Applications of agency theory in B2B marketing: Review and future directions

Handbook of Business-to-Business Marketing

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 41-53

  Banerjee, Ranjan ^a   Bergen, Mark ^b   Dutta, Shantanu ^c   Ray, Sourav ^d  

^a Group COO of Insta Worldwide   (India)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^d MCMASTER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881859228     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781781002445.00011     Document Type: Chapter

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