메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 79, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 623-675

After class: Aggregate litigation in the wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 84857185212     PISSN: 00419494     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (86)

References (258)
  • 1
    • 45849111528 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reexamining the posse comitatus act: Toward a right to civil law enforcement
    • See Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 Yale L & Pol Rev 383, 389, 394 (2003).
    • (2003) Yale L & Pol Rev , vol.21 , Issue.383 , pp. 394
    • Kealy, S.J.1
  • 2
    • 84864424014 scopus 로고
    • The eye that never sleeps a history of the pinkerton national detective agency
    • See Frank Morn, "The Eye That Never Sleeps": A History of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency 151-63 (Indiana 1982).
    • (1982) Indiana , pp. 151-163
    • Morn, F.1
  • 3
    • 84864469551 scopus 로고
    • Mar 2 Stat 696 codified as amended at 31 USC §§
    • Act of Mar 2, 1863, 12 Stat 696, codified as amended at 31 USC §§ 3729-33.
    • (1863) Act of , pp. 3729-3733
  • 4
    • 84864451939 scopus 로고
    • US When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law
    • Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000e et seq. In one of the first cases construing the 1964 Act, the Supreme Court held, "A [public accommodations] suit is thus private in form only. . . . If [a plaintiff] obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority." Newman v Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc, 390 US 400, 401-02 (1968) ("When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law.").
    • (1968) Newman v Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc , vol.400 , pp. 401-402
  • 5
    • 84864461178 scopus 로고
    • Pub L90 Stat 2641, codified at 42 USC §
    • See, for example, The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-559, 90 Stat 2641, codified at 42 USC § 1988.
    • (1976) The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of , vol.1988 , Issue.94-559
  • 6
    • 0042527934 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reinventing structural reform litigation: Deputizing private citizens in the enforcement of civil rights
    • See also Myriam Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 Colum L Rev 1384, 1420-21 (2000).
    • (2000) Colum L Rev , vol.1384 , pp. 1420-1421
    • Gilles, M.1
  • 7
    • 0036881948 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Private justice
    • See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S Cal L Rev 1, 12-13 (2002).
    • (2002) S Cal L Rev , vol.76 , Issue.1 , pp. 12-13
    • Bucy, P.H.1
  • 8
    • 77951816279 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Dynamic federalism: Competition, cooperation and securities enforcement
    • Because the SEC lacks adequate resources to effectively police the national securities market, supplemental enforcement is essential to achieve an appropriate level of deterrence
    • See Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11 Conn Ins L J 107, 126-27 (2005) ("Because the SEC lacks adequate resources to effectively police the national securities market, supplemental enforcement is essential to achieve an appropriate level of deterrence.").
    • (2005) Conn Ins L J , vol.11 , pp. 126-127
    • Jones, R.M.1
  • 9
    • 84864477372 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The federalization and privatization of public consumer protection law in the united states: Their effect on litigation and enforcement
    • Recognizing the resource limitations of government agencies, many consumer laws provide a private right of action so individual consumers also can litigate violations of these laws. Many of these laws also provide class actions and statutory damages which encourage consumers to act as 'private attorneys general.'"
    • See Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 Ga St U L Rev 663, 664 (2008) ("Recognizing the resource limitations of government agencies, many consumer laws provide a private right of action so individual consumers also can litigate violations of these laws. Many of these laws also provide class actions and statutory damages which encourage consumers to act as 'private attorneys general.'").
    • (2008) Ga St U L Rev , vol.24 , Issue.663 , pp. 664
    • Budnitz, M.E.1
  • 10
    • 33846083732 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Exploding the class action agency costs myth: The social utility of entrepreneurial lawyers
    • discussing academic critiques of class actions
    • See Myriam Gilles and Gary Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U Pa L Rev 103, 155-59 (2006) (discussing academic critiques of class actions).
    • (2006) U Pa L Rev , vol.155 , Issue.103 , pp. 155-159
    • Gilles, M.1    Friedman, G.2
  • 11
    • 84864451941 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Class Certification: Developments over the Last Five Years 2002- 2007
    • (Oct 26, 2007) ("[F]or better or worse, it is today clear that the tide has turned against class certification, and new barriers have arisen across a variety of contexts where formerly class certification had seemed automatic
    • See John C. Coffee Jr and Stefan Paulovic, Class Certification: Developments over the Last Five Years 2002-2007, 8 BNA Class Action Litig Rep 787 (Oct 26, 2007) ("[F]or better or worse, it is today clear that the tide has turned against class certification, and new barriers have arisen across a variety of contexts where formerly class certification had seemed automatic.").
    • BNA Class Action Litig Rep 787 , vol.8
    • Coffee Jr., J.C.1    Paulovic, S.2
  • 12
    • 29444455400 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Opting out of liability: The forthcoming, near-total demise of the modern class action
    • Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 Mich L Rev 373, 425-27 (2005).
    • (2005) Mich L Rev , vol.104 , Issue.373 , pp. 425-427
    • Gilles, M.1
  • 13
    • 84864461179 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933
    • In January 2012, a private equity fund called the Carlyle Group sought to include a class action waiver in its charter in advance of an initial public offering in order to immunize it from future securities class actions. See Carlyle Group LP, Amendment No 2 to Form S-1 Registration Statement under The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities and Exchange Commission Jan 10, 2012), online at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1527166/000095012312000638 /w83442a2sv1za.htm#204 (visited May 2, 2012). The fund ultimately withdrew the "controversial" waiver under "pressure from investors and regulators," but future efforts to embed class action waivers in IPO registration materials may become more commonplace and less controversial.
    • Securities and Exchange Commission Jan 10, 2012
  • 14
    • 84864461180 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Carlyle drops arbitration clause from i.p.o. plans
    • Feb 3(visited May 2, 2012
    • Kevin Roose, Carlyle Drops Arbitration Clause from I.P.O. Plans, NY Times DealBook (Feb 3, 2012), online at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/ carlyle-drops-arbitration-clause-from-i-p-o-plans/ (visited May 2, 2012).
    • (2012) NY Times DealBook
    • Roose, K.1
  • 15
    • 84864493700 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The death of stockholder litigation?
    • Feb 13
    • See also John C. Coffee Jr, The Death of Stockholder Litigation?, Natl L J (Feb 13, 2012), online at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id= 1202541959250&The-death-of-stockholder-litigation&slreturn=1 (visited May 2, 2012) (suggesting that other companies are considering adding class action waivers, and "a horde of managements [will] follow the first company to succeed in including such a provision").
    • (2012) Natl L J
    • Coffee Jr., J.C.1
  • 16
    • 84864493697 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Compliance Manual
    • Taking the position that an employee cannot waive the right to file an administrative complaint, nor can agencies be required to waive their right to exercise statutory rights in bringing enforcement actions
    • But see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Compliance Manual, Notice 915.002 (July 10, 1997), reprinted in Employment Practices Guide at 6169-77 (CCH 2009) (taking the position that an employee cannot waive the right to file an administrative complaint, nor can agencies be required to waive their right to exercise statutory rights in bringing enforcement actions).
    • (2009) Notice 915.002 (July 10, 1997), Reprinted in Employment Practices Guide at , pp. 6169-6177
  • 17
    • 84864451943 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • WL 36274, *17 (NLRB
    • See also D.R. Horton, Inc, and Michael Cuda, 2012 WL 36274, *17 (NLRB 2012) (striking down arbitration agreements imposed on employees as a condition of employment that prohibit both class actions in court and class-wide arbitration as a violation of Section 7 of the National Labor relations Act).
    • (2012) D.R. Horton, Inc, and Michael Cuda 2012
  • 20
    • 79961239719 scopus 로고
    • Stating that high arbitration costs might render an arbitration agreement unenforceable
    • quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 US 614, 637 (1985) (stating that high arbitration costs might render an arbitration agreement unenforceable).
    • (1985) Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc , vol.473 , Issue.614 , pp. 637
  • 21
    • 84864424015 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 112th Cong, 1st Sess, in 157 Cong Rec S 2929 (May 12, 2011
    • After Concepcion was decided, Senators Al Franken and Richard Blumenthal, along with Congressman Hank Johnson, reintroduced the Arbitration Fairness Act, which would prohibit class waivers in all consumer, employment, and civil-rights-related contracts. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S 987, 112th Cong, 1st Sess, in 157 Cong Rec S 2929 (May 12, 2011).
    • (2011) Arbitration Fairness Act of , vol.987
  • 22
    • 84864451942 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Gutting class action
    • noting that the chances of federal legislation overriding Concepcion "aren't great in the current political environment
    • See also Editorial, Gutting Class Action, NY Times A26 May 13 2011) (noting that the chances of federal legislation overriding Concepcion "aren't great in the current political environment").
    • (2011) NY Times A26 May 13
  • 23
    • 84864493699 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 124 Stat codified in relevant part at 12 USC § 5518. 1376
    • See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) § 1028, Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376, 2003-04 (2010), codified in relevant part at 12 USC § 5518.
    • (2010) Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) § , vol.1028 , Issue.111-203 , pp. 2003-2004
  • 24
    • 84864493703 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • S Ct 876, 913 (2010).
    • (2010) S Ct , vol.876 , pp. 913
  • 25
    • 84864493702 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (cited in note
    • See Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 425-27 (cited in note 15 ).
    • Mich L Rev at , vol.104 , pp. 425-427
    • Gilles1
  • 27
    • 84864461184 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • cited in note
    • See Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 413-25 (cited in note 15 ).
    • Mich L Rev at , vol.104 , pp. 413-425
    • Gilles1
  • 28
    • 84864493706 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • P3d 1100, 1108 (Cal
    • See id at 399-404 (discussing first-wave challenges to class action waivers and noting that "[b]asic contract law directs that a contractual provision be deemed unenforceable and unconscionable if it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable: 'the former focusing on "oppression" or "surprise" due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on "overly harsh" or "one-sided" results'"), quoting Discover Bank v Superior Court, 113 P3d 1100, 1108 (Cal 2005).
    • (2005) Discover Bank v Superior Court , vol.113
  • 29
    • 79955608273 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • US holding that "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2" of the FAA
    • See Doctor's Associates, Inc v Casarotto, 517 US 681, 687 (1996) (holding that "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2" of the FAA).
    • (1996) Doctor's Associates, Inc v Casarotto , vol.517 , Issue.681 , pp. 687
  • 30
    • 84864461185 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • cited in note 15
    • See Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 401-02 & nn 140-50 (cited in note 15 ).
