targeted at individuals belonging to these groups in addition to the groups themselves. Id. arts. 1-4. That statute, the first law prohibiting discrimination, implemented France's obligations under the United Nations' International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).
117. JEAN AUROUX, LES DROITS DES TRAVAILLEURS, RAPPORT AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE ET AU PREMIER MINISTRE 7 (1981), available at http://www.vie-publique.fr/documents-vp/auroux.pdf
118. 1946 CONST. pmbl.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See JEAN PÉLISSIER, ALAIN SUPIOT & ANTOINE JEAMMAUD, DROIT DU TRAVAIL 17 (23d ed. 2006). These protections have only gotten better for French employees. As of 2000, French employees enjoyed a thirty-five-hour workweek and five weeks of paid vacation annually.
123. See C. TRAV. art. L212-1, L223-4.
124. AUROUX, supra note 77, at 7.
125. Law No. 82-689 of Aug. 4, 1982, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 6, 1982, p. 2518.
126. Id. arts. 1-6.
127. Id. arts. 7-10.
128. See AUROUX, supra note 77, at 8-9;
129. see also Law No. 82-689 of Aug. 4, 1982, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 6, 1982, p. 2520. Article 7 added Title VI to Book IV of the Labor Code, which protected the employees' right to expression in defining actions towards improving the conditions of work in the enterprise. Id.
130. AUROUX, supra note 77, at 15.
131. See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 125-26 (1976) (arguing that the American at will rule emerged and was solidified in treatises around the 1870s).
132. Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Lille, Feb. 19, 1906 [1909] D.P. II 121.
133. Law No. 49-1092 of Aug. 2, 1949, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 6, 1949, p. 7713.
134. Law No. 50-205 of Feb. 11, 1950, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Feb. 12, 1950, p. 1688.
135. Decree No. 55-156 of Feb. 2, 1955, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Feb. 3, 1955, p. 1241.
136. Law. No. 58-158 of Feb. 19, 1958, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Feb. 20, 1958, p. 1858. For a discussion of this law, see PÉLISSIER ET AL., supra note 82, at 20.
137. Ordinance No. 67-581 of July 13, 1967, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 19, 1967, p. 7241.
138. Law No. 73-3 of July 13, 1973, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 18, 1973, p. 7763. See generally PÉLISSIER ET AL., supra note 82, at 22.
139. C. TRAV. art. L122-1.
140. Id.
141. C. TRAV. art. L122-4.
142. C. TRAV. art. L122-6.
143. C. TRAV. art. L122-9.
144. C. TRAV. art. L122-14.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. C. TRAV. art. L122-13.
149. C. TRAV. art. L122-4-4.
150. C. TRAV. art. L321-2.
151. C. TRAV. art. L122-14-3.
152. Id.
153. AUROUX, supra note 77, at 6.
154. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 51-55 (2000);
155. Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886-88 (2000);
156. Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare Requires from Work, 54 UCLA L. REV. 373, 424 (2006).
157. The Preamble to the 1946 constitution, which has been incorporated into the 1958 constitution that is currently in force, reads: Following the victory won by free people over regimes that attempted to enslave and degrade the human person, the French people proclaim again that every human, without distinction of race, religion, or belief, possesses inalienable and sacred rights. It solemnly reaffirms the rights and liberties of man and citizen consecrated by the Declaration of Rights of Man of 1789 and the fundamental principles recognized by the laws of the Republic. The passage, in the original reads: Au lendemain de la victoire remportée par les peuples libres sur les régimes qui ont tenté d'asservir et de dégrader la personne humaine, le peuple français proclame à nouveau que tout être humain, sans distinction de race, de religion ni de croyance, possède des droits inaliénables et sacrés. Il réaffirme solennellement les droits et libertés de l'homme et du citoyen consacrés par la Déclaration des droits de 1789 et les principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la République. 1946 CONST. pmbl. (author's translation).
158. Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 7, 1978, pp. 227, 229.
159. For comparisons of French and American race-blindness, see Erik Bleich, Anti-Racism Without Races: Politics and Policy in a "Color-Blind" State, in RACE IN FRANCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 162 (Herrich Chapman & Laura L. Frader eds., 2004);
160. Robert C. Lieberman, A Tale of Two Countries: The Politics of Color-Blindness in France and the United States, in id. at 189;
161. Suk, supra note 22.
162. However, affirmative action programs based on socioeconomic disadvantage, measured by residence in designated geographical areas, have been introduced.
