Executive Behavior: A Creditor Perspective on Managerial Ownership

Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 427-450

  Anderson, Ronald ^a   Mansi, Sattar ^b   Reeb, David ^c  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c TEMPLE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Debt payment; Firm stakeholder; Managerial equity stake; Marketing failure; Organizational commitment

Indexed keywords

EID: 84886111665     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9781118258439.ch22     Document Type: Chapter

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