    • Mich L Rev at , vol.104 , pp. 401-402
    • Gilles1
  • 31
    • 84864424017 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Cooper v QC Financial Services, Inc
    • (D Ariz Arizona law
    • State and federal courts finding class action waivers unconscionable under state law: Cooper v QC Financial Services, Inc, 503 F Supp 2d 1266, 1290 (D Ariz 2007) (Arizona law)
    • (2007) F Supp 2d , vol.503 , Issue.1266 , pp. 1290
  • 32
    • 84864461181 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d 121611th Cir Georgia law
    • Dale v Comcast Corp, 498 F3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir 2007) (Georgia law)
    • (2007) Dale v Comcast Corp , vol.1224
  • 35
    • 84864461177 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Skirchak v Dynamics research corp
    • Skirchak v Dynamics Research Corp, 508 F3d 49, 59-60 (1st Cir 2007) (Massachusetts law)
    • (2007) F3d, 1st Cir Massachusetts law , vol.508 , pp. 59-60
  • 36
    • 84864431523 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • SW3d Mo
    • Ruhl v Lee's Summit Honda, 322 SW3d 136, 139-40 (Mo 2010)
    • (2010) Ruhl v Lee's Summit Honda , vol.136 , pp. 139-140
  • 42
    • 84864461166 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Thibodeau v comcast corporation, 912 a2d 874
    • Thibodeau v Comcast Corporation, 912 A2d 874, 887 (Pa Super Ct 2006)
    • (2006) Pa Super Ct , vol.887
  • 43
    • 84864424003 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • SE2d 394 400 SC
    • Herron v Century BMW, 693 SE2d 394 400 (SC 2010)
    • (2010) Herron v Century BMW , vol.693
  • 45
    • 84864451928 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (9th Cir) Washington law
    • Al-Safin v Circuit City Stores, Inc 394 1254 1261-62 (9th Cir) Washington law 2005
    • (2005) Al-Safin v Circuit City Stores, Inc , vol.1254 , pp. 1261-1262
  • 47
    • 84864461288 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • P3d
    • See, for example, Felts v CLK Management, Inc, 254 P3d 124, 137-39 (NM App 2011)
    • (2011) Felts v CLK Management, Inc , vol.124 , pp. 137-139
  • 48
    • 84864424005 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • P3d
    • McKee v AT&T Corp, 191 P3d 845, 397-98 (Wash 2008)
    • (2008) McKee v AT&T Corp , vol.191 , Issue.845 , pp. 397-398
  • 49
    • 84864451930 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • cited in note 15 listing decisions that upheld class action waivers against the unconscionability challenge
    • Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 400 n 139 (cited in note 15 ) (listing decisions that upheld class action waivers against the unconscionability challenge).
    • Mich L Rev at 400 , vol.104 , Issue.139
    • Gilles1
  • 51
    • 84864451932 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d 77
    • See also Booker v Robert Half International, Inc, 413 F3d 77, 81 (DC Cir 2005) (construing Randolph to allow a party to "resist[ ] arbitration on the ground that the terms of the arbitration agreement interfere with the effective vindication of statutory rights," but that party "bears the burden of showing the likelihood of such interference," which "cannot be carried by 'mere speculation'").
    • (2005) Booker v Robert Half International, Inc , vol.413 , Issue.81
  • 53
    • 84864438699 scopus 로고
    • Stat 730 codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 12-27 and 29 USC §§
    • Pub L No 63-212, 38 Stat 730 (1914), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 12-27 and 29 USC §§ 52-53.
    • (1914) Pub L 63-212 , vol.38 , pp. 52-53
  • 54
    • 84864461170 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • cited in note 15
    • Gilles, 104 Mich L Rev at 407 (cited in note 15 ).
    • Mich L Rev at , vol.104 , Issue.407
    • Gilles1
  • 55
    • 84864461171 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Brief and special appendix for plaintiffs-appellants
    • *17 (filed Sept 11 available on Westlaw at 2006 WL 6198567
    • Amex I, 554 F3d at 319, quoting Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants, In re American Express Merchants' Litigation, No 06-1871, *17 (filed Sept 11, 2006) (available on Westlaw at 2006 WL 6198567).
    • (2006) Re American Express Merchants' Litigation , Issue.6-1871
  • 56
    • 84864461172 scopus 로고
    • US 322
    • Amex I, 554 F3d at 320 (observing that the "public interest in vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws through the instrumentality of the private treble-damage action" could not be squared with an agreement that conferred de facto immunity from civil liability to American Express), quoting Lawlor v National Screen Service Corp, 349 US 322, 329 (1955).
    • (1955) Lawlor v National Screen Service Corp , vol.349 , Issue.329
  • 57
    • 84864461169 scopus 로고
    • US 468
    • See id at 1775, 1782 (finding "a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so" because "arbitration 'is a matter of consent, not coercion'"), quoting Volt Information Sciences, Inc v Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 US 468, 479 (1989).
    • (1989) Volt Information Sciences, Inc v Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University , vol.489 , Issue.479
  • 58
    • 84864424009 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • American express co v italian colors restaurant
    • memorandum opinion
    • American Express Co v Italian Colors Restaurant, 130 S Ct 2401, 2401 (2010) (memorandum opinion).
    • (2010) S Ct 2401 , vol.2401
  • 59
    • 84864424007 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Concepcion
    • Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1744. The Court also explained that "[t]he contract provided for arbitration of all disputes between the parties, but required that claims be brought in the parties' 'individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.'" The contract further provided that "the arbitrator may not consolidate more than one person's claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form of a representative or class proceeding." Id at 1744 & n 2.
    • S Ct at , vol.131 , Issue.1744
  • 62
    • 84864451933 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Concepcion
    • quoting Laster WL 5216255 at *11.
    • Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1745, quoting Laster, 2008 WL 5216255 at *11.
    • (2008) S Ct at , vol.131 , Issue.1745
  • 63
    • 84864424007 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Concepcion
    • outlining the fact pattern presented by the case, including the underlying claim and AT&T's motion to compel arbitration
    • Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1744 (outlining the fact pattern presented by the case, including the underlying claim and AT&T's motion to compel arbitration).
    • S Ct at , vol.131 , Issue.1744
  • 64
    • 84864461174 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Concepcion
    • See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1745-47.
    • S Ct at , vol.13 , pp. 1745-1747
  • 65
    • 84864461173 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Concepcion
    • Thomas concurring
    • Justice Thomas is of the view that the only viable defenses under FAA § 2 are defenses to the formation of a contract-for example, duress or fraudulent inducement-and that other public-policy-based challenges may well provide legal grounds to challenge the validity of any contract, but they do not count as "grounds . . . for the revocation" of contracts within the meaning of FAA § 2. No other justice shares this view. See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1753-57 (Thomas concurring).
    • S Ct at , vol.131 , pp. 1753-1757
  • 66
    • 84864451934 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Bruesewitz v Wyeth LLC S Ct 1068 2011 at 1089. Finding preemption under the Vaccine Act); Chamber of Commerce of the United States v Whiting, 31 S Ct 1968, 1981 (2011) (finding no preemption under the Immigration Reform and Control Act)
    • (2011) Bruesewitz v Wyeth LLC S Ct 1068 , vol.131 , Issue.1082
  • 67
    • 84864461176 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • S Ct 1131
    • See, for example, Bruesewitz v Wyeth LLC, 131 S Ct 1068, 1082 (2011) (finding preemption under the Vaccine Act); Chamber of Commerce of the United States v Whiting, 31 S Ct 1968, 1981 (2011) (finding no preemption under the Immigration Reform and Control Act); Williamson v Mazda Motor of America, Inc, 131 S Ct 1131, 1137 (2011) (finding no preemption under federal motor vehicle safety standards).
    • (2011) Williamson v Mazda Motor of America, Inc , vol.131 , Issue.1137
  • 69
    • 84864451936 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Leslie Bailey and Paul Bland, How Courts Can and Should Limit AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion (Public Justice 2011), online at http://www.publicjustice.net/Resources/How-Courts-Can-and-Should-Limit-ATT-v- Concepcion.aspx (visited Jan 8, 2012) (collecting arguments for minimizing the impact of Concepcion on class action waivers such as cases where the arbitration clause expressly adopts state law, or where a prohibition on waivers would not conflict with federal law).
    • (2011) How Courts Can and Should Limit AT&T Mobility V. Concepcion (Public Justice
    • Bailey, L.1    Bland, P.2
  • 70
    • 84864424006 scopus 로고
    • US 20 arbitration agreements are unenforceable in the rare case where Congress has clearly evinced an intention that the statutory claim at issue is inarbitrable
    • As the Supreme Court made clear in Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 US 20 (1991), arbitration agreements are unenforceable in the rare case where Congress has clearly evinced an intention that the statutory claim at issue is inarbitrable.
    • (1991) Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp , vol.500
  • 71
    • 84864493696 scopus 로고
    • Stat 33 codified as amended at 15 USC §§
    • Pub L No 79-15, 59 Stat 33 (1945), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1011-15.
    • (1945) Pub L 79 , vol.15 , Issue.59 , pp. 1011-1015
  • 73
    • 84864493695 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Subsequent to the decision in concepcion, the second circuit ordered the amex parties to brief the question of what effect, if any, the supreme court's decision should have on the rulings
    • February 1
    • Subsequent to the decision in Concepcion, the Second Circuit ordered the Amex parties to brief the question of what effect, if any, the Supreme Court's decision should have on the rulings in Amex I and Amex II. On February 1, 2012, the Second Circuit in Amex III broadly reaffirmed its prior two decisions.
    • (2012) Amex i and Amex II. on
  • 74
    • 84864451937 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • S Ct at 1753
    • Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1753.
    • Concepcion
  • 75
    • 84864461175 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d 80
    • See, for example, Tufariello v Long Island Rail Road Co, 458 F3d 80, 86 (2d Cir 2006) ("[T]he preemption doctrine flows from the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2, which 'invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to federal law' . . . The doctrine is inapplicable to a potential conflict between two federal statutes.")
    • (2006) Tufariello v Long Island Rail Road Co , vol.458 , pp. 2
  • 78
    • 84864451557 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d at 194, quoting Kristian, 446 F3d at
    • Amex II, 634 F3d at 194, quoting Kristian, 446 F3d at 63.
    • Amex II , vol.634 , pp. 63
  • 79
    • 84864440693 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • US at 92
    • See Randolph, 531 US at 92.
    • Randolph , vol.531
  • 80
    • 84864440684 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • US Stevens dissenting) (arguing that courts "should first try to harmonize" federal statutes, and observing "no statute must yield [to another federal statute] unless it is truly incapable of coexistence
    • See also National Association of Home Builders v Defenders of Wildlife, 551 US 644, 678-79 (2007) (Stevens dissenting) (arguing that courts "should first try to harmonize" federal statutes, and observing "no statute must yield [to another federal statute] unless it is truly incapable of coexistence").