163. See 22 Held for Riots in France, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2005, at A10.
164. See Fabien Jobard, Sociologie politique de la «racaille», in EMEUTES URBAINES ET PROTESTATIONS: UNE SINGULARITE FRANCAISE 59, 73 (Hugues Lagrange & Marco Oberti eds., 2006).
165. See, e.g., Laurent Mucchielli & Véronique le Goaziou, Inégalités, humiliations collectives et violences urbaines, in L'ÉTAT DES INEGALITES EN FRANCE 2007 at 199, 201 (Louis Maurin & Patrick Savidan eds., 2006).
166. See infra notes 123-24.
167. Stéphane Beaud & Michel Pialoux, La "racaille" et les "vrais jeunes": critique d'une vision binaire du monde des cités, in BANLIEUE, LENDEMAIN DE REVOLTE 17, 18-20 (Chakri Belaïd ed., 2006)
168. Craig S. Smith, Angry Immigrants Embroil France in Wider Riots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at A1.
169. INSEE, Enquête Emploi, 2002, in L'ETAT DES INEGALITS EN FRANCE 2007, supra note 119, at 95 tbl.
170. Centre d'études ed de recherches sur les qualifications (CEREQ), Enquêtes Générations, 1998, in L'ETAT DES INEGALITS EN FRANCE 2007, supra note 119, at 96 tbl.
171. INSEE, Enquête Emploi 2002, in L'ETAT DES INEGALITES EN FRANCE 2007, supra note 119, at 95 graph.
172. CEREQ, L'enquête génération 98, http://www.cereq.fr/ cereq/G98ind/enquete.htm
173. CEREQ, BREF NO. 205, LES JEUNES ISSUS DE L'IMMIGRATION: DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPERIEUR AU MARCHE DU TRAVAIL (2004), available at http://www.cereq.fr/pdf/b205.pdf
174. Roxane Silberman, Les enfants d'immigrés sur le marché du travail, in IMMIGRATION, MARCHE DU TRAVAIL, INTEGRATION 297, 301 (François Héran ed., 2002).
175. Id.
176. See Hénart, supra note 10, at 7.
177. Law No. 2006-396 of Mar. 31, 2006, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Apr. 2, 2006, p. 4950.
178. See, e.g., Law No. 2004-1486 of Dec. 30, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec. 31, 2004, p. 22567 (creating an administrative agency to combat discrimination and to promote equality); Law No. 2001-1066 of Nov. 16, 2001, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Nov. 17, 2001, p. 18311 (easing the burden of proof for plaintiffs in civil employment discrimination cases).
179. Jonah D. Levy, France: Directing Adjustment?, in II WELFARE AND WORK IN THE OPEN ECONOMY: DIVERSE RESPONSES TO COMMON CHALLENGES 308, 321, 324 (Fritz W. Scharpf & Vivien A. Schmidt eds., 2000).
180. TIMOTHY B. SMITH, FRANCE IN CRISIS: WELFARE, INEQUALITY, AND GLOBALIZATION SINCE 1980, at 9 (2004).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 75-76.
184. See Virginie Guiraudon, Immigration Politics and Policies, in 3 DEVELOPMENT IN FRENCH POLITICS 154 (Alistair Cole, Patrick Le Galès & Jonah Levy eds., 2005).
185. See Stéphanie Jamet, Improving Labour Market Performance in France 5-6 (OECD Econ. Dep't, Working Paper No. 504, 2006), available at http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/oececoaaa/504-en.htm (arguing that reducing strict employment protection legislation could increase overall labor market participation in France).
186. Giuseppe Bertola, Tito Boeri & Sandrine Cazes, Employment Protection in Industrialized Countries: The Case for New Indicators, 139 INT'L LAB. REV. 57, 67 (2000).
187. Francis Kramarz & Marie-Laure Michaud, The Shape of Hiring and Separation Costs 15 (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 1170, 2004), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/ izadps/dp1170.html.
188. SMITH, supra note 134, at 10-12.
189. See Rachel Tiplady, Job Security Ignites Debate in France, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Mar. 22, 2006, http://www. businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2006/gb20060321_896473.htm.
190. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation over the Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 709, 723 (1993). Donohue and Siegelman claim that slack labor markets make it cheaper for employers with discriminatory tastes to "indulge their preference" for white workers. Id. While I agree with Donohue and Siegelman on this point, I argue further that slack labor markets not only create incentives for such indulgences in irrational discriminatory "tastes," but also that slack labor markets create more opportunities for rational discrimination.
