The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy

Review of International Organizations

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 313-341

  Milner, Helen V ^a   Tingley, Dustin ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Domestic politics; Foreign aid; International institutions; Multilateralism; Public opinion

Indexed keywords

EID: 84883799886     PISSN: 15597431     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-012-9153-x     Document Type: Article

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