    • (2007) National Association of Home Builders v Defenders of Wildlife , vol.551 , pp. 678-679
  • 81
    • 84864461138 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • US at
    • Randolph, 531 US at 90-92:
    • Randolph , vol.531 , pp. 90-92
  • 82
    • 84864440692 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d 2744th Cir
    • See also In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litigation, 505 F3d 274, 285 (4th Cir 2007) ("[I]f a party could demonstrate that the prohibition on class actions likely would make arbitration prohibitively expensive, such a showing could invalidate an agreement.").
    • (2007) Re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litigation , vol.505 , Issue.285
  • 83
    • 84864469981 scopus 로고
    • S Ct at 1745
    • Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1745, 1753 (citing the district court's description of AT&T's arbitration provision as "quick, easy to use," likely to "promp[t] full or . . . even excess payment to the customer without the need to arbitrate or litigate," and "sufficient to provide incentive for the individual prosecution of meritorious claims" and a "better" option to plaintiffs than class litigation).
    • (1753) Concepcion , vol.131
  • 84
    • 84864434987 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • US
    • Significantly, the Concepcion Court never cited Randolph. As a consequence, lower courts are not free to determine that the Supreme Court in Concepcion implicitly overruled the Randolph case-by-case test. See Agostini v Felton, 521 US 203, 237 (1997) (stating that lower courts may not "conclude [that the Supreme Court's] more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent" and must "leav[e] to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions").
    • (1997) Agostini v Felton , vol.521 , Issue.203
  • 85
    • 84864434986 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • This Court does not normally overturn, or so dramatically limit, earlier authority sub silentio"
    • See also Shalala v Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc, 529 US 1, 18 (2000) ("This Court does not normally overturn, or so dramatically limit, earlier authority sub silentio").
    • (2000) Shalala v Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc , vol.529 , Issue.1 , pp. 18
  • 86
    • 84864469980 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • S Ct at
    • See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1753. Of course, the opinion did not reject or consider any argument that class proceedings are necessary to prosecute the Concepcions' particular small-dollar claim. Nor did Justice Scalia say-in dicta or otherwise-that it would be immaterial if the claimants could show that the instant claim required class treatment.
    • Concepcion , vol.131 , pp. 1753
  • 87
    • 84864434985 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • WL 1765661, *3 (CD Cal
    • Id at 1744. Indeed, a district court judge described AT&T's arbitration provision as "perhaps the most fair and consumer-friendly provisions this Court has ever seen." Makarowski v AT&T Mobility, LLC, 2009 WL 1765661, *3 (CD Cal).
    • (2009) Makarowski v AT&T Mobility LLC
  • 88
    • 84864491605 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (visited Jan 8, 2012): The wording of the majority decision Apr 27
    • See, for example, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, U.S. Supreme Court Finds That Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements Are Enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (Apr 27, 2011), online at http://www.gibsondunn.com/ publications/pages /USSupremeCourtFinds- ClassActionWaiversInArbitrationAgreementsAreEnforceableUnder FederalArbitrationAct.aspx (visited Jan 8, 2012): The wording of the majority decision in AT&T Mobility does not seem to require similar provisions in an arbitration agreement, although the Court did observe that the district court concluded that the guaranteed amounts would put the Concepcions in a better position than if they were participants in a class action.
    • (2011) U.S. Supreme Court Finds That Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements Are Enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act
    • Dunn, G.1    Llp, C.2
  • 89
    • 84864434988 scopus 로고
    • US
    • See Amex I, 554 F3d at 315-18; Amex II, 634 F3d at 198-99. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the "costs" recoverable under 28 USC § 1920 and FRCP 54(d) exclude expert witness fees and that the cost-shifting provisions of the Clayton Act simply do "not permit a shift of expert witness fees." See West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc v Casey, 499 US 83, 94, 99-100 (1991)
    • (1991) West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc v Casey , vol.499 , Issue.83 , pp. 99-100
  • 90
    • 84864469983 scopus 로고
    • Crawford Fitting Co v J.T. Gibbons, Inc
    • Crawford Fitting Co v J.T. Gibbons, Inc 482 US 437 442 1987
    • (1987) 482 US , vol.437 , pp. 442
  • 91
    • 84864422929 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Express Merchants Litigation *3 Feb 26
    • See Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Second Circuit Strikes Down Class Arbitration Provisions in In re American Express Merchants Litigation *3 (Feb 26, 2009), online at http://www.weil.com/files/upload/WeilBriefing-LitReg- 090226.pdf (visited Jan 8, 2012) ("Another option for businesses to consider, to the extent they wish to increase the possibility that their class arbitration waiver provisions will be enforceable under In re American Express, is the inclusion of a fee-shifting provision for attorneys' fees and expert costs.").
    • (2009) Second Circuit Strikes Down Class Arbitration Provisions in in Re American
    • Gotshal, W.1    Llp, M.2
  • 92
    • 84864433215 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (visited Jan 8, 2012) (advising that AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, Class Action Alert *4 (Nixon Peabody LLP Apr 27
    • See Christopher M. Mason and Benjamin R. Dwyer, U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Class Action Waivers in Consumer Contracts: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, Class Action Alert *4 (Nixon Peabody LLP Apr 27, 2011), online at http://www.nixonpeabody.com /linked-media/publications/Class-Action-Alert- 04-27-2011.pdf (visited Jan 8, 2012) (advising that "[c]ompanies should consider tailoring their contracts to provide the individual customer reasonable access to a fair and inexpensive dispute resolution process like the contract addressed in Concepcion").
    • (2011) U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Class Action Waivers in Consumer Contracts
    • Mason, C.M.1    Dwyer, B.R.2
  • 93
    • 84864434989 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d 294 noting that while cost allocation features of the "[a]greements would impose prohibitive costs on [plaintiff]," this argument "has been mooted by [defendant's] representation to the district court that it would pay all arbitration costs")
    • See, for example, Carter v Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc, 362 F3d 294, 300 (5th Cir 2004) (noting that while cost allocation features of the "[a]greements would impose prohibitive costs on [plaintiff]," this argument "has been mooted by [defendant's] representation to the district court that it would pay all arbitration costs")
    • (2004) Carter v Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc , vol.300
  • 94
    • 84864422931 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Phillips v associates home equity services, inc
    • 2dfinding that an individual could not be compelled to arbitrate if required to bear the prohibitive arbitration costs, but stating that the court would reconsider its ruling if the defendants agreed to pay these costs
    • Phillips v associates home equity services, inc 179, F Supp, 2d, 840, 847, 2001, finding that an individual could not be compelled to arbitrate if required to bear the prohibitive arbitration costs, but stating that the court would reconsider its ruling if the defendants agreed to pay these costs
    • (2001) F Supp , vol.840 , pp. 847
  • 95
    • 18844427631 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Current issues in consumer arbitration
    • The case law is divided on a number of cost issues, particularly at what point in time financial burdens should be assessed, and on whether the analysis should be affected by offers to waive contractual cost provisions
    • See also Kelly Thompson Cochran and Eric J. Mogilnicki, Current Issues in Consumer Arbitration, 60 Bus Law 785, 789 (2005) ("The case law is divided on a number of cost issues, particularly at what point in time financial burdens should be assessed, and on whether the analysis should be affected by offers to waive contractual cost provisions.").
    • (2005) Bus Law , vol.789 , Issue.785
    • Cochran, K.T.1    Mogilnicki, E.J.2
  • 96
    • 84864422930 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d6th Cir en banc
    • Morrison v Circuit City Stores, Inc, 317 F3d 646, 657-58, 663 (6th Cir 2003) (en banc).
    • (2003) Morrison v Circuit City Stores, Inc , vol.317-646 , Issue.657 , pp. 663
  • 99
    • 84864422939 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A2d
    • Delta Funding Corp v Harris, 912 A2d 104, 112-13 (NJ 2006).
    • (2006) Delta Funding Corp v Harris , vol.912 , Issue.104 , pp. 112-113
  • 100
    • 77953329647 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Arbitration's summer soldiers: An empirical study of arbitration clauses in consumer and nonconsumer contracts
    • Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, and Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U Mich J L Ref 871, 876 (2008).
    • (2008) U Mich J L Ref , vol.41 , Issue.871 , pp. 876
    • Eisenberg, T.1    Miller, G.P.2    Sherwin, E.3
  • 101
    • 78149428637 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Ware why do businesses use (or not use) arbitration clauses?
    • Christopher R. Drahozal and Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 Ohio St J Disp Res 433, 446-74 (2010).
    • (2010) Ohio St J Disp Res , vol.25 , Issue.433 , pp. 446-474
    • Drahozal, C.R.1    Stephen, J.2
  • 102
    • 84864424007 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Concepcion
    • Breyer dissenting) ("What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?")
    • See Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1761 (Breyer dissenting) ("What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?")
    • S Ct at , vol.131 , Issue.1761
  • 103
    • 84864440677 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • P3d 723 (Nev noting plaintiffs' argument that "the class action waiver was exculpatory because, in cases . . . where the individualized claims are relatively small, it is almost impossible to secure legal representation unless those claims are aggregated with the claims of other similarly situated individuals
    • Picardi v Eighth Judicial District Court, 251 P3d 723, 725 (Nev 2011) (noting plaintiffs' argument that "the class action waiver was exculpatory because, in cases . . . where the individualized claims are relatively small, it is almost impossible to secure legal representation unless those claims are aggregated with the claims of other similarly situated individuals").
    • (2011) Picardi v Eighth Judicial District Court , vol.725
  • 104
    • 84864474519 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • WL 5216255 at *1. The unfair competition and false advertising claims were initially dismissed with leave to amend. The Consumers Legal Remedies Act claim was dismissed with prejudice because plaintiffs failed to comply with certain statutory notice requirements.
    • See Laster, 2008 WL 5216255 at *1. The unfair competition and false advertising claims were initially dismissed with leave to amend. The Consumers Legal Remedies Act claim was dismissed with prejudice because plaintiffs failed to comply with certain statutory notice requirements.
    • (2008) Laster
  • 106
    • 84864432793 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No 08- 017, New York University Law & Economics Research Paper No 08-28, Dec
    • Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, and Emily L. Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts *6 (Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No 08-017, New York University Law & Economics Research Paper No 08-28, Dec 2007), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 /papers.cfm? abstract-id=1076968 (visited Jan 8, 2012) (discussing the study of varying use of arbitration clauses across contracts within the same firms). See also notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
    • (2007) Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts *6 , pp. 103-104
    • Eisenberg, T.1    Geoffrey, P.M.2    Sherwin, E.L.3
  • 107
    • 84864461127 scopus 로고
    • US 322
    • Id at 1756 (Thomas concurring). In its decision in Amex I, the Second Circuit made a similar point, albeit in the specific context of antitrust claims, where the Supreme Court has long held that, "'in view of the public interest in vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws through the instrumentality of the private treble-damage action,' an agreement which confers even 'a partial immunity from civil liability for future violations' of the antitrust laws is inconsistent with the public interest." Amex I, 554 F3d at 319, quoting Lawlor v National Screen Service Corp, 349 US 322, 329 (1955).
