Behavioral law and economics

Behavioral Economics and Its Applications

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 115-156

  Jolls, Christine ^a,b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884102400     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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