191. See YAZID SABEG & LAURENCE MEHAIGNERIE, LES OUBLIES DE L'EGALITE DES CHANCES (2004).
192. See id. at 199.
193. See SMITH, supra note 134, at 179-80.
194. Id. at 197.
195. See Hénart, supra note 10, at 14-15.
196. e, in L'ETAT DES INÉGALITÉS EN FRANCE 2007, supra note 119, at 97 tbl.
197. HAUT CONSEIL A L'INTÉGRATION, LA PROMOTION SOCIALE DES JEUNES DANS LES QUARTIERS EN DIFFICULTÉ 10 (2003), available at http://i.ville.gouv.fr/divbib/doc/AVISpromosociale.pdf.
198. CLAUDE BÉBÉAR, RAPPORT AU PREMIER MINISTRE, DES ENTREPRISES AUX COULEURS DE LA FRANCE: MINORITES VISIBLES: RELEVER LE DEFI DE L'ACCÈS A L'EMPLOI ET DE L'INTEGRATION DANS L'ENTRERPISE 13 (2004), available at http://lesrapports.ladocumentationffancaise.fr/BRP/ 044000573/0000.pdf.
199. INSEE, Enquête Emploi, in L'ETAT DES INEGALITES EN FRANCE 2007, supra note 119, at 36 tbl.
200. British scholars and policymakers have long recognized that women and minorities are disadvantaged when people in power unconsciously give more favorable treatment to persons of the same social, cultural, or religious background as themselves because they feel more comfortable with them. See BOB HEPPLE QC, MARY COUSSEY & TUFYAL CHOUDHURY, EQUALITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF UK ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION 15 (2000).
201. Jean-François Amadieu, Enquête «Testing» sur CV (2004), available at http://cergors.univ-parisl .fr.
202. SAMUEL THOMAS, RAPPORT D'ANALYSE DES AFFAIRES RECENTES DE DISCRIMINATIONS À L'EMBAUCHE POURSUIVIES PAR SOS RACISME 14 (2005) (detailing three such experiments).
203. Amadieu, supra note 155, at 3-4.
204. See, e.g., MICHÈLE LAMONT, THE DIGNITY OF WORKING MEN (2002).
205. Abdelhak Eltmali, Regards de jeunes, in LA DISCRIMINATION A L'EMPLOI: L'INSERTION PROFESSIONNELLE DES JEUNES ISSUS DE L'IMMIGRATION 47, 48-49 (Mustapha Bourmmani ed., 2001).
206. SOPHIE BODY-GENDROT & CATHERINE WIHTOL DE WENDEN, POLICE ET DISCRIMINATION RACIALES 147 (2003).
207. VERONIQUE DE RUDDER, CHRISTIAN POIRET & FRANÇOIS VOURC'H, L'INEGALITE RACISTE 142 (2000).
208. The French text reads : La crise qu'ont traversée cet automne certains des quartiers de nos villes a agi comme un révélateur. Ce que nous savions, mais parfois ne voulions pas voir, est apparu clairement. Ces quartiers peuvent apparaître comme le précipité de tous les maux de la société française : décrochages massifs
209. See Law No. 2006-396 of Mar. 31, 2006, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Apr. 2, 2006, p. 4950. Most of the provisions enhanced training and educational opportunities through various new programs.
210. See, e.g., arts. 2, 11, 25, 29, 38. The law included one significant provision to strengthen antidiscrimination law, by strengthening the powers of the administrative agency that enforces this body of law.
211. See id. art. 41.
212. Id. art. 24.
213. Id. art. 8.
214. Hugues Lagranges & Marco Oberti, Le mouvement anti-CPE et l'unité des jeunes, in EMEUTES URBAINES ET PROTESTATIONS: UNE SINGULARITE FRANCAISE, supra note 118, at 131, 139.
215. See Que veulent les lycéens anti-CPE?, LE MONDE.FR, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/chat/0,46-0@2- 734511,55-751216,0.html (publishing interview with Tristan Rouquier, President of the Independent and Democratic Federation of High School Students).
216. See CPE: Les arguments contre, LE MONDE.FR, Mar. 2, 2006, http://www.lemonde.fr/web/chat/0,46-0@2-3224,55-745929,0.html (publishing interview with Bruno Juilliard, President of the National Union of Students of France).
217. Law No. 2006-457 of Apr. 21, 2006, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Officiai Gazette of France], Apr. 22,2006, p. 5993.
218. See Michel Delberghe, Le CV anonyme ne sera pas obligatoire dans les entreprises, LE MONDE, Oct. 12,2006, at 10.
219. Law No. 2006-457 of Apr. 21, 2006, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Apr. 22, 2006, p. 5993.
220. Id.
221. See Suk, supra note 22;
222. Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Suk, Dependence], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006759.