    • (1955) Lawlor v National Screen Service Corp , vol.349
  • 110
    • 84864461125 scopus 로고
    • US 483 holding that a state statute that mandates wage disputes must be allowed to be litigated in a judicial forum is counter to the FAA and thus preempted), quoting Cal Lab Code § 229
    • Perry v Thomas, 482 US 483, 484, 491 (1976) (holding that a state statute that mandates wage disputes must be allowed to be litigated in a judicial forum is counter to the FAA and thus preempted), quoting Cal Lab Code § 229.
    • (1976) Perry v Thomas , vol.484 , pp. 491
  • 111
    • 79955821352 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Arbitration as delegation
    • David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 NYU L Rev 437, 454 (2011) (arguing that the Court's reading of the FAA has transformed the statute into a private delegation of legislative power).
    • (2011) NYU L Rev , vol.86 , Issue.437 , pp. 454
    • Horton, D.1
  • 112
    • 84864442567 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Concepcion
    • Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1748. See also id at 1758 (Breyer dissenting) ("[W]e should think more than twice before invalidating a state law that does just what § 2 requires, namely, puts agreements to arbitrate and agreements to litigate 'upon the same footing.'").
    • S Ct at , vol.131 , pp. 1748
  • 113
    • 0345509091 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • US
    • Obstacle preemption exists "where 'under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'" Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363, 373 (2000)
    • (2000) Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council , vol.373 , pp. 363
  • 114
    • 84864474520 scopus 로고
    • US 52
    • quoting Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67 (1941). To determine whether obstacle preemption exists, the Supreme Court has instructed the lower federal courts to employ their collective "judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and identifying its purpose and intended effects." Crosby, 530 US at 373.
    • (1941) Hines v Davidowitz , vol.312 , Issue.67
  • 115
    • 84864440679 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • quoting Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US at 67.
    • Concepcion, 131 S Ct at 1753, quoting Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US at 67.
    • Concepcion S Ct at , vol.131 , Issue.1753
  • 116
    • 84864474532 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d (11th Cir
    • Cruz v Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir 2011).
    • (2011) Cruz v Cingular Wireless, LLC , vol.648 , Issue.1205 , pp. 1211
  • 117
    • 84864474521 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Spinetti
    • citing Morrison, 317 F3d at 663. See also text accompanying notes
    • Spinetti, 324 F3d at 217, citing Morrison, 317 F3d at 663. See also text accompanying notes 98-102.
    • F3d at , vol.324 , Issue.217 , pp. 98-102
  • 119
    • 84864470922 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (visited Jan 6, 2012 Regular Session (Feb 18, 2011)
    • California Legislature, 2011-12 Regular Session (Feb 18, 2011), online at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab-1051-1100/ab-1062-bill- 20110901-amended-sen-v96.pdf (visited Jan 6, 2012).
    • (2011) California Legislature
  • 120
    • 84864446250 scopus 로고
    • F3d 7th Cir
    • See, for example, Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir 1995) (holding that mandamus appeal from grant of class certification was appropriate because an appeal from the final judgment "will come too late to provide effective relief for these defendants [due to] the sheer magnitude of the risk to which the class action, in contrast to the individual actions pending or likely, exposes them").
    • (1995) Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc , vol.51 , Issue.1293 , pp. 1297
  • 121
    • 84864466593 scopus 로고
    • Pub L No 111- 203, title X, codified at 12 USC § 5301 et seq
    • Pub L No 111-203, title X, 124 Stat 1955, codified at 12 USC § 5301 et seq.
    • (1955) Stat , vol.124
  • 122
    • 79955559426 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • § et seq, 12 USC § 5511 et seq
    • Dodd-Frank Act § 1021 et seq, 12 USC § 5511 et seq.
    • Dodd-Frank Act , vol.1021
  • 124
    • 83655208710 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Unsafe at any rate
    • Summer (visited Jan 8, 2012).
    • The CFBP was the brainchild of Elizabeth Warren. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 Democracy 8, 16-18 (Summer 2007), online at http://www.democracyjournal.org /pdf/5/Warren.pdf (visited Jan 8, 2012). Warren, who had earned a reputation as proconsumer during her academic career, was feared by many business types as President Obama's obvious choice to run the CFPB. She built the agency from scratch, serving as assistant to the President and special advisor to the Treasury.
    • (2007) Democracy , vol.5 , Issue.8 , pp. 16-18
    • Warren, E.1
  • 125
    • 84864423972 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Consumer bureau to run-director or not
    • June 15 (visited Jan 8, 2012) (reporting that Republicans have "lambasted Warren, and done whatever they can to stop President Obama [from] even thinking about naming her to run the bureau")
    • See Jennifer Liberto, Consumer Bureau to Run-Director or Not, CNN Money (June 15, 2011), online at http://money.cnn.com/2011/06/15/news /economy/consumer-bureau/index.htm (visited Jan 8, 2012) (reporting that Republicans have "lambasted Warren, and done whatever they can to stop President Obama [from] even thinking about naming her to run the bureau").
    • (2011) CNN Money
    • Liberto, J.1
  • 128
    • 79955559426 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • § (a), 12 USCA § 5497(a) (providing that the director of the CFPB is entitled to request, and the Federal Reserve is required to transfer, an amount "reasonably necessary" from the earnings of the Federal Reserve, up to a statutory cap of 10 percent of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve for 2011
    • See also Dodd-Frank Act § 1017(a), 12 USCA § 5497(a) (providing that the director of the CFPB is entitled to request, and the Federal Reserve is required to transfer, an amount "reasonably necessary" from the earnings of the Federal Reserve, up to a statutory cap of 10 percent of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve for 2011, 11 percent in fiscal year 2012, and 12 percent thereafter)
    • Dodd-Frank Act , vol.1017
  • 129
    • 84864461128 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Note, administrative law-agency design-dodd-frank act creates the consumer financial protection bureau
    • Note, Administrative Law-Agency Design-Dodd-Frank Act Creates the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 124 Harv L Rev 2123, 2126 (2011) ("The degree of independence the Bureau holds is unlike that of a standard independent agency because it is largely insulated from both executive and legislative control, especially due to its independent revenue source.")
    • (2011) Harv L Rev , vol.124 , Issue.2123 , pp. 2126
  • 130
    • 84864423978 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Note
    • (cited in note 143 ) ("[T]he Dodd-Frank Act takes the rare step of exempting the Bureau from the most powerful tool for congressional control-appropriations.")
    • Note, 124 Harv L Rev at 2127 (cited in note 143 ) ("[T]he Dodd-Frank Act takes the rare step of exempting the Bureau from the most powerful tool for congressional control-appropriations.")
    • Harv L Rev at 2127 , vol.124
  • 131
    • 84864440680 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Hill May 3 (visited Jan 9, 2012)
    • Bernie Becker, et al, Overnight Money: Defund, Delay, Defang, The Hill (May 3, 2011), online at http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking- financial-institutions/159097-overnight-money-defund-delay-defang (visited Jan 9, 2012).
    • (2011) Overnight Money: Defund, Delay, Defang
    • Becker, B.1
  • 132
    • 84055181892 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • NY Times B1 (May 6, 2011)
    • In May 2011, forty-four Senate Republicans sent a letter to President Obama declaring they "will not support the consideration of any nominee, regardless of party affiliation," to direct the bureau until the agency is restructured. Edward Wyatt and Ben Protess, Foes Revise Plan to Curb New Agency, NY Times B1 (May 6, 2011)
    • Foes Revise Plan to Curb New Agency
    • Wyatt, E.1    Protess, B.2
  • 133
    • 84864461130 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • website of Senator Richard Shelby (May 5, 2011), (visited Dec 20, 2011) (providing the full text of the letter)
    • citing 44 U.S. Sens. to Obama: No Accountability, No Confirmation, website of Senator Richard Shelby (May 5, 2011) online at http://shelby.senate. gov/public/index.cfm/newsreleases?ID=893bc8b0-2e73-4555-8441-d51e0ccd1d17 (visited Dec 20, 2011) (providing the full text of the letter).
    • 44 U.S. Sens. to Obama: No Accountability, No Confirmation
  • 134
    • 84864467776 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Free enterprise fund v public company accounting oversight board
    • See, for example, Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S Ct 3138, 3142 (2010) (ruling that a regulatory board created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contravened separation of powers by conferring executive power on agency officials without subjecting them to presidential control).
    • (2010) S Ct 3138 , vol.130 , Issue.3142
  • 135
    • 84864461131 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • With new power, gop takes on consumer agency
    • Nov 23
    • See, for example, Victoria McGrane and Deborah Solomon, With New Power, GOP Takes On Consumer Agency, Wall St J A5 (Nov 23, 2010) (reporting that members of the House Financial Services Committee wrote the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department questioning the legality of the CFPB)
    • (2010) Wall St J A5
    • McGrane, V.1    Solomon, D.2
  • 136
    • 84864423971 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Huffington Post (Nov 23, 2010) (visited Jan 9, 2012)
    • William Alden, GOP Lawmakers: Elizabeth Warren's Job 'Undermines' Constitution, Huffington Post (Nov 23, 2010), online at http://www. huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/23/elizabeth-warren-gop-n-787571.html (visited Jan 9, 2012) (describing Representatives Spencer Bachus and Judy Biggert's opposition to the agency and providing a letter sent by the Representatives to the Treasury and Federal Reserve asserting that Warren's role as special advisor "circumvented the advice-and-consent process and undermined one of the key checks and balances in our Constitution. While the Act confers upon the Secretary of the Treasury limited interim authority 'to perform the functions of the Bureau' (Section 1066(a)), Professor Warren is now exercising that authority"). For the Treasury and Federal Reserve's response, see Letter from Eric M. Thorson, Inspector General of the Department of the Treasury, and Elizabeth A. Coleman, Inspector General of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to Representatives Spencer Bachus and Judy Biggert (Jan 10, 2011), online at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ig/ Documents/OIG-CA%2011004%20Committee%20of%20Financial%20Services %20Response%20CFPB.pdf (visited Jan 9, 2011).
    • GOP Lawmakers: Elizabeth Warren's Job 'Undermines' Constitution
    • Alden, W.1
  • 137
    • 84864461132 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Note, administrative law
    • (cited in note 143 )
    • See Note, Administrative Law, 124 Harv L Rev at 2126 (cited in note 143 ).
    • Harv L Rev at 2126 , vol.124
  • 138
    • 84864474523 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Bank challenger picked to run consumer agency
    • July 18
    • See Deborah Solomon and Maya Jackson Randall, Bank Challenger Picked to Run Consumer Agency, Wall St J A2 (July 18, 2011). Cordray is also a controversial pick, as he was a proconsumer state AG who brought a number of important lawsuits against industry.
