Avoiding lying: The case of delegated deception

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 93, Issue , 2013, Pages 273-278

  Erat, Sanjiv ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Lying; Principal agent

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884411132     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.035     Document Type: Article

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