The rationality of splitting equally

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 365-381

  Bolton, Gary E ^a  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Evolutionary game theory; Fairness

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031094095     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(96)00026-1     Document Type: Article

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