    • (2011) Wall St J A2
    • Solomon, D.1    Jackson Randall, M.2
  • 139
    • 84864440683 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • NY Times B1 Oct 12
    • See id; Michael Powell, The States vs. Wall St., NY Times B1 (Oct 12, 2010): Mr. Cordray in two years in office has demonstrated a willingness to sue early and often, filing lawsuits against global financial houses, rating agencies, subprime lenders and foreclosure scammers. He has wrested about $2 billion so far, a string of gilded pelts: a $475 million Merrill Lynch settlement, $400 million from Marsh & McLennan and $725 million from the American International Group. . . . Former Senator Michael DeWine, a Republican who is running against Mr. Cordray, a Democrat, in the November election, has implied that Mr. Cordray wields an antibusiness cudgel.
    • (2010) The States Vs. Wall St
    • Powell, M.1
  • 140
    • 84859567287 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • NY Times A1 (Jan 5 2012)
    • See Helene Cooper and Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer Chief, NY Times A1 (Jan 5, 2012) (reporting that President Obama appointed Richard Cordray to serve as director of the CFPB while the Senate was in recess after Republicans had refused to confirm Cordray since his nomination in July 2011).
    • Bucking Senate Obama Appoints Consumer Chief
    • Cooper, H.1    Steinhauer, J.2
  • 141
    • 79955559426 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • § (b), 12 USC § 5518(b)
    • Dodd-Frank Act § 1028(b), 12 USC § 5518(b). Notably, Dodd-Frank confers similar authority on the SEC to ban mandatory arbitration in the securities context and flatly prohibits mandatory arbitration in mortgage and home equity loan contracts. Dodd-Frank Act § 1414, 15 USC § 1639c(e). The Act also bans mandatory arbitration that would waive protections for those who blow the whistle on securities fraud and commodities fraud.
    • Dodd-Frank Act , vol.1028
  • 142
    • 84864440681 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • §, USC § 78u-6
    • Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 USC § 78u-6
    • Dodd-Frank Act , vol.922 , Issue.15
  • 143
    • 84864423973 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • § USC § 26
    • Dodd-Frank Act § 748, 7 USC § 26.
    • Dodd-Frank Act , vol.748 , Issue.7
  • 144
    • 84864423974 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • §, 12 USC § 5481(12)
    • The Dodd-Frank Act expressly lists the "enumerated consumer laws" that are within the agency's jurisdiction. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1002(12), 12 USC § 5481(12).
    • Dodd-Frank Act , vol.1002 , Issue.12
  • 145
    • 84864423975 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Pub L No 94- 240, Stat 257, codified at 15 USC § 1667 et seq
    • Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub L No 94-240, 90 Stat 257, codified at 15 USC § 1667 et seq
    • Consumer Leasing Act of 1976 , vol.90
  • 146
    • 84864423976 scopus 로고
    • Pub L No 95-630, Stat
    • Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Pub L No 95-630, 92 Stat 3728 (1978), codified at 15 USC § 1693 et seq
    • (1978) Electronic Fund Transfer Act , vol.92 , pp. 3728
  • 147
    • 84978720838 scopus 로고
    • Pub L No 93-495 Stat
    • Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub L No 93-495, 88 Stat 1521 (1974), codified at 15 USC § 1691 et seq
    • (1974) Equal Credit Opportunity Act , vol.88 , pp. 1521
  • 148
    • 84864461135 scopus 로고
    • Pub L No 93-495 Stat
    • Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub L No 93-495, 88 Stat 1511 (1974), codified at 15 USC § 1666 et seq
    • (1974) Fair Credit Billing Act , vol.88 , pp. 1511
  • 149
    • 84864461134 scopus 로고
    • Pub L No 91-508 Stat
    • The Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub L No 91-508, 84 Stat 1128 (1970), codified at 15 USC § 1681 et seq
    • (1970) The Fair Credit Reporting Act , vol.84 , pp. 1128
  • 150
    • 84864461133 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Pub L No 105- 216, Stat codified at 12 USC § 4901 et seq
    • Home Owners Protection Act of 1998, Pub L No 105-216, 112 Stat 897, codified at 12 USC § 4901 et seq
    • Home Owners Protection Act of 1998 , vol.112 , pp. 897
  • 151
    • 84864427939 scopus 로고
    • Pub L No 95- 109, Stat 874 codified at 15 USC § 1692 et seq
    • Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub L No 95-109, 91 Stat 874 (1977), codified at 15 USC § 1692 et seq.
    • (1977) Fair Debt Collection Practices Act , vol.91
  • 152
    • 84864440682 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 19-7 Clarks' Bank Deposits and Payments Monthly *7 July
    • See, for example, Barkley Clark and Barbara Clark, Prediction: Likely First Targets of Bureau Rulemaking, 19-7 Clarks' Bank Deposits and Payments Monthly *7 (July 2010) ("We have no doubt that one of the first rules out of the box will restrict or prohibit pre-dispute arbitration clauses coupled with class action waivers in consumer financial services contracts. This issue has been ablaze over the last several years.")
    • (2010) Prediction: Likely First Targets of Bureau Rulemaking
    • Clark, B.1    Clark, B.2
  • 155
    • 84864440687 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Consumer Financial Protection Bureau May 11 (visited Jan 9, 2012)
    • Raj Date, Independent Research at the CFPB (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau May 11, 2011), online at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/independent- research-at-the-cfpb/ (visited Jan 9, 2012).
    • (2011) Independent Research at the CFPB
    • Date, R.1
  • 156
    • 84864423979 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Public Citizen Apr 27 (visited Jan 9, 2012)
    • Gupta released this statement after the Court issued its decision in Concepcion: Class actions are an essential tool for justice in our society. Brown v. Board of Education was a class action. The fate of class actions should not be decided through the fine print of take-it-or-leave-it contracts. . . . Public Citizen is committed to fighting against forced arbitration, which every day is used to deny justice to consumers and employees. We will continue to champion consumers' rights in every branch of government. We will not give up. Deepak Gupta, In AT amp;T v. Concepcion, U.S. Supreme Court Deals Crushing Blow to Consumers, Public Citizen (Apr 27, 2011), online at http://www.citizen.org/ pressroom /pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3326 (visited Jan 9, 2012).
    • (2011) AT&T V. Concepcion, U.S. Supreme Court Deals Crushing Blow to Consumers
    • Gupta, D.1
  • 157
    • 84864440689 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • May 23 (visited Jan 9, 2012)
    • Deepak Gupta, Moving to CFPB, BlueMauMau (May 23, 2011), online at http://www.bluemaumau.org/moving-cfpb (visited Jan 9, 2012) (stating on his blog that he will be joining the CFPB and is "looking forward to the challenge of helping to build a new consumer agency from scratch").
    • (2011) Moving to CFPB, BlueMauMau
    • Gupta, D.1
  • 158
    • 84864474531 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Letter to the editor
    • NY Times Dec 3 (visited Jan 9, 2012)
    • Deepak Gupta, Letter to the Editor, Class-Action Lawsuits, NY Times (Dec 3, 2010), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/opinion/lweb04class.html (visited Jan 9, 2012).
    • (2010) Class-Action Lawsuits
    • Gupta, D.1
  • 159
    • 84864474533 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • High court gives banks a win, but will it last?
    • Apr 28
    • See also Kate Davidson, High Court Gives Banks a Win, but Will It Last?, Am Banker 1 (Apr 28, 2011) (quoting Gupta on the question of whether the CFPB has authority to ban certain forms of arbitration: "Congress always has the authority to overturn a decision, but Congress has delegated the authority to ban arbitration in certain contracts in this instance, . . . [s]o there is nothing unusual about an administrative agency exercising authority delegated to it by Congress").
    • (2011) Am Banker , vol.1
    • Davidson, K.1
  • 160
    • 79955559426 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • USC § 5518
    • Dodd-Frank Act § 1028, 12 USC § 5518. There is precedent for this approach to consumer protection by "regulat[ing] contract terms directly, mandating, limiting, or prohibiting terms including prices."
    • (1028) Dodd-Frank Act § , vol.12
  • 161
    • 78649261668 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Behavior and contract
    • Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 Law & Ineq 135, 177 (2009) (citing the example of the FTC, which has authority to "simply prohibit[] terms that cannot be viewed as benefiting consumers in a vast majority of situations").
    • (2009) Law & Ineq , vol.27 , Issue.135 , pp. 177
    • White, A.M.1
  • 162
    • 84864440691 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d, 2d Cir
    • See, for example, In re Initial Public Offerings Securities Litigation, 471 F3d 24, 41-42 (2d Cir 2006) (rejecting the "some showing" standard and adopting a requirement that plaintiffs provide "definitive" proof, through "affidavits, documents, or testimony to . . . [establish] that each Rule 23 requirement has been met")
    • (2006) Re Initial Public Offerings Securities Litigation , vol.471 , Issue.24 , pp. 41-42
  • 163
    • 84864440690 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d 305 3d Cir
    • In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 552 F3d 305, 316, 320 (3d Cir 2008): An overlap between a class certification requirement and the merits of a claim is no reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether a class certification requirement is met. . . . Factual determinations necessary to make Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance of the evidence.
    • (2008) Re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation , vol.552 , pp. 320
  • 164
    • 84864433605 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Predominance of common questions-common mistakes in applying the class action standard
    • See also J. Douglas Richards and Benjamin D. Brown, Predominance of Common Questions-Common Mistakes in Applying the Class Action Standard, 41 Rutgers L J 163, 169 (2009).
    • (2009) Rutgers L J , vol.41 , Issue.163 , pp. 169
    • Douglas Richards, J.1    Brown, B.D.2
  • 165
    • 84864423980 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • FRD 573 ND Ill
    • See, for example, Reed v Advocate Health Care, 268 FRD 573, 596 (ND Ill 2009) (denying certification after weighing plaintiffs' method of proving injury and damages, and competing expert testimony, and concluding that plaintiffs were unable to provide common proof of their claims)
    • (2009) Reed v Advocate Health Care , vol.268 , pp. 596
  • 166
    • 84864433191 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • FRD 232 SD Iowa
    • Walsh v Principal Life Insurance Co, 266 FRD 232, 237 (SD Iowa 2010) (investigating evidentiary submissions before denying class certification due to plaintiffs' inability to satisfy the predominance requirement with evidence of injury common to the class).
    • (2010) Walsh v Principal Life Insurance Co , vol.266 , pp. 237
  • 167
    • 84864461115 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • S Ct 2541 (2011).