223. Traditional comparative method has looked to foreign law as a source of models that can be imported to solve presumably similar problems. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 95 (1993) (arguing that transplanting is a fertile source of legal development);
224. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998) (same);
225. James Gordley, Comparative Legal Research: Its Function in the Development of Harmonized Law, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 555, 560 ( 1995) (arguing that "[m]any legal problems are conceptually the same wherever they arise," thereby calling for transnational inquiry). Scholars have recently critiqued the notion that comparative law should search for transplantable models.
226. See, e.g., William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (1995) (criticizing the legal transplant approach);
227. Pierre Legrand, On the Singularity of Law, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 517, 522-25 (2006) (noting that law always works in a particular local context).
228. In arguing that the French experience can be instructive for American employment law and equal opportunity, I do not suggest that the disasters that have befallen France as a result of its choices with regard to job security protection will also plague the United States if we, too, adopt such norms. Rather, it is my hope that observing the dynamics and tensions between job security protection and the failing struggle to achieve racial equality in France will sharpen the critical perspective and imagination that American lawyers bring to their attempts to achieve racial equality through law in the United States.
229. As Robert Kagan has astutely noted, the relevant medical metaphor should not be transplant, but psychotherapy. Like psychotherapy, Kagan notes, "comparative analysis attempts to reveal roads not taken, unconsciously maintained patterns, and sources of resistance to change, thereby encouraging new courses of action that build on existing resources and potentials." ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 5-6 (2001).
230. See supra Part II.
231. Section 225-2 of the Penal Code prohibits, inter alia, the refusal to hire a person on the basis of the prohibited characteristics in Section 225-1. See C. PEN. art. 225-2. Section 122-45 of the Labor Code provides, inter alia, "that no person can be excluded from a recruitment process or from access to an internship or a period of training in an enterprise" on the basis of any of the prohibited characteristics, which include race, origin, sex, and many other categories. C. TRAV. art. L122-45.
232. See supra Part IV.
233. See Suk, Dependence, supra note 173.
234. Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 38, at 1015-16.
235. Id. at 1027-28.
236. Id. at 1032.
237. Id.
238. See Bagenstos, supra note 20;
239. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. CR.-CL. L. REV. 91, 95-111 (2003);
240. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, Al STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186-211 (1995);
241. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987);
242. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1136-37 (1997);
243. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 468-74 (2001).
244. While it is clear that employers faced a real threat of liability for overtly discriminating against African Americans right after Title VII was passed, recent studies suggest that the threat of liability today is more limited. Michael Selmi, for instance, shows in an empirical study of class action employment discrimination litigation that these lawsuits do not substantially influence stock prices. These cases are usually settled, and the settlements do not significantly harm firm value. Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1267-68 (2003).
245. Krieger, supra note 185, at 1239.
246. Nonetheless, Christine Jolis argues that antidiscrimination law has had the effect of decreasing implicit bias. Jolis argues that, to the extent that antidiscrimination law has increased the presence of minorities in the workplace, implicit bias has been decreased. She reaches this conclusion by citing to social science literature establishing that the presence of minorities decreases the level of implicit racial bias exhibited by others. See Christine Jolis, Antidiscrimination Law's Effect on Implicit Bias, in BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES OF WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION (forthcoming 2007).
247. The morphing of discrimination that I describe is a variant of what Reva Siegel has called "preservation-through-transformation." Siegel argues that status-enforcing state action evolves as it is regulated by law and contested. Siegel, supra note 185, at 1113. Similarly, employment discrimination evolves in response to the way law proscribes certain employment practices.
248. For a good discussion of the methodology and limits of some of these empirical studies, see John J. Donohue, The Law and Economics of Antidiscrimination Law 38-44 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 101, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=763486.
249. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination 12 (MIT Dep't Econ. Working Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=422902.
250. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 958 (2003).
251. See William A. Darity Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 63, 76-81.
252. KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 161 (2004).
253. Id. at 163.
254. See ESTLUND, supra note 5, at 147.
255. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (documenting the persistence of residential segregation in the United States, which has undermined African Americans' social mobility).
256. I develop an argument in favor of a greater role for administrative agencies in achieving equal employment opportunity in Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 405.
257. See Katherine V. W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 535 (2001). Stone argues that this model emerged largely from scientific theories of management that were prevalent in the era of industrialization.
258. Id. at 529-35.
259. Id. at 554.
260. See, e.g., ESTLUND, supra note 5, at 82-83.