Incentive alignment, control, and the issue of misleading financial disclosures

Journal of Management

Volumn 33, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 547-569

  Donoher, William J ^a   Reed, Richard ^b   Storrud Barnes, Susan F ^c  

^a MISSOURI STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Boards; Compensation; Governance; Incentives; Misleading disclosures

Indexed keywords

EID: 34447620346     PISSN: 01492063     EISSN: 15571211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0149206307302550     Document Type: Article

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