    • (2011) S Ct 2541 , vol.131
  • 168
    • 84864461114 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (b)( 3) damages class actions appears minimal
    • See id at 2556-57 (2011). The Supreme Court clearly ramped up the requirements for establishing "commonality" under Rule 23(a), but no matter how rigorous the showing under Dukes, no one can argue that it is more exacting than the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement under the Initial Public Offering-Hydrogen Peroxide line of cases. See note 158 . Therefore, the impact of Dukes on Rule 23(b)(3) damages class actions appears minimal.
    • Therefore, the Impact of Dukes on Rule , vol.23
  • 169
    • 84864932948 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Class dismissed: Contemporary judicial hostility to small-claims consumer class actions
    • Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DePaul L Rev 305, 331 (2010).
    • (2010) DePaul L Rev , vol.59 , Issue.305 , pp. 331
    • Gilles, M.1
  • 176
    • 84864434745 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Compare fulbright & jaworski llp
    • (visited Jan 9, 2012)
    • Although some studies show that the number of class actions filed has remained fairly steady over the past three years, others reveal that, given the increased evidentiary and burden of proof standards that plaintiffs must satisfy, a significant number of these classes are not certified. Compare Fulbright & Jaworski LLP, 7th Annual Litigation Trends Survey Report (2010), online at http://www.fulbright.com/litigationtrends (visited Jan 9, 2012)
    • (2010) 7th Annual Litigation Trends Survey Report
  • 177
    • 84864459557 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Evidentiary and burden of proof standards for class certification rulings
    • June 11. Securities fraud class actions appear to be the exception
    • Joel S. Feldman, Simone R. Cruickshank, and Gary J. McGinnis, Evidentiary and Burden of Proof Standards for Class Certification Rulings, 11 BNA Class
    • (2010) BNA Class Action Litig Rep , vol.11 , Issue.536 , pp. 541
    • Feldman, J.S.1    Cruickshank, S.R.2    McGinnis, G.J.3
  • 178
    • 84864440666 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • National Economics Research Associates July 26 (visited Jan 9, 2012)
    • See Jordan Milev, Robert Patton, and Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2011 Mid-Year Review *1 (National Economics Research Associates July 26, 2011), online at http:// www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB-Mid-Year-Trends-0711(3).pdf (visited Jan 9, 2012) (reporting that securities class action filings remained steady and suggesting that "a wave of new cases alleging breach of fiduciary duty in connection with" mergers and acquisitions is the cause).
    • (2011) Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2011 Mid-Year Review , vol.1
    • Milev, J.1    Patton, R.2    Starykh, S.3
  • 180
    • 33646067095 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • State attorney general actions the tobacco litigation and the doctrine of parens patriae
    • See Richard P. Ieyoub and Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 Tulane L Rev 1859, 1863-64 (2000).
    • (2000) Tulane L Rev , vol.74 , Issue.1859 , pp. 1863-1864
    • Ieyoub, R.P.1    Eisenberg, T.2
  • 181
    • 84864446619 scopus 로고
    • US
    • Parens patriae derives from Latin, meaning "parent of the country." Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc v Puerto Rico, 458 US 592, 600 (1982).
    • (1982) Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc v Puerto Rico , vol.458 , Issue.592 , pp. 600
  • 182
    • 79955959559 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An overview
    • See also Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 Tulane L Rev 1847, 1847 (2000).
    • (2000) Tulane L Rev , vol.74 , Issue.1847 , pp. 1847
    • Ratliff, J.1    Patriae, P.2
  • 183
    • 84864440668 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • US at 607
    • Snapp, 458 US at 607.
    • Snapp , vol.458
  • 184
    • 84864434749 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Aggregate litigation goes public: Representative suits by state attorneys general
    • forthcoming (on file with authors)
    • Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 Harvard L Rev *5 (forthcoming 2012) (on file with authors), citing Snapp, 458 US at 608. Lemos interprets Snapp to support parens patriae authority where the state "acts on behalf of 'its residents in general,' rather than 'particular individuals,' asserting a 'general interest' in the welfare of its citizens of the sort that a state might try to 'address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.'"
    • (2012) Harvard L Rev , vol.126 , Issue.5
    • Margaret, H.1    Lemos2
  • 185
    • 84864434750 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (cited in note 171 )
    • Lemos, 126 Harv L Rev *5 (cited in note 171 ).
    • Harv L Rev , vol.126 , pp. 5
    • Lemos1
  • 186
    • 84864434750 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (cited in note 171)
    • Lemos, 126 Harv L Rev *5 (cited in note 171 ).
    • Harv L Rev , vol.126 , pp. 5
    • Lemos1
  • 187
    • 84864474509 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F Supp 809, 812 NDNY noting "[t]here is no numerical talisman to establish parens patriae standing
    • See, for example, People v Peter & John's Pump House, Inc, 914 F Supp 809, 812 (NDNY 1996) (noting "[t]here is no numerical talisman to establish parens patriae standing," and, citing Snapp, 458 US at 607, that "[a]lthough more must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents, the indirect effects of the injury must be considered as well in determining whether the State has alleged injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its population").
    • (1996) People v Peter & John's Pump House, Inc , vol.914
  • 188
    • 84864461116 scopus 로고
    • BR Bankr ED Mich
    • See also In re Sclater, 40 BR 594, 596-97 (Bankr ED Mich 1984) (allowing state to bring claim as parens patriae under state consumer protection law that was silent on AG's authority).
    • (1984) Re Sclater , vol.40 , Issue.594 , pp. 596-597
  • 189
    • 84864440667 scopus 로고
    • US
    • USC § 15c. See also Hawaii v Standard Oil Co of California, 405 US 251, 264 (1972) (insisting on a "clear expression of a congressional purpose" that a state may sue as parens patriae to "recover damages for injury to its general economy" under the Clayton Act)
    • (1972) Hawaii v Standard Oil Co of California , vol.405 , Issue.251 , pp. 264
  • 190
    • 84864461117 scopus 로고
    • F2d 9th Cir (same)
    • California v Frito-Lay, Inc, 474 F2d 774, 777-78 (9th Cir 1973) (same).
    • (1973) California v Frito-Lay, Inc , vol.474 , Issue.774 , pp. 777-778
  • 191
    • 84864440670 scopus 로고
    • Pub L No 94- 435, 90 Stat 1383
    • See Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act § 301, Pub L No 94-435, 90 Stat 1383 (1976), codified in relevant part at 15 USC § 15c (granting state AGs the right to bring treble damages suits on behalf of "natural persons," as opposed to business entities, residing in their states
    • (1976) Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act § 301
  • 192
    • 84864440671 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 94th Cong, 2d Sess (Jan 19, 1976) in 122 Cong Rec S 15974 (daily ed May 28, 1976)
    • See also Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, S 94-803, 94th Cong, 2d Sess (Jan 19, 1976) in 122 Cong Rec S 15974 (daily ed May 28, 1976)
    • Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, S , pp. 94-803
    • Hart-Scott-Rodino1
  • 193
    • 84864485115 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Federalism and concurrent jurisdiction in global markets: Why a combination of national and antitrust enforcement is a model for effective economic regulation
    • Katherine Mason Jones, Federalism and Concurrent Jurisdiction in Global Markets: Why a Combination of National and Antitrust Enforcement Is a Model for Effective Economic Regulation, 30 Nw J Intl L & Bus 285, 295 (2010) ("[T]he purpose of the grant of statutory parens patriae authority to state attorneys general was 'to overcome obstacles to private class actions through enabling state attorneys general to function more efficiently as consumer advocates.'") (citations omitted). One year later, the Supreme Court decided Illinois Brick v Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977), stripping indirect purchasers of standing under federal antitrust laws and eviscerating Congress's earlier empowerment of state AGs. See id at 726-29.
    • (2010) Nw J Intl L & Bus , vol.30 , pp. 295
    • Mason Jones, K.1
  • 194
    • 84864440672 scopus 로고
    • F2d, 7th Cir
    • See, for example, Illinois v Life of Mid-America Insurance Co, 805 F2d 763, 766 (7th Cir 1986) ("[E]ven if the complaint did sufficiently allege an injury to the state in its quasi-sovereign capacity, it is not clear . . . that Congress, in enacting the RICO statute, intended to permit such a parens patriae proceeding.")
    • (1986) Illinois v Life of Mid-America Insurance Co , vol.805 , Issue.763 , pp. 766
  • 195
    • 84864440669 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d, 2d Cir finding that the state was a "non-enumerated part[y] [which] lack[ed] statutory standing" under ERISA).
    • Connecticut v Physicians Health Services of Connecticut, Inc 287 F3d 110 120-21 (2d Cir 2002) (finding that the state was a "non-enumerated part[y] [which] lack[ed] statutory standing" under ERISA).
    • (2002) Connecticut v Physicians Health Services of Connecticut, Inc , vol.287 , Issue.110 , pp. 120-121
  • 196
    • 84864461118 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Pub L No 88- 352, codified at 42 USC §
    • Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253, codified at 42 USC § 2000a et seq.
    • (2000) Stat 253 , vol.78
  • 197
    • 84904201681 scopus 로고
    • Pub L No 90- 284, codified as amended at 42 USC § 3601 et seq
    • Pub L No 90-284, 82 Stat 81 (1968), codified as amended at 42 USC § 3601 et seq.
    • (1968) Stat , vol.82 , pp. 81
  • 198
    • 79955108462 scopus 로고
    • Pub L No 101- 336, codified as amended at 42 USC § 12101 et seq
    • Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990), codified as amended at 42 USC § 12101 et seq.
    • (1990) Stat , vol.104 , pp. 327
  • 199
    • 80052138199 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • State enforcement of federal law
    • See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 NYU L Rev 698, 710-11 (2011).
    • (2011) NYU L Rev , vol.86 , Issue.698 , pp. 710-711
    • Margaret, H.1    Lemos2
  • 200
    • 84864440673 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Eeoc v federal express corp
    • (EDNY 2003) (Title VII)
    • See also EEOC v Federal Express Corp, 268 F Supp 2d 192, 197-98 (EDNY 2003) (Title VII)
    • F Supp 2d , vol.268 , Issue.92 , pp. 197-198
  • 201
    • 84864434751 scopus 로고
    • F2d 3d Cir (42 USC § 1983)
    • Pennsylvania v Porter, 659 F2d 306, 318 (3d Cir 1981) (42 USC § 1983)
    • (1981) Pennsylvania v Porter , vol.659 , Issue.306 , pp. 318
  • 203
    • 84864461119 scopus 로고
    • F Supp,SDNY (Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act)
    • Vacco v Mid Hudson Medical Group, PC 877 F Supp 143 149 (SDNY 1995) (Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act).
    • (1995) Vacco v Mid Hudson Medical Group, PC , vol.877 , Issue.143 , pp. 149
  • 204
    • 84864461120 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d, 7th Cir
    • Courts often recite a litany of five grounds upon which a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement can be deemed bound to arbitrate under that agreement: "(1) assumption; (2) agency; (3) estoppel; (4) veil piercing; and (5) incorporation by reference." Zurich American Insurance Co v Watts Industries, Inc, 417 F3d 682, 687 (7th Cir 2005). Of these, agency is the only potentially applicable ground for assertions that the state AG is bound to class waivers in underlying agreements.
