Experimental evidence for agency models of salesforce compensation

Marketing Science

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2000, Pages 348-365

  Ghosh, Mrinal ^a   John, George ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency Theory; Experimental Economics; Sales Compensation; Salesforce

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034257396     PISSN: 07322399     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mksc.19.4.348.11792     Document Type: Article

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