    • (2005) Zurich American Insurance Co v Watts Industries, Inc , vol.417 , Issue.682 , pp. 687
  • 205
    • 84864445509 scopus 로고
    • F3d, 3d Cir
    • See Pritzker v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc, 7 F3d 1110, 1121 (3d Cir 1993) ("Under traditional agency theory, . . . [b]ecause a principal is bound under the terms of a valid arbitration clause, its agents . . . and representatives are also covered under the terms of such agreements.").
    • (1993) Pritzker v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc , vol.7 , Issue.1110 , pp. 1121
  • 206
    • 42949102547 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Note, from georgia v. Tennessee copper to massachusetts v. EPA: Parens patriae
    • Georgetown L J
    • See Sara Zdeb, Note, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v. EPA: Parens Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintiffs, 96 Georgetown L J 1059, 1068 (2008) ("Parens patriae originated as an English common law doctrine which allowed the Crown to assert the rights of subjects who were incapacitated.").
    • (2008) Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintiffs , vol.96 , Issue.1059 , pp. 1068
    • Zdeb, S.1
  • 208
    • 84864434748 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • WL 2474634 (ED Pa): In the absence of an agreement between DAK and Azuna or evidence that DAK had control or supervision over Azuna, the Court cannot conclude that there is an agency relationship binding DAK to an agreement to arbitrate entered into by Azuna
    • See also Azuna, LLC v Netpia.com, Inc, 2009 WL 2474634, *3 (ED Pa): In the absence of an agreement between DAK and Azuna or evidence that DAK had control or supervision over Azuna, the Court cannot conclude that there is an agency relationship binding DAK to an agreement to arbitrate entered into by Azuna. Therefore, DAK is not bound by the arbitration agreement under an agency theory.
    • (2009) Azuna, LLC v Netpia.com, Inc , pp. 3
  • 209
    • 84864474512 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (cited in note 171 )
    • As Lemos points out in a related context, "parens patriae group members have no ability to replace the attorney general as their representative if they are displeased with his work." Lemos, 126 Harv L Rev at *14 (cited in note 171 ).
    • Harv L Rev at *14 , vol.126
    • Lemos1
  • 211
    • 84864474510 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A2d DC
    • See, for example, Boyle v Giral, 820 A2d 561, 566-67 (DC 2003) (affirming settlement of a parens patriae suit where defendants "vigorously attack[ed] the cy pres distribution approved by the trial court, and contend[ed] that D.C.Code § 28-4507(b)(2)(B) 'mandates' that members of the consumer class receive direct monetary relief," and finding that the trial court exercised properly its discretion in awarding cy pres where "[i]t would be utterly impracticable for the [s]ettlement to provide individual compensation to the [c]onsumer [s]ettlement [c]lass members").
    • (2003) Boyle v Giral , vol.820 , Issue.561 , pp. 566-567
  • 212
    • 84864437702 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Antitrust, Spring
    • See also Albert A. Foer, Enhancing Competition through the Cy Pres Remedy: Suggested Best Practices, 24 Antitrust 86, 87 (Spring 2010): Some courts in parens patriae cases have ordered the entire damage award to be used for public interest purposes, such as education with respect to the industry in which liability was established, even though the consumers on whose behalf the case was brought did not recover their actual damages. In other instances, cy pres distributions have been ordered to be used by state attorneys general to fund antitrust enforcement. (citation omitted).
    • (2010) Enhancing Competition Through the Cy Pres Remedy: Suggested Best Practices , vol.24 , Issue.86 , pp. 87
    • Albert, A.1    Foer2
  • 213
    • 78751512036 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Note, sheep in wolves' clothing: Removing parens patriae
    • Colum L Rev 121, 122
    • See Alexander Lemann, Note, Sheep in Wolves' Clothing: Removing Parens Patriae Suits under the Class Action Fairness Act, 111 Colum L Rev 121, 122 n 9, 134 (2011) (citing cases rejecting the argument that parens patriae suits should be treated as class actions for purposes of CAFA removal).
    • (2011) Suits under the Class Action Fairness Act , vol.111 , Issue.9 , pp. 134
    • Lemann, A.1
  • 214
    • 84864421288 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • daily ed Feb 9
    • See, for example, id at 424, quoting 151 Cong Rec S 1163-64 (daily ed Feb 9, 2005) (Sen Hatch): If this legislation enables State attorneys general to keep all class actions in State court, it will not take long for plaintiffs' lawyers to figure out that all they need to do to avoid the impact of [CAFA] is to persuade a State attorney general to simply lend the name of his or her office to a private class action.
    • (2005) 151 Cong Rec S , pp. 1163-1164
  • 215
    • 84864423963 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Are parens patriae suits just class actions in disguise?
    • Feb 21 (visited Jan 9, 2012)
    • See also McGlinchey Stafford PLLC, Are Parens Patriae Suits Just Class Actions in Disguise?, CAFA Law Blog (Feb 21, 2011), online at http://www.cafalawblog.com/legal-publications-and-articles-are-parens-patriae- suits-just-class-actions-in-disguise.html (visited Jan 9, 2012).
    • (2011) CAFA Law Blog
    • Stafford Pllc, M.1
  • 216
    • 84864423962 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d at 320
    • See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F3d at 320.
    • Hydrogen Peroxide , vol.552
  • 217
    • 84864474514 scopus 로고
    • F2d, 9th Cir
    • Courts generally hold that res judicata, in the aggregate litigation context, applies only where the potentially barred party was given notice and the opportunity to opt out. See Brown v Ticor Title Insurance Co, 982 F2d 386, 390 (9th Cir 1992) ("[I]f the plaintiff was not adequately represented in the prior action or there was a denial of due process, then the prior decision has no preclusive effect.").
    • (1992) Brown v Ticor Title Insurance Co , vol.982 , Issue.386 , pp. 390
  • 218
    • 84864432249 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • SW3d, Tex
    • See Farmers Group, Inc v Lubin, 222 SW3d 417, 425 (Tex 2007).
    • (2007) Farmers Group, Inc v Lubin , vol.222 , Issue.417 , pp. 425
  • 219
    • 84864422815 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Columbia Law School State Attorney General Project *2-7 Oct 31 (visited Jan 9, 2012) (discussing differences in resources among state AG offices)
    • See Peter J. Brann, State Attorneys General Consumer Protection Under a New Administration: New Opportunities and New Challenges, Columbia Law School State Attorney General Project *2-7 (Oct 31, 2008), online at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null? &exclusive=filemgr.download&file-id= 55833&rtcontentdispositi (visited Jan 9, 2012) (discussing differences in resources among state AG offices).
    • (2008) State Attorneys General Consumer Protection under A New Administration: New Opportunities and New Challenges
    • Peter, J.1    Brann2
  • 220
    • 84864474513 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (cited in note 184 )
    • See Lemos, 86 NYU L Rev at 761 (cited in note 184 ) ("[S]tate attorneys general face resource constraints that limit the scope of possible enforcement actions.")
    • NYU L Rev at 761 , vol.86
    • Lemos1
  • 221
    • 84864474515 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Attorney general of ohio
    • June 29 (visited Jan 9, 2012)
    • Marc Dann, Attorney General of Ohio, Address to the City Club of Cleveland *5 (June 29, 2007), online at http://www.legalnewsline.com/ content/img/f197459/dannspeech.pdf (visited Jan 9, 2012) ("[Industry groups] know that public officials don't have the resources to finance complicated law suits [sic] that often take years to work their way through the courts.")
    • (2007) Address to the City Club of Cleveland , pp. 5
    • Dann, M.1
  • 222
    • 84864446596 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Rethinking the public-private distinction in legal ethics: The case of "substitute" attorneys general
    • David B. Wilkins, Rethinking the Public-Private Distinction in Legal Ethics: The Case of "Substitute" Attorneys General, 2010 Mich St L Rev 423, 431 ("[D]efendants in [complex class actions] have deep pockets and are capable of hiring the best legal talent can buy to wear down their opponents, even when that opponent is the state.").
    • (2010) Mich St L Rev , Issue.423 , pp. 431
    • David, B.1    Wilkins2
  • 223
    • 84864472693 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • When caught with your hand in the cookie jar . . . Argue standing
    • See Jay L. Himes, When Caught with Your Hand in the Cookie Jar . . . Argue Standing, 41 Rutgers L J 187, 217 (2009) ("[I]n recent years, the states' major pharmaceutical-drug antitrust cases have followed on-going private litigations and were generally settled along with the private actions.")
    • (2009) Rutgers L J , vol.41 , Issue.187 , pp. 217
    • Jay, L.1    Himes2
  • 224
    • 84864440675 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • No 01-CV-11401 SDNY Mar 7
    • Settlement Agreement between Plaintiff States and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co, Watson Pharma, Inc and Danbury Pharmacal, Inc Regarding Buspar, In re Buspirone Litigation, No 01-CV-11401 (SDNY Mar 7, 2003) (establishing that state AGs settled multistate monopolization action against pharmaceutical companies, together with private class actions, for $100 million and injunctive relief)
    • (2003) Re Buspirone Litigation
  • 225
    • 84864440674 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • F3d, 6th Cir
    • In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 481 F3d 355, 357 (6th Cir 2007) (noting that fifty-two state AGs filed their own multistate action after the FTC and private class actions had been initiated).
    • (2007) Re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation , vol.481 , Issue.355 , pp. 357
  • 227
    • 84864483626 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (cited in note 205 )
    • Wilkins, 2010 Mich St L Rev at 427 (cited in note 205 ) ("Given both shrinking state budgets and the growing list of potential big-ticket claims involving alleged harms to consumers or the environment, the number of Attorneys General seeking to create [contingency fee] arrangements of this kind will, in all likelihood, only increase.").
    • (2010) Mich St L Rev at 427
    • Wilkins1
  • 228
    • 84961820088 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Private contingent fee lawyers and public power: Constitutional and political implications
    • Id (noting that while defendants have argued that AGs lacked "the statutory or constitutional authority to delegate [ ] public duties to these private parties," AGs have generally been able to defeat these arguments). But see Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: Constitutional and Political Implications, 18 Sup Ct Econ Rev 77, 101-06 (2010) (asserting constitutional problems with AGs hiring private counsel on contingency).
    • (2010) Sup Ct Econ Rev , vol.18 , Issue.77 , pp. 101-106
    • Redish, M.H.1
  • 229
    • 84864483626 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (cited in note 205 )
    • See Wilkins, 2010 Mich St L Rev at 426 (cited in note 205 ) (describing various instances of state AGs hiring private counsel on contingency and noting that "in recent years, arrangements of this kind have become increasingly common").
    • (2010) Mich St L Rev at 426
    • Wilkins1
  • 230
    • 84864440676 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • P3d (Cal 2010), cert denied, 131 S Ct 920
    • See, for example, County of Santa Clara v Superior Court, 235 P3d 21, 36 (Cal 2010), cert denied, 131 S Ct 920 (2011) (upholding contract where the county hired outside counsel on contingency in public nuisance actions against lead paint manufacturers because "neutral, conflict-free government attorneys retain[ed] the power to control and supervise the litigation"); State v Lead Industries Association, Inc, 951 A2d 428, 477 (RI 2008) (upholding legality of contingency fee agreement between state and outside counsel where AG maintains "absolute control" over the litigation). David Wilkins argues that contingency fee arrangements are superior to hourly fee arrangements: [E]ven if a state or municipality were able to find lawyers with the requisite expertise and experience who were willing to work for an hourly rate that the government was willing or able to pay, officials would still have to fund the significant up-front costs and expenses that often are required to mount cases of this kind out of public coffers.
    • (2011) County of Santa Clara v Superior Court , vol.235 , Issue.21 , pp. 36
  • 232
    • 84864427374 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • WL 4166238, *1 (ED Cal)
    • For cases upholding contingency fee agreements between AGs and private counsel, see City of Grass Valley v Newmont Mining Corp, 2007 WL 4166238, *1 (ED Cal)
    • (2007) City of Grass Valley v Newmont Mining Corp
  • 235
    • 84864423964 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • NW2d 139, ND
    • State v Hagerty, 580 NW2d 139, 148 (ND 1998)
    • (1998) State v Hagerty , vol.580 , pp. 148
  • 236
    • 84864461123 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • WL 684860, *8 (Mo Ct App)
    • Kinder v Nixon, 2000 WL 684860, *8 (Mo Ct App).
    • (2000) Kinder v Nixon
  • 237
    • 84864461124 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Pub L No 104- 67 Stat 737
    • The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub L No 104-67, 109 Stat 737, codified in various sections of Title 15, provides that the lead plaintiff-the class member with the largest claimed loss who seeks the position-shall "select and retain counsel to represent the class." PSLRA § 27, 15 USC § 77z-1. The PSLRA "transformed the lead plaintiff process from a 'race to the courthouse' to an orderly procedure."
    • The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) , vol.109
  • 238
    • 78649539292 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Is "pay-to-play" driving public pension fund activism in securities class actions? An empirical study
    • David H. Webber, Is "Pay-to-Play" Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 BU L Rev 2031, 2038 (2010).
    • (2010) BU L Rev 2031 , vol.2038
    • Webber, D.H.1
  • 239
    • 84864423966 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • FRD, SDNY
    • See, for example, In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation, 197 FRD 71, 75 (SDNY 2000). The lead counsel selection process has been described as: [T]ypically occur[ing] in one of two ways, neither of which necessarily leads to an optimal outcome. Often, interested counsel jockey for the lead counsel position, leaving the court to choose one of the contenders, sometimes with little guidance. . . . Alternatively, the plaintiffs' lawyers negotiate among themselves to select lead counsel or a team of lead counsel, and the choice is presented as a fait accompli for the court summarily to endorse. Id. The court added that "[g]iven the potential for massive plaintiffs' recoveries in such cases, the lead counsel position may involve a potentially large attorney's fee. The role therefore has become a coveted prize to be fought over or bargained for among competing plaintiff's attorneys." Id.
    • (2000) Re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation , vol.197 , Issue.71 , pp. 75
  • 240
    • 84864423967 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (cited in note 7 )
    • On this point, Samuel Issacharoff observes that this model places AGs in the role of gatekeeper and warns that, sooner or later, gatekeepers tend to become toll collectors. See Email from Samuel Issacharoff, Professor at New York University School of Law, to Myriam Gilles, August 2011 (on file with authors). In a general sense, this is surely correct-and it corroborates our, and Issacharoff's, strong preference for broad-based private enforcement. See Gilles, 100 Colum L Rev at 1414-24 (cited in note 7 ). But the point here is that the broad-based private enforcement option is off the table after Concepcion.
    • Colum L Rev at 1414-24 , vol.100
    • Gilles1
  • 241
    • 13744258776 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Doing good, doing well
    • Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 Vand L Rev 2087, 2103 (2004).
    • (2004) Vand L Rev 2087 , vol.57 , pp. 2103
    • Erichson, H.M.1
  • 243
    • 84864422933 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Consumer watchdog: Ex-ohio ag is a smart choice for key agency
    • July 25 Mr. Cordray's reputation as a consumer advocate is that he's tough, smart and honest. As Ohio attorney general, he successfully sued financial giants Bank of America and American International Group. And he took on the major securities-rating agencies)
    • See, for example, Editorial, Consumer Watchdog: Ex-Ohio AG Is a Smart Choice for Key Agency, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette B6 (July 25, 2011) ("Mr. Cordray's reputation as a consumer advocate is that he's tough, smart and honest. As Ohio attorney general, he successfully sued financial giants Bank of America and American International Group. And he took on the major securities-rating agencies.")
    • (2011) Pittsburgh Post-Gazette B6
  • 244
    • 84864469990 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Deal offers mortgage relief for thousands
    • Aug 10 announcing the $125 million settlement reached by AG Martha Coakley with mortgage companies engaged in fraudulent practices)
    • See, for example, DC Denison, Deal Offers Mortgage Relief for Thousands, Boston Globe B7 (Aug 10, 2011) (announcing the $125 million settlement reached by AG Martha Coakley with mortgage companies engaged in fraudulent practices)
    • (2011) Boston Globe B7
    • Denison, D.C.1
  • 247
    • 84864451558 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • NY Times A1 Oct 15
    • See, for example, Barry Meier and Richard A. Oppel Jr, States' Big Suits against Industry Bring Battle on Contingency Fees, NY Times A1 (Oct 15, 1999): The staggering fees prompted public uproar, particularly in Texas, where one lawyer, Marc D. Murr of Houston, who appeared to play little role in the litigation, sought $260 million in fees. Faced by a state investigation, Mr. Murr, whose request was supported by the former Texas Attorney General who hired him, backed down.
    • (1999) States' Big Suits Against Industry Bring Battle on Contingency Fees
    • Meier, B.1    Richard Jr., A.O.2
  • 248
    • 84864434990 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • NY Times at A1 (cited in note 221 ): As part of a business counteroffensive against the trend, the United States Chamber of Commerce will soon begin an intensive lobbying campaign to get legislatures to drastically restrict states' use of contingency lawyers. . . . Republican lawmakers with the backing of business groups passed legislation [in Texas] requiring the State Attorney General to have contingency-fee contracts approved by a board appointed by top state officials. Legal fees could not exceed $4,000 an hour
    • See also Meier and Oppel, States' Big Suits against Industry Bring Battle on Contingency Fees, NY Times at A1 (cited in note 221 ): As part of a business counteroffensive against the trend, the United States Chamber of Commerce will soon begin an intensive lobbying campaign to get legislatures to drastically restrict states' use of contingency lawyers. . . . Republican lawmakers with the backing of business groups passed legislation [in Texas] requiring the State Attorney General to have contingency-fee contracts approved by a board appointed by top state officials. Legal fees could not exceed $4,000 an hour.
    • States' Big Suits Against Industry Bring Battle on Contingency Fees
  • 249
    • 84864422934 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 3 CFR § 217 May 16
    • Executive Order 13433, 3 CFR § 217 (May 16, 2007).
    • (2007) Executive Order 13433
  • 251
    • 84864443966 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Judicial hellholes, lawsuit climates and bad social science: Lessons from west virginia
    • Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social Science: Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W Va L Rev 1097, 1127 (2008)
    • (2008) W Va L Rev , vol.110 , Issue.1097
    • Elizabeth, G.T.1
  • 252
    • 84864422932 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Pro-business groups invest in races for attorney general
    • Oct 29 reporting that businesses fearing "activist" AGs spent millions to try to have them unseated
    • Jonathan D. Salant, Pro-business Groups Invest in Races for Attorney General, Wash Post A6 (Oct 29, 2006) (reporting that businesses fearing "activist" AGs spent millions to try to have them unseated)
    • (2006) Wash Post A6
    • Jonathan, D.S.1
  • 253
    • 84864469986 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • July 21
    • Robert Lenzner and Matthew Miller, Buying Justice, Forbes (July 21, 2003), online at http://www.forbes.com/free-forbes/2003/0721/064.html (visited Jan 10, 2012) (reporting that the US Chamber of Commerce spent "$100 million since 2000" in campaigns "taking aim at state attorneys general," and had "prevailed in 11 attorney general races").
    • (2003) Buying Justice Forbes
    • Lenzner, R.1    Miller, M.2
  • 255
    • 84899023447 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The evolving civil justice reform movement: Procedural reforms have gained steam, but critics still focus on arguments of the past
    • providing examples of possible improprieties by Kansas and Texas state AGs
    • Mark A. Behrens and Andrew W. Crouse, The Evolving Civil Justice Reform Movement: Procedural Reforms Have Gained Steam, but Critics Still Focus on Arguments of the Past, 31 U Dayton L Rev 173, 180-81 (2006) (providing examples of possible improprieties by Kansas and Texas state AGs)
    • (2006) U Dayton L Rev , vol.31 , pp. 180-181
    • Behrens, M.A.1    Crouse, A.W.2
  • 256
    • 84864469984 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (visited Jan 10, 2012) (citing numerous examples of AGs awarding contingency fee contracts to campaign contributors) US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform Oct 14
    • John Fund, Cash In, Contracts Out: The Relationship between State Attorneys General and the Plaintiffs' Bar 6-11, US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (Oct 14, 2004), online at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com /get-ilr-doc.php?id=820 (visited Jan 10, 2012) (citing numerous examples of AGs awarding contingency fee contracts to campaign contributors).
    • (2004) Cash In, Contracts Out: The Relationship between State Attorneys General and the Plaintiffs' Bar , pp. 6-11
    • Fund, J.1
  • 258
    • 84864451562 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • (visited Jan 10, 2012) Sept 22
    • Lisa Rickard, State Attorneys General and the CFPA, Free Enterprise (Sept 22, 2009), online at http://freeenterprise.com/2009/09/state-attorneys-general- and-the-cfpa.html (visited Jan 10, 2012): While the [US] Chamber [of Commerce] has a number of serious concerns about the proposed Consumer Financial Protection Act, not least among them is the probability of increased litigation from some state attorneys general, who, with new federal authority to enforce the CFPA, will be hiring private plaintiffs' lawyers on contingency fee contracts.
    • (2009) State Attorneys General and the CFPA, Free Enterprise
    • Rickard, L.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.